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Summary 
 
By using genealogy, this study analyzes the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship, which has constituted the power relationship 
between trustees and target societies and fields of intervention of power in 
international society. This dispositive has been reproduced from the colonial 
period to the present. However, this study does not attempt a complete 
history of humanitarianism and trusteeship. Its aim is to follow the 
formation and reproduction of power relations in international society. In 
this study, ‘trusteeship’ refers to a relation of inequality and a field of 
intervention, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. Thus, 
the concept of trusteeship includes various practices such as colonial 
administration, development assistance, and transitional administration. 
Equally, the category of ‘humanitarianism’ also includes practices such as 
protection from anarchy, relief from oppression, and freedom from poverty, 
which are above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. Examining IR 
theories which employ genealogy, this study adopts sociological genealogy as 
a methodology. Previous studies on new trusteeship tend to presume that 
new trusteeship is rooted only in liberal internationalism. However, this 
study argues that it is underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but 
iii 
 
 
 
also by humanitarian discourse. Furthermore, some existing works on 
humanitarian intervention and new trusteeship presume that there are two 
kinds of humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and 
‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ The former means that politics is just 
a tool for humanitarian purposes; and the latter means that humanitarian 
discourse is a convenient cloak for political interests. This dichotomy leads to 
the distinction between ‘good trusteeship embodying humanitarianism’ and 
‘bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism.’ This study aims to show that 
this dichotomy is highly questionable and to indicate the co-constitutive 
nature of trusteeship and humanitarianism. The language of trusteeship 
harks back to the colonial period even while the humanitarianism of today 
tends to reject political and colonial content. While trusteeship requires 
strong moral justification, humanitarianism contributes to the constitution 
of trusteeship when it attempts to alleviate human suffering. Although 
humanitarianism has represented trusteeship as universal and impartial, 
trusteeship has tended to expand and defend the interests of particular 
communities in international society. This study indicates the inherent 
danger of trusteeship and humanitarianism.  
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Introduction 
 
 International territorial administrations in Cambodia (1992), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1995), Eastern Slavonia (1995), Kosovo (1999) and East 
Timor (1999) demonstrated the unequal relationship between international 
peacebuilders and target societies in that the former governed the latter 
without democratic legitimacy. This relationship is eerily similar to the 
relationship between colonizers and colonized in terms of paternalism. 
Equally, the relationship between donor countries (developed countries) and 
recipient countries (developing countries) in development aid might be put in 
the same category. Since the colonial period, this kind of unequal 
relationship has been reproduced. Northern countries have demonstrated a 
tendency to intervene in Southern countries. How have fields of intervention 
of power been formed in international society? When did it emerge? What 
contributes to the reproduction of these unequal relations? 
 This study starts from the hypothesis that the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship has reproduced relations of inequality and 
facilitated intervention. The meaning of ‘trusteeship’ in this study is 
different from that of trusteeship in the historical study of the British 
Empire. According to Andrew Porter, the idea of trusteeship is the idea ‘of a 
responsibility to contribute to the protection, welfare and advancement of 
non-Europeans caught up in the growth of British influence and control’ 
(Porter 1988: 36). On the other hand, the term of ‘trusteeship’ in this study 
refers to a relation of inequality, rather than a specific or particular 
historical practice. The concept of trusteeship includes various practices such 
as colonial administration, development assistance, and transitional 
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administration. In trusteeship, trustees intervene in target societies (wards) 
using various tactics. However, this intervention is not just based on military 
power; rather, it is legitimized through manipulation of the representations 
of target societies. Humanitarianism contributes to this manipulation by 
representing target societies as suffering from pathologies, such as 
savageness, violence, poverty, and conflicts. I name this process 
‘pathologization.’ By the concept of ‘pathologization,’ I attempt to describe a 
process in which humanitarianism attributes root causes of human suffering 
to the nature of target societies. Subsequently, humanitarianism prepares 
‘prescriptions’ to address the root causes of human suffering. Trusteeship has 
been established in the relationship between trustees and target societies. 
Pathologization constitutes this relationship. And trusteeship has been 
embodied in the prescriptions. The concept of ‘humanitarianism’ thus is not 
just the direct relief of suffering. (However, I do not mean that 
humanitarianism has always contributed to the construction of power 
relations. Rather, humanitarianism can operate without relations of 
domination or undermining sovereignty when it does not have the ambition 
of removing the root causes of suffering and is not involved in 
pathologization.)  
 While humanitarianism contributes to the constitution of trusteeship 
by pathologization, trusteeship deeply influences the forms of 
humanitarianism. Pathologization has often been affected by the culture and 
socio-political systems of the powerful, who are in a position to dispense 
benefits to others. And when humanitarianism constitutes prescriptions for 
pathology, it tends to exploit power relations in international society. In this 
sense, trusteeship and humanitarianism are mutually constitutive.  
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The relationship between humanitarianism and politics has been a 
major question for IR theorists since humanitarian intervention started to 
attract their attention. Many existing works on humanitarian intervention 
and new trusteeship tend to presume that there are two kinds of 
humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and 
‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ The former means that politics is just 
a tool for humanitarian purposes; and the latter means that humanitarian 
discourse is a convenient cloak for political interests. This dichotomy leads to 
the distinction between ‘good trusteeship embodying humanitarianism’ and 
‘bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism.’ This study aims to show that 
this dichotomy is highly questionable and to indicate the co-constitutive 
nature of trusteeship and humanitarianism. 
Humanitarianism and trusteeship have altered their forms across 
space and time. In the 19th century, trusteeship was actualized as colonial 
administration (colonial trusteeship). Around the time of the First World War, 
trusteeship was internationalized (internationalization of trusteeship). In 
the 1940s, colonial trusteeship was transformed into development 
trusteeship. And in the late 20th century, it was embodied as peacebuilding 
(peacebuilding trusteeship or new trusteeship). Equally, in the 19th century, 
humanitarianism identified savageness as a pathology of dependent societies, 
and since the 1940s, it has interpreted poverty as a pathology of Southern 
countries. After the Cold War, Southern countries were represented as 
suffering from internal and regional conflicts. Despite the transformation of 
their forms, humanitarianism and trusteeship have continuously composed 
the dispositive which constitutes relations of inequality and facilitates 
intervention.  
４ 
 
 
 
 In order to prove this claim, this study traces the history of the 
dispositive of trusteeship and humanitarianism from the 19th century to the 
present, drawing on the insights of Michel Foucault’s critical theory. 
Foucault developed genealogical analysis for the purpose of the revelation of 
power relations after he realized that his archeological analysis was not 
suitable for this intention. As David Campbell argues, genealogy ‘seeks to 
trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, gained importance, and 
effected politics’ (Campbell 1992: 5). The aim of genealogy is not to write ‘true’ 
history but to demonstrate ‘the heterogeneity of what was imagined 
consistent with itself ’ (Foucault 1980a: 147). It is ‘to recognize the events of 
history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats 
– the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities’ (Foucault 1984: 80). 
Thereby, it is possible to deconstruct the normative authority of 
universalized and naturalized power structure.  
 In genealogical analysis, Foucault focused on ‘dispositive.’ Dispositive 
was explained by himself as the following:  
 
‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term [dispositive] is, firstly, a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral 
and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid. Such are the elements of the [dispositive]. The [dispositive] 
itself is the system of relations that can be established between these 
elements.’ (Foucault 1980b: 194) 
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Power relations in a society are constituted not only by discourse but also by 
non-discursive practice. The concept of dispositive can shed light on this 
structure. By using this concept, this study analyzes the formation of 
relations of inequality and fields of intervention in international society. The 
main aim of this study is to demonstrate that humanitarianism and 
trusteeship have formed the dispositive that reappears cyclically and 
changes its form across space and time, reproducing relations of inequality 
and facilitating intervention via pathologization and prescription. However, 
the aim of the genealogical analysis of dispositive is not a causal analysis but 
to allow a reflective approach to intervention. 
 According to Foucault, genealogy is a ‘history of present’ which 
‘explicitly and self-reflectively begins with a diagnosis of the current 
situation’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 119). The central concern of this study 
is the power relations of peacebuilding and its origin. As stated above, this 
study suggests the hypothesis that humanitarianism and trusteeship have 
comprised the dispositive that reproduced relations of inequality and 
facilitated intervention. This study will show that the power relations of 
peacebuilding are also underpinned by the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship.  
The history of the relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism began in the 19th century. The dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship developed in the British Empire which 
possessed various colonies in India and Africa. As Ch. 2 will argue, India was 
a case of existing rule that subsequently required humanitarianism as 
justification. Its justification marked the beginning of the relationship 
between trusteeship and humanitarianism. The Indian population was 
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considered oppressed by indigenous despotism and savage religion. 
Therefore, the liberation of the population from such oppression by 
modernization was suggested. After this enterprise failed in the Mutiny, the 
justification of colonial trusteeship changed. Instead of liberation, the 
protection of Indian indigenous society from ‘anarchy’ was advocated as a 
new justification of trusteeship. 
 In contrast, African colonies were not administrated by the British 
Empire during the 19th century, though nominally colonized on the map. 
However, European traders and colonists had already come to African coasts 
and had contacts with native people. As the slave trade and invasion of 
native communities by European colonists increased, the anti-slavery 
movement and the native protection movement began in Europe. As Ch. 3 
will argue, British humanitarians such as anti-slavery activists and native 
protection activists attempted to put native communities under the British 
Empire in order to protect native people from slave traders and European 
colonists. They were intentionally and unintentionally strengthening British 
colonial rule in Africa. Thus, humanitarianism contributed to the 
constitution of trusteeship.  
 Around the time of the First World War, as Ch.4 will argue, the 
legitimacy of colonial empires was undermined by accusations of the abuse of 
native peoples by intellectuals and politicians. However, these critics of 
empire did not cast doubt on the necessity of trusteeship, presuming that 
non-European people needed security for life and civilization. As colonial 
empires had abused the human dignity of native populations, the critics of 
empire claimed that international trusteeship was better in humanitarian 
terms. Moreover, humanitarians who accused colonial empires of abusing the 
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human dignity of native people strengthened the theology of indirect rule by 
linking it to incipient cultural relativism. Thus, in this period, colonial 
trusteeship was criticized and, at the same time, reproduced. 
 As Ch. 5 will discuss, during the 1940s the idea of colonial 
trusteeship had to be revised because it met bitter resistance from local 
societies in colonies and heavy criticism from outside. As a result, the idea of 
development trusteeship emerged in the British Empire. Development 
trusteeship was characterized by the discourse of ‘poverty,’ a kind of 
humanitarian discourse, and expected to contribute to the reestablishment 
of legitimacy. Subsequently, international aid donors such as the World Bank 
in the 1960s inherited development trusteeship and expanded their power in 
developing countries by using the discourse of poverty. In this way, 
humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of development trusteeship 
in this period.  
 Ch. 6 will analyze the process in which the discourse and practice of 
peacebuilding trusteeship appeared in the early 1990s. After the Cold War, 
Southern countries were pathologized through the notions of ‘failed states,’ 
‘civil wars,’ and violence itself. All these notions were interpreted as internal 
to Southern countries. This pathologization led to new prescriptions such as 
liberal peacebuilding and responsibility to protect. These discourses of 
peacebuilding trusteeship were underpinned not only by liberal 
internationalism but also by humanitarianism. On the other hand, while the 
practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was also underpinned by 
humanitarianism, it was affected by the geopolitical interests of big powers. 
The peace keeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia is considered as the first 
case of large scale territorial administration in the 1990s. In this case, 
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peacebuilding trusteeship had not been conducted until the end of the Cold 
War because of the geopolitical interests of big powers, despite mass murder 
by the Khmer Rouge. However, when peacebuilding trusteeship was 
established in the early 1990s, it required justification through 
humanitarian discourse because transitional administration by the UN was 
undemocratic. Similarly, in the Bosnian and Kosovo cases, international 
peacebuilders provided governing functions in the transitional 
administration. These undemocratic regimes were also underpinned not only 
by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarian discourse. However, it 
did not mean that they were free from the geopolitical interests of big 
powers. 
 To tell the story of the co-constitutive nature of trusteeship and 
humanitarianism in this way means to argue against presumptions of 
previous studies on new trusteeship. It is presumed that new trusteeship has 
been underpinned only by liberal internationalism and that trusteeship can 
be classified into two categories: good trusteeship embodying 
humanitarianism and bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism. This study 
will argue that trusteeship has to some extent been underpinned and 
constituted by humanitarian discourse. However, as this study will indicate, 
when humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship, it was 
political. Humanitarianism has often been affected by the culture and 
socio-political systems of the powerful, who are in a position to dispense 
benefits to others. Therefore, it is questionable to separate good trusteeship 
from bad trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism.  
Before proceeding, four caveats are needed. First, I do not attempt a 
complete history of humanitarianism and trusteeship. Rather, this study is 
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episodic like Foucault’s genealogy. Also, the main aim of this study is not to 
explore the transformation of the meanings of ‘trusteeship’ and 
‘humanitarianism.’ Rather, it is to analyze the generation and development 
of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Therefore, a complete 
history of humanitarianism and trusteeship is not necessary. Second, this 
study does not intend to provide comprehensive policy evaluation. Although 
this study will analyze the policy discourses of development and 
peacebuilding, it will not examine the results of these policies. Rather, my 
main aim is to explicate the historical constitution of the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship. Third, the goal of this study is not to suggest 
any alternative policy of new trusteeship. Rather, it aims to show how the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has been reproduced in 
international society. Fourth, as stated above, the aim of this study is not a 
causal analysis. Rather, by focusing on the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship, this study seeks to allow a reflective approach 
to intervention. 
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Ch. 1 Towards a Genealogy of the Dispositive of 
Humanitarianism/Trusteeship 
 
 Before starting the analysis, this chapter will review previous studies 
and establish a framework for the analysis. The first half of this chapter will 
show the missing link and hidden assumptions of previous studies. Debates 
about new trusteeship have focused on the ‘liberal internationalism’ of the 
new trusteeship. Not only proponents of new trusteeship but also its critics 
argue that new trusteeship is premised on the framework of liberal 
internationalism. However, this study will argue that new trusteeship is 
underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by 
humanitarianism. Proponents of new trusteeship tend to justify new 
trusteeship by referring to the humanitarian aspects of new trusteeship. 
Moreover, they implicitly presume that trusteeship can be classified into two 
categories – good trusteeship and bad trusteeship – according to its 
relationship with humanitarianism. This study will argue that this 
assumption is seriously debatable. The second half of this chapter will 
establish a framework for the analysis to follow the formation and 
development of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. It will 
reexamine the genealogical approach in IR studies and introduce the 
concepts of ‘pathologization,’ ‘prescription,’ and ‘circular process of 
trusteeship.’  
 
 
1. A Missing Link and Hidden Assumptions in Previous Studies 
1-1 Humanitarianism as a Missing Link 
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 International peacebuilders were provided governing functions in 
some large scale peacebuilding operations (transitional administration) in 
the 1990s. These operations are named ‘new trusteeship’ because of the 
unequal relationship between international peacebuilders and target 
societies and the supreme authority of international peacebuilders. Liberal 
peacebuilding theorists have argued that new trusteeship is underpinned by 
liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism presumes that ‘a liberal 
international peace evolves through the political and economic liberalization 
of states combined with global trade, international cooperation and respect 
for international law’ (Richmond 2009: 590). Roland Paris states that;  
 
‘A single paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the 
work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The 
central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest 
foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market 
democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented 
economy.’ (Paris 1997: 56) 
 
John Heathershaw also observes that peacebuilding has been premised on 
liberalism, although he acknowledges that there are some variations of 
liberal peacebuilding (Heathershaw 2008). As he states, ‘The UN’s 
“post-conflict peacebuilding” emerged amid a reawakening of liberal 
internationalist ideals in the International Community in the aftermath of 
the Cold War’ (ibid.: 599). As Francis Fukuyama (1992) observes, the idea of 
liberal democracy seems to have become a dominant ideology since the end of 
the Cold War. He insists that there are few viable alternatives to liberal 
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democracy. Peacebuilding is interpreted as a vehicle of liberal democracy and 
a best path to worldwide peace (Doyle 1999: 62).  
 Several scholars critical of new trusteeship raise questions about this 
framework of liberal peacebuilding. They argue that liberal democracy has 
no universal applicability (Parekh 1993: 169; Grissom 2010; MacGinty 2010) 
and that liberal peacebuilding is too elitist and paternalistic (Bain 2003; 
Richmond 2004; Chandler 2004). However, they share with liberal peace 
theorists the presumption that peacebuilding is underpinned by liberal 
internationalism (e.g. Richmond 2009: 560-561; Pugh 2004: 47-48). Kristoffer 
Liden, Roger MacGinty, and Oliver P. Richmond argue that:  
 
‘Reflecting the Western-led, international political climate after the 
Cold War, the various peace operations of the last two decades have 
sought to build sustainable forms of peace through political, social 
and economic liberalization. As postulated by liberal 
constitutionalism and internationalism, these efforts are expected to 
contribute to international as well as domestic peace by adding the 
liberalized state to a pacific union of liberal democracies. Their aim is 
to reproduce the (neo)-liberal (meaning a market democracy) 
sovereign state and a liberal normative and institutional system of 
government and international governance.’ (Liden, MacGinty, and 
Richmond 2009: 587) 
 
 Some critics of new trusteeship identify the liberalism of new 
trusteeship as being similar to colonial trusteeship. Mark Duffield and 
Vernon Hewitt (2009) state that:  
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‘While the racial and hegemonic aspects of colonialism are now 
routinely rejected, its liberal alter ego lives on unchallenged and 
continues to uncritically shape our experience of the world. 
Colonialism and development are different but, at the same time, 
they both share a liberal problematic of security.’ (Duffield and 
Hewitt 2009: 10) 
 
According to critical perspectives, modernization theory, which is derived 
from liberalism, has defined the subjectivity of understanding of the Third 
World, but it is ‘lacking in empirical support and theoretical consistency’ 
(Jahn 2007a: 98). Also, peacebuilding based on liberal democracy maintains 
and strengthens the existing political hierarchy at the local, national and 
global levels (Richmond 2009: 562). Moreover, interventions based on an 
ideology of liberalism have been ‘producing enemies instead of allies and 
heightening insecurity instead of enhancing security’ (Jahn 2007b: 212). 
 However, the liberalization of target societies has not been 
mentioned as a primal purpose of interventions by the UN. And the focal 
point of the intense debate on humanitarian intervention is not liberal 
democratization but the alleviation of human suffering. Actually, the 
supporters of liberal peacebuilding nearly always make the following 
counterargument to critics:  
 
‘How many lives would have been lost if not for these interventions? 
[…] The collapse of the peacebuilding project would be tantamount to 
abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, 
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disease and fear.’ (Paris 2009: 103, 108) 
 
‘Surely the ending of armed conflict, improvements in welfare and 
improvements in human rights protection are indicators of “success” 
[of peacebuilding]?’ (Newman 2009: 46) 
 
As this study will show later, the power of new trusteeship is derived not just 
from the notion of liberal democracy but from the idea of humanitarianism.  
 
1-2 Hidden Presumptions 
 Those who support humanitarian intervention and the subsequent 
liberal peacebuilding tend to think that while politics has been the root of 
humanitarian disasters, a gradual universalization of moral obligation has 
allowed politics consistent with morality (Jahn 2012: 39). Thomas Weiss and 
Cindy Collins (2000: 7) state that:  
 
‘The belief that all of humanity – regardless of race, religion, age, or 
gender – deserves protection from unnecessary suffering is becoming 
a more universally accepted truth as well as a norm that occasionally 
guides the behavior of state-to-state and state-to-society relations.’ 
 
On the basis of this moral universality, it is argued that international 
citizens have a responsibility to act for suffering humanity (Falk 1992: 22; 
Linklater 2000: 493) and that ‘intervention can be an emancipatory 
instrument, at least in certain extreme situations’ (Falk 1993: 758; see 
Wheeler 2000: 49). However, they note that humanitarian discourse has been 
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abused by politics. For example, although US intervention in Nicaragua 
during the 1980s was named ‘humanitarian intervention,’ many 
commentators argue that, in fact, this was a misleading description (e.g. 
Weiss and Collins 2000: 4; Teson 1996: 109). Therefore, in any group of 
supporters of humanitarian intervention, one of the most important issues is 
how to judge the humanitarianism of the intervention (Wheeler 2000: 33-51). 
Some consider humanitarian motives as a threshold condition; others 
highlight a positive humanitarian outcome of intervention. In either theory, 
humanitarianism is represented as innocent. For these pro-intervention 
theorists, humanitarianism is a necessary condition to justify political power 
(Teson 1996: 118). It indicates that they, intentionally or unintentionally, 
make a distinction between ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and 
‘humanitarianism abused by politics’. In the former, humanitarianism 
controls politics as a means to protect human rights. Humanitarian 
intervention belongs to this category. On the other hand, in the latter, 
humanitarianism is exploited to conceal an ugly political motivation for 
intervention.  
 This dichotomy of humanitarianism leads to a dichotomy of 
trusteeship. Theorists who are sympathetic with new trusteeship attempt to 
separate new trusteeship from colonial trusteeship in terms of the 
relationship with humanitarianism. While colonial trusteeship is unjust 
because its aim is to pursue the self-interests of trustees, new trusteeship is 
just because it seeks to alleviate the human suffering of others. In other 
words, humanitarianism is embedded in the latter. Ramesh Thakur, a 
political scientist and one of the authors of the Responsibility to Protect 
(2001), states that: 
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‘In the age of colonialism, most Afro-Asians and Latin Americans 
became the victims of Western superiority in the organization and 
weaponry of warfare. […] As memories of colonialism dim and 
become increasingly distant, the salience of sovereignty is 
correspondingly diminishing. […] The goal of intervention for 
human-protection purposes is never to wage war on a state in order 
to destroy it and eliminate its statehood, but always to protect 
victims of atrocities inside the state, to embed that protection in 
reconstituted institutions after the intervention and then to 
withdraw all foreign troops.’ (Thakur 2002: 300-301) 
 
Similarly, Roland Paris (2011: 41) argues that while ‘colonialism was 
practiced largely to benefit the imperial states themselves, including 
through the extraction of material and human resources from the colonized 
society’, peacebuilding operations by the UN ‘have not principally been 
motivated by efforts to extract wealth from their host societies’. According to 
Michael Doyle (2006: 3), ‘multilateral peacebuilding, because of its impartial 
character, will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages 
will choose.’ According to these authors, unlike colonial trusteeship, new 
trusteeship demonstrates a humanitarian aspect. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the number of ‘failed states’ has increased and uncontrolled violence 
has threatened human rights. Doyle argues that: ‘The destructiveness of civil 
anarchy is unacceptable both to all who suffer and to much of the 
international community forced to observe the suffering’ (Doyle 2006: 18). 
Construction of states by new trusteeship is ‘the precondition for any 
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defensible system of human rights’ (Ignatieff 2003b: 320). Thus, 
peacebuilding is based on human rights norms of international law (Wilde 
2008: 404-405; Kaldor 2007: 188). However, as ‘colonialism is now 
condemned as an international crime’ (Chesterman 2005: 341), new 
trusteeship is likely to be criticized for its enormous power. Therefore, 
Ignatieff suggests good trusteeship which ‘reproduces the best effects of 
empire (inward investment, pacification, and impartial administration) 
without reproducing the worst features (corruption, repression, and 
confiscation of local capacity)’ (Ignatieff 2003b: 320). Similarly, on new 
trusteeship, Fukuyama argues that ‘This international imperium may be a 
well-meaning one based on human rights and democracy’ (Fukuyama 2004: 
132). Doyle (2006: 3) claims that ‘we should avoid “throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater.”’ Thus, previous studies tend to presume that there is 
good trusteeship and bad trusteeship and that new trusteeship is good 
because it aims to protect human rights and colonial trusteeship is bad 
because it seeks to exploit material and human resources of target societies. 
This dichotomy reveals an assumption that trusteeship is counterposed to 
humanitarianism. While in bad trusteeship, humanitarianism is abused by 
trusteeship, in good trusteeship, humanitarianism is embodied in 
trusteeship. 
 Critics of liberal peacebuilding do not share this dichotomy. However, 
some of them seek to save peacebuilding from the yoke of colonial trusteeship. 
As Alex J. Bellamy suggests, ‘critical approaches demand an interrogation of 
whether dominant approaches to peace operations, guided as they are by 
liberal ideology, contribute to the promotion of human security’ (Bellamy 
2005: 34).While they criticize liberal peacebuilding according to 
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humanitarianism, they do not deny the possibility to make an alternative 
peacebuilding model. For example, Richmond suggests ‘the emancipatory 
model’ of peacebuilding. He states that: 
 
‘The emancipatory model […] is concerned with a much closer 
relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership, and 
tends to be very critical of the coerciveness, conditionality and 
dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate upon. 
This is mainly found within bottom-up approaches, and tends to veer 
towards needs-based activity and a stronger concern for social 
justice.’ (Richmond 2005: 215) 
 
His intention is to empower the weak by peacebuilding. In other words, he 
seeks to separate ‘emancipatory peacebuilding’ from colonial and new 
trusteeship according to humanitarianism. In this sense, he implies another 
dichotomy of trusteeship, whether or not his alternative model can overcome 
the problems of liberal peacebuilding.  
Thus, liberal peacebuilding theorists tend to separate new 
trusteeship from colonial trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism. Similarly, 
some critics of liberal peacebuilding suggest another dichotomy of 
trusteeship which is based on humanitarianism. In this sense, 
humanitarianism is an important notion when we examine trusteeship.  
However, contrary to the number of studies on liberal democracy, the 
amount of research on humanitarianism is not large. Humanitarianism is a 
missing link in studies on new trusteeship. While debates on humanitarian 
intervention address the dilemma between human rights and sovereignty, 
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they seldom argue about humanitarianism itself. This is understandable 
because humanitarian intervention aims to alleviate only the human 
suffering which is caused by states. Bhikhu Parekh (1997) suggests the 
following definition of humanitarian intervention:  
 
‘Humanitarian intervention, as the term is used today, then, is an act 
of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view 
to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or the 
gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create 
conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.’ 
(Parekh 1997: 55) 
 
As this definition implies, the humanitarianism of humanitarian 
intervention is concerned mainly with the ending of physical suffering such 
as that caused by ethnic cleansing and mass murder by central governments. 
However, other human suffering such as poverty is ignored. In an argument 
about humanitarian intervention, ‘suffering and death become a matter of 
humanitarian intervention only when they are caused by the breakdown of 
the state or by an outrageous abuse of its power’; and ‘Slow death through 
poverty, malnutrition, and economic and political mismanagement do not 
generally form part of our conception of humanitarian concerns’ (ibid.). Most 
theorists of humanitarian intervention are concerned only with the 
relationship between sovereignty of states and human solidarity (e.g. 
Wheeler 1997). 
In the late 2000s, some scholars began to analyze the nature of 
humanitarianism. Exploring the history of humanitarianism from the 19th 
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century to the present, they understand ‘humanitarianism’ as ‘a general 
commitment to “prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be 
found,” “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being,” 
and to “promote mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting 
peace amongst all peoples” (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 12). They recognized a 
distinction between humanitarian ‘responses rooted in simply providing care 
and responses linked to broader notions of human progress’ (Calhoun 2008: 
74). Michael Barnett names the former ‘emergency humanitarianism’ and 
the latter ‘alchemical humanitarianism’. While emergency humanitarianism 
‘focuses on symptoms’, alchemical humanitarianism ‘adds the ambition of 
removing the root causes of suffering’ (Barnett 2011: 10). Alchemical 
humanitarianism has been associated with ‘broader projects of human 
improvement’ (Calhoun 2008: 89). This kind of humanitarianism has 
demonstrated paternalism, which is ‘the belief that some people can and 
should act in ways that are intended to improve the welfare of those who 
might not be in a position to help themselves’ (Barnett 2011: 12). Moreover, it 
is accompanied with social engineering projects to address the root causes of 
suffering. Barnett implies that humanitarianism and trusteeship are deeply 
related. 
 
‘Humanitarian governance looks more like a rival to empire, because 
it is dedicated to the emancipation and empowerment, not the 
oppression and subservience, of those who are hanging on for dear 
life. But a second, more discerning look suggests that although 
humanitarian governance is not an empire in sheep’s clothing, it does 
bear some of its markings.’ (ibid.: 221) 
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As this study will show later, humanitarianism has sometimes contributed to 
the constitution of imperialism and colonialism.  
While these earlier works on humanitarianism are path-breaking in 
that they observe the distinction between ‘emergency humanitarianism’ and 
‘alchemical humanitarianism,’ there remain further questions. First of all, 
they do not demonstrate how humanitarianism is linked to a certain human 
and social model, and how it is involved in the constitution of trusteeship. 
According to them, alchemical humanitarianism has advocated and carried 
out social engineering. However, this is misleading because ‘the ambition of 
removing the root causes of suffering’ itself does not necessarily accompany 
social engineering and colonialism. Humanitarians have a desire for social 
engineering through colonial administration when they link a humanitarian 
crisis to deviations from specific human and social models. Who has decided 
the ideal model for humanity and society? And how has human suffering 
been linked with this model? As yet, there is no satisfactory explanation.  
Secondly, previous research does not explain how the power of 
humanitarianism has worked during the long history of humanitarianism. 
Barnett employs the framework ‘paternalism’ to examine the power of 
humanitarianism; however, this framework is too simple to analyze the 
power of humanitarianism. He defines paternalism as ‘the belief that some 
people can and should act in ways that are intended to improve the welfare 
of those who might not be in a position to help themselves’ (Barnett 2011: 12). 
However, the power of humanitarianism is to contribute to the constitution 
of trusteeship that transforms the nature of target societies and to the 
establishment of undemocratic regimes in target societies. Wendy Brown 
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(2004: 459-460) argues that: 
 
‘[Human rights] are not simply rules and defenses against power, 
but can themselves be tactics and vehicles of governance and 
domination. […] the point is that there is no such thing as mere 
reduction of suffering or protection from abuse — the nature of the 
reduction or protection is itself productive of political subjects and 
political possibilities.’ 
 
Of course, humanitarianism can operate without relations of domination or 
undermining sovereignty. However, when humanitarianism contributed to 
the constitution of trusteeship, it functioned as a vehicle of domination and 
led to the deprivation of the political agency of target societies. This 
argument leads to crucial questions: how has humanitarianism contributed 
to the constitution of trusteeship and how has the relationship between 
trusteeship and humanitarianism developed? Now, we need an effective 
strategy to examine the relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism. This study adopts genealogy, as the next section will 
argue. 
 
 
2. Genealogy as Methodology 
2-1 Genealogy of IR 
Genealogy was invented by Nietzsche as a historical method, and 
improved by Foucault. Now, various IR theorists use it as their methodology. 
However, genealogy as methodology is highly ambiguous. Foucault 
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considered his strategy ‘not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a 
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as 
an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life’ (Foucault 1984: 50). Therefore, 
there is no consensus about the way of using genealogy among the IR 
theorists. At first, we ought to understand why Foucault adopted genealogy. 
Before using genealogy as his strategy, Foucault had explored the structural 
rules governing discourse by archeology. On archeology he stated that:  
 
‘Such an analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: 
it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis 
knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori 
[...] ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be 
reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to 
dissolve and vanish soon afterwards.’ (Foucault 1973: xxi-xxii) 
 
After Immanuel Kant suggested dichotomous world view, a sensible world 
and an intelligible world, this world view became the starting point for the 
philosophers who addressed the ontological issue. However, avoiding the 
ontological issue, Foucault focused on the regularity exhibited by relations 
among various speech acts – which he called discursive formation – and 
revealed discourse ‘as practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49). Subsequently, he began to focus on the 
relationship between power, knowledge and body in a modern society, and 
adopted genealogy as his new strategy. While his archeology mainly 
concentrated on the strata of discourse, his genealogy focused on the 
techniques of power. It was because he noticed that ‘rituals of power’ such as 
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penitentiary and confession were a focal point where the relationship 
between power, knowledge, and the body were reproduced. By employing 
genealogy, Foucault indicated that some forms of power such as discipline 
and bio-power have been working in a modern society. The primal aim of 
these powers ‘was a “parallel increase in the usefulness and docility” of 
individuals and populations’ for states and capitalism (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982: 135). In sum, Foucault’s genealogy was associated with his concern 
with power. 
The main aim of Foucault’s genealogy was to point out ‘on what kinds 
of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of 
thought the practices that we accept rest’ (Foucault 1988: 154-5). In addition, 
Foucault’s genealogy has three characteristics. First, his genealogy is a 
‘history of the present’. The central concern of genealogists is the power 
relations and political struggles in modern society. Therefore, traits of power 
relations in contemporary society should be the starting point for them. This 
is a distinctive characteristic of genealogy. The history of the present is 
different from ‘presentism’ which explores precursors of the present in the 
past and from ‘finalism’ which presumes that history is moving to a certain 
end. The aim of genealogy is ‘to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its 
surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats – the basis of all 
beginnings, atavisms, and heredities’ (Foucault 1984: 80). Thereby, it is 
possible to show the contingency and circumstantiality of the ruling 
discursive formation and power relations. The genealogy does not have to be 
comprehensive; rather, it is exemplary because its aim is to de-unify an 
authoritative history.  
Second, Foucault’s genealogy aims to show ‘strategy without 
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strategists’. Power relations in a society are not constructed through 
individual intentions; they have no strategists (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 
109). Rather, they can be formed inter-subjectively. Therefore, ‘One has to 
dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to 
say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the 
subject within a historical framework’ (Foucault 1980a: 117). This 
requirement led to his genealogy. Genealogy aims to explore the formation of 
power relations which are constituted inter-subjectively. The power 
investigated by genealogists is generated and supported by dispositive. 
Dispositive, Foucault’s unique term, was explained by himself as the 
following:  
 
‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term [dispositive] is, firstly, a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral 
and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid. Such are the elements of the [dispositive]. The [dispositive] 
itself is the system of relations that can be established between these 
elements.’ (Foucault 1980b: 194) 
 
By using the concept of dispositive, Foucault sought to combine the 
discursive domain and non-discursive domain in the analysis of power 
relations. 
Third, Foucault’s genealogy focuses on ‘rituals of power’. According to 
Foucault, the genealogy ‘can account for the constitution of knowledges, 
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discourses and domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a 
subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history’ (ibid.). ‘Rituals 
of power’ controls individuals by constituting their subjectivity. Then, the 
basis on which the genealogists establish their argument is the isolation of 
‘meticulous rituals of power’. Meticulous rituals of power exhibit the traits of 
power relations. 
Nevertheless, genealogy of some IR theorists scarcely demonstrates 
these characteristics. Campbell (1998) uses ‘a history of the present, an 
interpretative attitude suggested by Michel Foucault’ (Campbell 1998: 2) as 
his approach. In his book Writing Security, he argues that ‘danger is not 
objective condition […] [but] an effect of interpretation’ (ibid.: 1-2) and that 
states have exploited security discourse for the production and reproduction 
of their unstable identity. Thus, his concern about the discursive power is not 
far from Foucault’s. But his ontological assumption is different from 
Foucault’s understanding. Campbell states that:  
 
‘The world exists independently of language, but we can never know 
that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the 
world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions 
of interpretation.’ (ibid.: 6)  
 
This assumption derives not from Foucault’s theory but from the theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe or Derrida. As Jan Selby points out, Foucault did not 
think that only texts determine socio-political relations, and analyzed not 
only the discursive domain but also the non-discursive domain using 
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genealogy (Selby 2007: 326-330). This difference is reflected in their 
understandings of ‘rituals of power’. While Foucault recognized the 
non-discursive practices such as the penitentiary as ‘rituals of power’, 
Campbell considers narratives and writing on foreign policy as ‘rituals of 
power’. Following Campbell, Hansen (2006) also adopts genealogy (Hansen 
2006: 53) and demonstrates the same differences from Foucault’s genealogy. 
Her aim is to depict how Bosnia has been represented in Western discourse. 
She shares the presumption with Campbell that ‘policies are dependent upon 
representations of the threat, country security problem, or crisis they seek to 
address’ (Hansen 2006: 5-6). Thus, she analyzes only discursive domains 
such as narratives and writing on foreign policy. 
Their methodology is called Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Jager and Maier 2009), though its ontological presumption is slightly 
different from Foucault’s. Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis seems to 
be a mix of Foucault’s archeology and genealogy. I name such a usage of 
genealogy archeological genealogy. I do not argue that this methodology is 
wrong or unusable; rather, my argument is that it is one of a variety of 
genealogies. In fact, we can find various ways of using genealogy. Nietzsche’s 
genealogy is not the same as Foucault’s in that the latter presumes 
inter-subjectivity of the (re)production of power relations. Moreover, 
according to Gordon (1986), the Frankfurt thinkers also employed their own 
genealogy that was different from Foucault’s.  
But how can we recognize a certain methodology as genealogy and 
what conditions should genealogy fulfill? Bartelson’s genealogy is much 
closer to archeology than Campbell’s (Bartelson 1995). He traces the usages 
and meanings of the word of ‘sovereignty.’ His concern is not about ‘rituals of 
２８ 
 
 
 
power’ but epistemic shifts in the notion of sovereignty; on this point, his 
approach is archeological. However, as he discusses, his methodology is 
genealogy in that his description is a ‘history of the present’ which is one of 
the characteristics of Foucault’s genealogy. This is because his main question 
is how the idea of sovereignty, which is a ruling discourse in current 
international society, appeared. A history of the present is the most 
important feature of genealogy in that it distinguishes genealogy from other 
historical analysis. Therefore, as long as a certain methodology contains this 
feature, it is possible to recognize it as a kind of genealogy. 
Contrary to the archeological genealogy used by some IR theorists, 
other theorists demonstrate a different usage of genealogy that focuses not 
only on the discursive domain but also on the non-discursive domain. Der 
Derian (1987), one of the earliest IR studies employing genealogy, uses 
genealogy that demonstrates various characteristics of Foucault’s genealogy. 
He suggests an alternative interpretation of the history of diplomacy as 
genealogy of estrangement and mediation. In his work, diplomacy was 
defined as ‘the mediation of estranged peoples organized in states’ (Der 
Derian 1987: 42). He focuses on the relationship between Self and Other in 
diplomacy and indicates the inherent crisis of diplomacy. It is worth noting 
that he analyzes not only the discursive domain but also the non-discursive 
domain and, thereby, recognizes socio-political forces that have developed the 
discourse of diplomacy. His methodology is one of the successful examples of 
genealogy in IR studies. Also, Selby (2007)’s suggestion as to the usage of 
Foucault’s theoretical legacy is also important. Contrary to the genealogy of 
IR studies that focus mainly on the discursive domain, he suggests an 
alternative usage of Foucault’s theory alongside Marx. According to Selby, 
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Foucault was ‘an interrogator of modern liberal capitalist societies’ like Marx 
(Selby 2007: 326). I name this kind of usage of genealogy, and that which 
analyzes social economic and political forces, sociological genealogy. Table 1 
summarizes genealogy as methodology. 
 
 
Archeological 
Genealogy 
Sociological Genealogy 
Ontological assumption 
Discourse constructs 
realities. 
As well as discursive 
practice, social 
economic and political 
forces construct 
discursive formation. 
Objects of analysis Discursive domain 
 
Discursive domain and 
non-discursive domain 
 
Table 1 Two Kinds of Genealogy 
 
2-2 Theoretical Frameworks 
Now, which genealogy should we choose? Before choosing, it is 
necessary to further clarify the research plan and objectives of this study. 
The aim of this study is to follow the formation and development of the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. The main concern of this study 
is how the power relationship between trustees and target societies has been 
formed and how trusteeship and humanitarianism have mutually 
constituted. As stated in Introduction, by the term of trusteeship, I refer to a 
relation of inequality and a field of intervention, rather than a specific or 
particular historical practice. Trusteeship has several basic characteristics. 
(i) In trusteeship, the relationship between trustees and target societies is 
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unequal, and trustees seek to intervene in target societies by various tactics. 
(ii) Trusteeship is constituted by theology and practice. By the term of 
‘theology,’ I imply that discourse of trusteeship is neither neutral nor 
universal; rather, it is similar to religious belief. The theology of trusteeship 
has disguised itself as ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ or ‘universal.’ However, it is 
likely to be ethnocentric and biased, as this study will show. Theology 
identifies trustees and target societies and defines the relationship between 
them. Trusteeship has been embodied in some political arrangements 
(practice) such as colonial administration, development, and peacebuilding.  
Etymologically speaking, as Ch. 2 will argue, the words ‘trust’ and 
‘trusteeship’ were applied to the relationship between the British Empire 
and dependent territories in the late 18th century. After that, the 
relationship between colonial empires and dependent territories was defined 
as ‘trusteeship.’ As stated in the Introduction, the meaning of this ‘trust’ or 
‘trusteeship’ was ‘a responsibility to contribute to the protection, welfare and 
advancement of non-Europeans caught up in the growth of British influence 
and control’ (Porter 1988: 36). As the idea of a responsibility of civilized 
countries to dependent territories was developed in the 19th century, the 
unequal relationship between trustees and target societies was constituted. 
Therefore, a genealogy of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship 
should begin with the analysis of colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism 
of the British Empire in the 19th century. Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 will explore the 
colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism in British India and Africa in the 
19th century.  
As stated already, humanitarianism is deeply related to the 
construction of the relationship between target societies and trustees by 
３１ 
 
 
 
defining their nature, and plays a major part in the design of the political 
arrangements of trusteeship. Humanitarianism is not just an ideology to 
legitimize trusteeship but constitutive of it. As Barnett argues, 
humanitarianism is ‘a form of compassion’ (Barnett 2011: 10). When one 
observes human suffering of others, it arouses compassion for them and 
leads him/her to alleviate such human suffering. However, in this phase, 
humanitarianism does not constitute trusteeship. As this study will argue, 
when humanitarianism attributes the causes of human suffering to the 
nature of target societies, it constitutes trusteeship. Following Barnett 
(2011) and Calhoun (2008), this study makes a distinction between 
humanitarian ‘responses rooted in simply providing care and responses 
linked to broader notions of human progress’ (Calhoun 2008: 74) and focuses 
on the latter. However, I do not intend to say that humanitarianism has not 
changed nor that humanitarianism universally exists. As well as trusteeship, 
humanitarianism has also transformed. What is recognized as ‘human 
suffering’ is not determined a priori. The category of ‘humanitarianism’ thus 
includes various practices such as protection from anarchy, relief from 
oppression, and freedom from poverty, which are above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering. I do not argue that humanitarianism has always 
contributed to the constitution of unequal power relations; rather, only when 
it attributes the causes of human suffering to the nature of target societies, it 
is involved in the constitution of trusteeship. 
 As this study will demonstrate, trusteeship, humanitarianism, and 
their relationship have been constituted not only through the discourse of 
intellectuals and policy makers but also by social practices. This dispositive 
of humanitarianism/trusteeship is composed of internal and international 
３２ 
 
 
 
laws, institutions, regulations, statements, and social practices such as 
colonial administration, missionary work, and humanitarian aid. Therefore, 
it is hard to grasp the relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism only by discourse analysis. That is why this study adopts a 
sociological genealogy. 
 In order to explore how humanitarianism defines the nature of target 
societies and trustees, this study introduces the ideas of pathologization and 
prescriptions. By the concept of pathologization, I attempt to describe a 
process in which humanitarianism attributes root causes of human suffering 
to the nature of target societies. For humanitarianism, human suffering is 
pathology to be repaired. When humanitarianism connects human suffering 
with the nature of target societies, they are represented as savage societies 
that cannot remove the causes of human suffering on their own. 
Subsequently, humanitarianism prepares prescriptions to address the root 
causes of human suffering. Prescriptions include administration and social 
engineering by external actors (trustees) such as colonial empires. Trustees 
are represented as saviors of the suffered by humanitarianism.  
These frameworks are based on postcolonial studies which have 
theorized identities of colonial subjectivities, for example, Edward Said, 
Orientalism; Gayatri Spivak, In Other Worlds; Homi Bhaba, The Location of 
Culture; Bill Ashcroft, et al., The Empire Writes Back; and Gloria Anzaldua, 
Borderlands/La Frontiera. Postcolonialism focuses on culture and identity 
and analyzes the power structure of colonial discourse. They criticize 
essentialism – ‘the idea that identities and culture have their own essential 
features which are impermeable to others’ (Grovogui 2007: 236) because 
essentialism has been a part of hegemonic discursive formation in the 
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colonial period. For example, Edward Said (1978), suggesting the idea of 
Orientalism, argues that colonial societies were constructed as different and 
Other by a system of knowledge about the Orient. In this regime, while the 
West is represented as superior, original, and civilized, the Orient is 
represented as inferior, fake, and savage. In terms of the manipulation of 
identity, humanitarianism is similar to Orientalism. Orientalist discourse is 
associated with ‘the enabling socio-economic and political institutions’ and 
constitutes the Western ‘cultural hegemony’ (Said 1978: 5-6). According to 
Said (1993), representations of Oriental culture and colonial political power 
are co-constitutive. He observes that, even after decolonization, colonial 
discourse exists and reproduces the hegemony of Western countries. The 
perspective of this study is quite similar to postcolonialism. As this study will 
show, since the 19th century, humanitarianism has defined the nature and 
identity of non-European countries and constituted trusteeship. Trusteeship 
sought to transform the nature and identity of target societies into the 
Other/inferior. This structure has survived even after decolonization.  
 However, the approach of this study is slightly different from 
post-colonialism in terms of the objects of analysis. Post-colonial theorists 
such as Said and Stuart Hall adopt archeological genealogy and focus on 
culture. Their objects of analysis are meaningful artifacts including novels 
and movies (e.g. Said 1978, 1993; Hall 1990). On the other hand, the 
approach of this study focuses on socio-political institutions, laws, 
regulations, statements, and social practice that have constituted the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Although I do not deny the 
importance of culture, the main focus of this study tends to be especially laws, 
institutions, regulations, statements, and social practice. The dispositive of 
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humanitarianism/trusteeship has (re)produced hierarchies in international 
society by transforming the socio-political institutions of target societies. 
Analysis of socio-political institutions, laws, regulations, statements, and 
social practice can reveal the tactics of the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship.  
 On this point, the genealogical approach of this study is slightly 
different from Foucault’s as well as that of post-colonialism. This is because 
Foucault tried to avoid the analysis of state apparatus including judiciary 
and military systems. He stated that:  
 
‘If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the 
State apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially 
repressive... I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I 
want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that 
must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the 
State.’ (Foucault 1980: 122) 
 
In his theory, state apparatus carries out repressive power, in his words, ‘the 
force of prohibition’ (ibid.: 119). However, what he attempted to analyze was 
‘systems of power’ which produce and sustain truth and subjects (ibid.: 133). 
This kind of power ‘induces pleasure, forms knowledge, [and] produces 
discourse’ (ibid.: 119); that is, the micro level of power. Therefore, Foucault 
focused on prisons, schools, hospitals and factories. 
 However, while this study focuses on socio-political institutions, it 
does not intend to examine the sovereign power of trusteeship. The aim of 
this study is to investigate the relationship between trusteeship and 
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humanitarianism. My hypothesis is that trusteeship and humanitarianism 
constitute the dispositive which produces truth and subjects in international 
society. This study explores how humanitarianism determines the 
relationship between trustees and target societies and how socio-political 
institutions of target societies are restructured in trusteeship. Sociological 
genealogy can account for the historical constitution of the ‘systems of power’. 
On this point, the approach of this study is similar to Foucault’s. 
 
 
Kinds of 
Genealogy 
What It Indicates Objects of Analysis 
Post-Colonialism 
such as Said’s 
Orientalism 
Archeological 
Genealogy 
Cultural 
Hegemony 
Meaningful 
Artifacts of Culture 
such as Novels and 
Movies 
Foucault’s 
Genealogy 
Sociological 
Genealogy 
Systems of Power 
that Produce and 
Maintain Truth 
and Subjects 
Prisons, Schools, 
Hospitals and 
Factories 
Genealogy of 
this study 
Sociological 
Genealogy 
Systems of Power 
Constituted by 
Trusteeship and 
Humanitarianism 
Socio-Political 
Institutions, laws, 
regulations, 
statements, and 
social practice 
Table 2 Differences among Three Approaches 
 
 In order to analyze the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship 
genealogically, this study introduces another theoretical framework – 
reflexivity. By this concept, I attempt to indicate the circular process of 
trusteeship from pathologization and making prescriptions to criticizing and 
revising theology and practice of trusteeship (Figure 1). As this study will 
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show later, trusteeship has been repeatedly criticized and revised in each 
period. However, most of the critics of trusteeship have never suggested the 
abolition of trusteeship. This is not because they were imperialists or 
colonialists, but because they were humanitarians. Trusteeship has changed 
in response to changing power relations and norms in international society, 
but it has never disappeared because of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism 
has, intentionally or unintentionally, led to the reinvigoration of trusteeship 
and contributed to the regeneration of the power structure in international 
society.  
 
Figure 1 Circular Process of Trusteeship 
 
2-3 Pre-modern Trusteeship and Modern Trusteeship 
When did trusteeship as an unequal relationship and a field of 
intervention appear and how has it survived in international society? 
Although the word of ‘trust’ or ‘trusteeship’ had not existed, trusteeship as an 
unequal relationship and a field of intervention can be found in the case of 
(Re-)
Pathologization
Prescriptions
ReactionCriticism
Revision
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the Spanish Empire in the 16th century. The Spanish thought that colonial 
administration was justifiable for the benefit of the Amerindians (Todorov 
1999; Jahn 2000).  
However, the theology of trusteeship of the Spanish Empire was 
different from the theology of trusteeship after the 19th century in terms of 
human and social models because episteme shifted in the late 18th century. 
The Scottish Enlightenment, which was deeply affected by Newton’s theory 
and world view, assumed that the secular world had its own laws that were 
independent from the sacred world. Scottish philosophers strived to discover 
the laws that regulated the secular world. Their philosophy signified a 
departure from a Presbyterianism that believed that God had already 
decided everything a priori. For example, Adam Smith, a representative 
Scottish Enlightenment intellectual, argued in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, that human beings make his/her morality through 
communication with others in a society, though he presumed that their 
moral sentiments are given by God. Thus, the relationship between society 
and individuals began to replace the relationship between God and human 
beings (Dunn 1983). This shift of world view was accompanied with the new 
idea that human beings and societies were capable of being reformed. 
Philosophers like Jeremy Bentham, believing the universality of reason, 
‘asserted that men could be improved by correctly socializing their instincts 
for pleasure’ (Ignatieff 1978: 67). Furthermore, British intellectuals in the 
18th century considered ‘society’ as an autonomous entity. In The Wealth of 
Nations, Smith analyzed the characteristics of various societies and created 
his social development model based on the forms of production: hunting, 
pastoral (herding), agricultural, commercial. As Ch. 2 will discuss, 
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utilitarians inherited this social development model and created the new 
theory that society is capable of reformation.  
In addition, in the 18th century, new humanitarian norms emerged. 
Humanitarians began the penitentiary reform movement and advocated the 
abolition of cruel punishments (Foucault 1977: Part II Ch. 1; Ignatieff 1978; 
Follet 2001). Evangelicals and liberalists cooperated in the reformation of 
criminal systems, though they were theoretically opposed to each other 
(Follet 2001). Finally, punishments involving the public infliction of physical 
pain to the body declined and imprisonment as the preeminent penalty 
emerged (Ignatieff 1978). As a result, the norm that a human body should 
not be injured spread in some European societies (Hunt 2007). At the same 
time, a variety of Scottish intellectuals considered the feeling of ‘compassion’ 
as the main nature of human beings (Fiering 1976). According to Barnett 
(2011: 10), ‘the actual term [of humanitarianism] began coming into 
everyday use in the early nineteenth century’. Thus, the episteme shifted in 
Europe in the 18th century and humanitarianism subsequently appeared.  
The relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism began in 
the 19th century. As the Spanish Empire went into decline, the British 
Empire sought to achieve hegemonic power and developed the theology and 
practice of colonial trusteeship. British politicians, philosophers and 
missionaries had interests in British colonies and other non-European 
countries and were involved in the constitution of colonial trusteeship. In 
this process, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship emerged.  
This study identifies four distinctive ages of trusteeship: an age of 
colonial trusteeship from the late 18th century to the late 19th century; an 
age of internationalization of trusteeship around the time of the First World 
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War; an age of development trusteeship from the Second World War to the 
1990s; and an age of peacebuilding trusteeship from the 1990s to the present. 
In an age of colonial trusteeship, the theology and practice of colonial 
trusteeship were developed in India and Africa. As the British Empire 
encountered serious resistance from the local people and the new idea of 
racism appeared in Europe, they were revised in the mid-19th century. 
Around the time of the First World War, colonial trusteeship was criticized 
by intellectuals and politicians, and internationalized as the mandate 
system. In the 1940s, the British Empire still had to revise the theology and 
practice of trusteeship because of increasing resistance from local people and 
severe criticisms of colonial trusteeship from within and without. The British 
Empire finally created development trusteeship. While development 
trusteeship continued even after the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding 
trusteeship appeared in the 1990s as humanitarian crises of the Third World 
were highlighted by Western countries. Figure 2 indicates these changes of 
trusteeship from the 19th century to the present. My intention in this study 
is to show that trusteeship and humanitarianism have constituted each 
other in all these ages of trusteeship and that a series of transformations of 
trusteeship has demonstrated a circular process.  
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      Figure 2 Locus of Trusteeship Circular Process 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has established a framework for the analysis of the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. This framework is premised on 
Foucault’s genealogy. For this genealogy, traits of power relations in the 
current society would be the starting point. It focuses on factors in discursive 
domain and non-discursive domain which constitute power relations. And it 
hypothesizes that these power relations are not constituted intentionally. 
This study takes the relationship between trustees and target societies in 
the post-Cold War era (new trusteeship or peacebuilding trusteeship) as the 
starting point and considers humanitarianism as a missing link in new 
trusteeship. It will analyze institutions, laws, regulations, statements, and 
social practice which have constituted the dispositive of 
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humanitarianism/trusteeship from the early 19th century to the late 20th 
century.  
The framework of this study provides the definition of trusteeship as 
an unequal relationship and a field of intervention and the hypothesis that 
humanitarianism has contributed to the constitution of the relationship 
between trustees and target societies. The main argument of this study is 
that the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has been reproduced in 
international society. In order to analyze the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship, the concepts of ‘pathologization’ and 
‘prescriptions’ are introduced. Pathologization means that humanitarianism 
would find pathology in target societies. It would transform the identity of 
target societies into the Other/inferior. And it would lead to prescriptions by 
which target societies would be governed. After trusteeship is constituted, it 
would be examined repeatedly. The framework of this study suggests the 
‘circular process of trusteeship’ in which trusteeship would be constituted, 
criticized, revised, and re-constituted.  
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Ch. 2 Colonial Trusteeship and Humanitarianism in India: 
Utilitarianism and Post-utilitarianism 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship. This chapter and the next will explore the 
origins of the dispositive. As stated in Ch. 1, the relationship between 
trusteeship and humanitarianism started in the 19th century. In this century, 
theology and practice of colonial trusteeship radically changed, responding to 
the territorial expansion of the British Empire in Asia and Africa. This 
chapter will analyze the case of British India because, as it was called the 
‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire, it was the most important territory 
for geopolitical and economic reasons. As Thomas Metcalf (2007) argues, the 
colonial policy in India was highly influential in formulating the colonial 
policies for other British territories.  
Colonial trusteeship in India was unique because it was a case of 
existing rule that subsequently required humanitarian discourse as 
justification. Although the idea of human suffering did not emerge explicitly, 
the theology of colonial trusteeship in India tended to demonstrate a 
discursive structure of humanitarianism. In the early 19th century, 
utilitarianism defined the objective of colonial trusteeship as the liberation of 
the Indian population from indigenous religious and political despotism. 
Suffering from savagism and oppression by religious and political despotism 
formed humanitarian discourse. This humanitarian discourse contributed to 
the constitution of colonial trusteeship. Thus, it marked the origins of the the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. After the Mutiny of 1857, 
‘anarchy,’ which was characterized by irrational violence and interpreted as a 
４３ 
 
 
 
result of modernization, formed the new pathology of India. The protection of 
Indian societies from anarchy was defined as the new objective of colonial 
trusteeship. 
Existing studies on utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism in the 19th 
century tend to focus on the relationship between colonial trusteeship and 
liberalism (Mehta 1990; Jahn 2005; Pitts 2006; Mantena 2010). They showed 
that liberalism legitimized colonial trusteeship by representing Indian 
societies as savage. While the argument of these studies is highly important, 
the humanitarian element of utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism in the 
analysis of India has been overlooked. This chapter will show how colonial 
trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive in the 
discursive formation of British India. The first half of this chapter will 
analyze how colonial trusteeship in India was constituted by utilitarianism. 
The second half of this chapter will examine how colonial trusteeship in 
India was revised after the Mutiny.  
 
 
1. Trusteeship, Utilitarianism, and India 
1-1 Trusteeship before the 19th Century 
 As stated in Ch.1, trusteeship is defined as an unequal relationship 
between trustees and wards and a field of intervention. Etymologically 
speaking, ‘trust’ was a system for managing lands and goods in the 13th 
century (Pollock and Maitland 1898 II: 240). In the system of trust, land 
owners asked a third party to manage it to prevent the confiscation of their 
lands and goods. While the possessory right of the lands would be 
transferred to a third party, the property right of the land would be held by 
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the land owner. In Medieval England, people did not separate the lands of 
the nation from the lands of the king (Pollock and Maitland 1898 I: 548). In 
other words, they did not have any idea of national territory. Therefore, there 
was not the idea ‘trust’ or ‘trusteeship’ in the relationship between governors 
and governed. John Locke was one of the first philosophers who applied the 
idea ‘trust’ to political power. In Two Treatises of Government (1689), he 
argued that:  
 
‘For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited 
by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, 
the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve into 
the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they 
shall think best for their safety and security.’ (Second Treatise, 
section 149) 
 
Thus, political power was considered as based on the trust from citizens. 
Theoretically, this relationship begins when someone (e.g. citizens) delegates 
their political power to a third party (e.g. kings). However, in the 17th 
century, this idea was accepted only by radicals because it implied the right 
of revolution. According to F. W. Maitland, ‘in the course of the eighteenth 
century it became a parliamentary commonplace that all political power is a 
trust’ (Maitland 1900: xxxxvi).  
 It was Edmund Burke who applied the idea of trust to British 
colonial administration in India. Before the theology of colonial trusteeship 
developed, the British Empire had actually ruled Indian colonies. Until the 
late 18th century, the British India Company had no political power but only 
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trading privileges from Elizabeth I. However, as the Mughal Empire was 
declining and the order of India was becoming unstable, the Company 
started to intervene in domestic politics and finally obtained sovereign power 
in India. However, in the late 18th century, the administration of the East 
India Company was criticized for corruption and the abuse of political power. 
One of the critics of the East India Company was Burke. He claimed that the 
principle of colonial rule of India was ‘a trust: and it is the very essence of 
every trust to be accountable, and even totally to cease, when it substantially 
varies from the purpose for which alone it could have a lawful existence’ 
(Burke 1899: 439). The East India Company had never fulfilled the duties of 
a trustee. Therefore, he insisted that the administrative authority for British 
India be transferred to the British government (Whelan 1996). As Porter 
observes, the aim of Burke’s trusteeship was not to transform the nature of 
Indian societies but to protect them from the irresponsible rule by the British 
India Company (Porter 1999: 201). He did not consider Indian societies as 
savage; on the contrary, he expressed his admiration for Indian civilization. 
In this point, he did not pathologize Indian societies. Moreover, he did not 
believe in the possibility of developing society by radical reform. Although he 
applied the idea of trust to British colonial administration in India, colonial 
trusteeship as an unequal relationship was not constituted. In contrast to 
Burke’s views, utilitarianism pathologized Indian societies and demanded 
that the British Empire transform the nature of Indian societies by social 
engineering policies, as the following section will show. 
 
1-2 Pathologization of India 
 Since Burke’s address on India, the relationship between the British 
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Empire and India as colonial trusteeship had developed. However, the origin 
of the colonial administration was mainly military conquest. The Indian 
population had not delegated their political power to the British government 
or the East India Company. Therefore, this definition of the relationship 
between Britain and India required theoretical substantiation. In the early 
19th century, it was utilitarianism that provided the philosophical 
foundation for the British colonial administration in India. It was argued 
that India required colonial administration by the British Empire because it 
was suffering from savagism and despotism. This pathologization not only 
legitimized the colonial administration but also constituted the practice of 
the administration.  
In the discourse of utilitarianism, India was represented as a savage 
society in which the population was autocratically ruled by religious and 
political authority. In The History of British India (hereafter, ‘HBI’), James 
Mill stated that: 
 
‘Beside the causes which usually give superstition a powerful sway in 
ignorant and credulous ages, the order of priests obtained a greater 
authority in India than in any other region of the globe.’ (HBI: 1: 282)  
 
In India, the religious privileged class was seizing legislative and judicial 
powers as well as executive power. Therefore, ‘the king was little more than 
an instrument in the hands of the Brahmans’ (HBI: 1: 189). The collusion of a 
religious privileged class and political power was considered as one of the 
characteristics of a savage society. Moreover, for utilitarians, Hinduism ‘is no 
other than that primary worship, which is addressed to the designing and 
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invisible beings who preside over the powers of nature, according to their 
own arbitrary will, and act only for some private and selfish gratification’ 
(HBI: 1: 330). Thus, the utilitarians observed that Indian political systems 
were ruled by superstition.  
For utilitarians, the form of Indian political regime also marked its 
savageness. James Mill argued that ‘No idea of any system of rule, different 
from the will of a single person, appears to have entered the minds of them, 
or their legislators’ (HBI: 1: 175). Hindu law stated that without a king, a 
country would collapse into a state of anarchy (HBI: 3: 57). Although the 
Indian population was suffering from oppression by religious and political 
authority, they desired despotism and did not want any check to the power 
because Hinduism and their tradition made them blind to the oppression. 
Hence, Mill predetermined that Indian societies were suffering from 
indigenous despotism.  
In addition to the savage political systems, indigenous socio-economic 
systems also contributed to the oppression of the Indian population. 
According to Mill, Hindu laws had serious deficiencies: inadequacy of the 
protection of property rights, cruel punishment, unsophisticated criminal 
procedure, unwritten law, and insufficient independence of judges (HBI: 1: 
Ch. 4). Because of these deficiencies, the Indian population was threatened 
with the arbitrariness of dictators and could not enjoy the protection of law. 
Moreover, in the land tenure and revenue systems, the Indian population 
were oppressed. Indian peasants (ryots) were subject to indigenous landlords 
(zamindars). Therefore, they did not have any economic freedom (HBI: 5: 
410-419). Thus, in the discourse of utilitarianism, the majority of the Indian 
population was represented as having no property rights and no economic 
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freedom. 
 Utilitarianism defined Indian societies as in an early stage of 
development by introducing the ladder of civilization in which savage 
societies were placed at the bottom and European countries were put at the 
top (Pitts 2005: 136). In On Liberty (hereafter, ‘OL’) and Considerations on 
Representative Government (hereafter, ‘RG’), J. S. Mill argued that society 
would develop from savagism to modern civilization (Jahn 2005: 603). In a 
savage society, people lack a discipline for cooperation with others and for 
the submission to laws. Therefore, they cannot comprise a nation until they 
learn to obey political authority. In this stage of development, despotic 
government was suitable for disciplining savage people and developing 
civilization. (RG: 212; Jahn 2005: 601-602). However, in this regime, the 
people were just like slaves because subordination derives only from the 
power of the ruler not from the will of the people, and they do not understand 
rules and laws yet (RG: 213). As long as the people are like slaves, 
civilization would cease to progress because ‘the only unfailing and 
permanent source of improvement is liberty’ (OL: 134). East Asian countries 
including India had allowed their people no liberty and individuality (OL: 
139). Therefore, their civilizations were degenerating. However, J. S. Mill did 
not deny the possibility that a savage society would develop into a modern 
society. He suggested the civilization of savage societies by colonial 
administration. Colonial trusteeship in the 19th century was characterized 
by this presumption that colonization could alleviate the savagism and 
despotism of non-European societies. Although, in the late 18th century, 
Adam Smith made his own social development model in which society would 
evolve through the four stages of hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and toward 
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commercial society, he did not apply his theory to the relationship between 
India and Britain and neither did he argue that colonization could civilize 
primitive societies (Pitts 2005: 27-34). 
 When utilitarianism defined Indian societies as savage, Britain was 
implicitly and explicitly represented as civilized. Lord Macaulay, who was a 
utilitarian and colonial administrator, declared that: ‘the history of England 
is emphatically progress’ (cited in Levin 2004: 11). This image of Britishness 
was inherited from the previous generation of British intellectuals. For 
example, Adam Ferguson, one of the representative Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers, stated that:  
 
‘The genius of political wisdom and civil arts appears to have chosen 
his seats in particular tracts of the earth, and to have selected his 
favourites in particular races of men. […] [England had] carried the 
authority and government of law to a point of perfection, which they 
never before attained in the history of mankind.’ (Ferguson 1995 
[1767]: 106, 159) 
 
However, this vision was not created only by the Scottish philosophers. As 
Said (1994: Ch. 2) argues, when Britain sought to rule Ireland and colonize 
America, similar images had already been expressed. By representing India 
as savage and Britain as civilized, the relationship between a trustee and 
target societies was constituted.  
 
Thus, utilitarianism pathologized Indian societies as despotic and 
savage. It was presumed that the Indian population was suffering from 
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savagism and despotism. The liberation of the Indian population from these 
evils was considered as the main objective of colonial administration. 
Utilitarianism presumed that it was the British who had the necessary 
qualification to undertake this task because Britain was one of the most 
civilized nations. It is possible to classify this discourse as a kind of 
humanitarianism because it aimed to alleviate human suffering. This 
humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering in that it identified the nature of target societies as 
pathology, and suggested the colonization of India as a prescription for it. 
James Mill highlighted the altruistic aspect of the British colonial 
administration by arguing that ‘instead of yielding a tribute to England, [the 
colonial administration in India] never yielded enough for the expence [sic] of 
its own government [...] it has cost this country enormous sums’ (cited in 
Levin 2004: 45). This ‘humanitarian’ justification for the British colonial 
administration marked the beginning of the relationship between 
trusteeship and humanitarianism.  
 
1-3 Prescriptions 
Social Engineering 
 The pathology of Indian societies was considered curable, so the 
utilitarians suggested prescriptions for it. In arguing for such prescriptions, 
the utilitarians asked the question: what made the difference between India 
and Europe? James Mill, in his essay ‘Education,’ attributed the cause of the 
difference to ‘education’ (Mill 1992a: 147). His meaning of ‘education’ was 
broader than just ‘teaching’ or ‘instruction.’ He defined ‘education’ as ‘the 
best employment of all the means which can be made use of, by man, for 
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rendering the human mind to the greatest possible degree the cause of 
human happiness’ (ibid.: 141). This definition implied that education was the 
(re)formation of the human mind for the maximization of utility. 
Furthermore, he attempted to classify education into four types: domestic 
education, technical education, social education and political education. 
Domestic education meant the formation of the mind through the conduct of 
the family, and related to the personality and character of the individual. 
Technical education was primarily school education for the acquisition of 
moral and intellectual habits. Social education referred to how a society 
decides what was good for people and could provide happiness. Domestic and 
technical education was thought to be strongly influenced by the social 
norms established by social education. Political education was related to 
political systems that could decide what people desired. According to Mill, 
social education was completely dependent on political education. In other 
words, political education would decide the nature of society (ibid.: 181-182).  
According to utilitarianism, if the difference between Britain and 
India was derived from political education, the reform of Indian political 
systems would lead to the civilization of Indian societies (Jahn 2005: 604)1. 
However, it was considered as dangerous to implement liberal democratic 
systems of government in India prematurely because the Indian population 
would use such free institutions to oppress others. J. S. Mill also stated that: 
 
‘In a barbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. […] 
                                                   
1 While J. S. Mill sought to show how political systems affect social 
development, he did not analyze how civilized nations achieved an advanced 
stage of social development (see Collini et al: 1983: Ch. 4).  
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[W]hen there are either free institutions or a desire for them, in any of 
the people artificially tied together, the interest of the government lies 
in an exactly opposite direction. It is then interested in keeping up 
and envenoming [sic] their antipathies that they may be prevented 
from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of them as tools for 
the enslavement of others.’ (RG: 394) 
 
In their theory, the stage of social development decided the political systems 
of the society. Therefore, before the introduction of civilized political systems 
into India, Indian societies had to be developed.  
Instead of implanting representative government in India, the 
utilitarians insisted that civilized nations make laws to civilize savage 
societies because legislation based on utilitarianism was the universal 
vehicle of civilization. James Mill argued that:  
 
‘how much the vices of the people depend upon the vices of the laws, 
and how necessarily the vices of the people diminish, as the virtues of 
the laws are increased. Of this no man will doubt: that the most 
effectual step which can be taken by any government to diminish the 
vices of the people is to take away from the laws every imperfection, 
by which, the vices, to impart to them every perfection, by which, the 
virtues, of the people, may receive encouragement.’ (HBI: 5: 521) 
 
He suggested the reform of the political and economic systems of Indian 
societies through legislation based on utilitarianism and the liberation of the 
Indian population from religious authority, indigenous despotism, and 
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landlords. As Eric Stokes observes, ‘Mill was proposing a revolution of Indian 
society carried through solely by the weapon of law’ (Stokes 1959: 64).  
Similarly, J. S. Mill thought that the reform of political institutions 
could transform the nature of savage societies. In addition to legislation, he 
suggested the education of Indian elites by employing them as civil servants 
(Mill 1990d: 63-64). In his plan, they would form a middle class and learn 
how to manage liberal democratic institutions of government. Furthermore, 
he proposed the establishment of Western judicial institutions in India. 
These would be an effective tool for spreading the idea of rule of law. In 
particular, criminal courts were considered as ‘a powerful agent of 
civilization’ that could improve the nature of Indian society (Mill 1990a: 152). 
These ideas were based on Bentham’s philosophy. While it is 
debatable whether or not ‘Bentham had always dreamed of making laws for 
India’ (Halevy 1934: 510), he did argue that his legislation, based on 
utilitarianism, could efficiently govern any society in the world (Pitts 2005: 
103-122). This idea deeply affected James and J. S. Mill’s philosophy. 
However, J. S. Mill observed that: ‘It never seems to have occurred to 
[Bentham] to regard political institutions in a higher light, as the principal 
means of the social education of a people’ (Mill 1969: 16). It means that 
Bentham did not examine social engineering through legislation. It was 
James and J. S. Mill who linked the reform of socio-political systems to the 
civilization of savage societies (Pitts 2005: 137). This new idea provided not 
only strong justification for the British colonial administration, but also the 
new strategy of colonial administration. 
 Thus, utilitarianism proposed, as prescriptions for India, the reform 
of socio-political institutions: legislation based on utilitarianism, the 
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establishment of Western educational systems, and the introduction of 
Western judicial institutions. These policies were a kind of social engineering 
because they aimed to transform the nature of Indian societies. Thus, social 
engineering policies were justified as an efficient tool for developing Indian 
societies. 
 
Benevolent Despotism 
 In addition to the social engineering, the authoritarian colonial 
regime in India was justified by utilitarianism because it was better than 
other regimes in terms of administrative efficiency. In principle, 
utilitarianism was opposed to monarchy and aristocracy because such 
systems involved administration that was contrary to a society’s best 
interests. However, in a democracy, policies could not be decided quickly 
because the decision-making process required numerous assemblies (Mill 
1992b: 7). Therefore, representative democracy was supported as a better 
political design by utilitarians. However, as stated above, utilitarianism 
argued that the introduction of liberal democratic institutions would be 
harmful to India because power holders could abuse their position. Rather, 
benevolent despotism by civilized nations could help savage societies to 
reach an advanced stage of social evolution. Therefore, despotic regime was 
justified as a political arrangement in British India.  
 The problem was who would take the responsibility for 
administration in India: the East India Company, the Parliament or the 
Royal Family. James Mill opposed administration by the East India 
Company because it was likely to lead to corruption. Also, control by 
Parliament could encounter problems of patronage. Instead, he suggested 
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administration by the British Royal Family (Mill 1810a: 156; Pitts 2005: 
125-126). According to Mill, ‘A simple form of arbitrary government, 
tempered by European honour and European intelligence, is the only form 
which is fit for Hindustan’ (Mill 1810a: 155).2 On the other hand, J. S. Mill 
thought that a Council of India administration whose members were 
specialists would contribute to administrative efficiency. The Council would 
fill an important role to give administrators relevant information and advice. 
He highlighted the role of specialists and claimed that ‘no executive 
functionaries should be appointed by popular election’ (RG: 211). In his 
scheme, a Council was expected to prevent scandals. He wrote that: ‘The real 
friends of responsibility are those who would have this function exercised by 
a Council, who can be made responsible’ (Mill 1990b: 202). Therefore, ‘The 
utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look 
after it’ (RG: 418). In either case, Indian societies would be deprived of 
political agency. However, the aim of colonial trusteeship was not domination 
over India but the liberation of the Indian population from an indigenous 
despotic regime. Colonial trusteeship was altruistic and humanitarian.  
 Thus, in contrast to Burke’s colonial trusteeship that sought to 
protect Indian societies from the East India Company, utilitarian colonial 
trusteeship legitimized intrusive colonial policies. These included social 
engineering policies and benevolent despotism by the civilized nations. In 
this scheme, Indian societies would be deprived of political agency and their 
                                                   
2 If James Mill thought that the Royal Family was better than other actors 
in terms of a sense of ‘honour,’ it would seem to imply that he trusted in the 
‘virtue’ of the Royal Family, like Edmund Burke. Burke criticized the East 
India Company for corruption and a lack of virtue. He assumed that 
administration should be borne by the ruling class, which had the benefits of 
wisdom and public virtue (Whelan 1996). 
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identity would be transformed. India had already been ruled by the British 
Empire in the early 19th century not due to humanitarian concern but 
because of economic and geopolitical considerations. Utilitarianism 
legitimized such despotic colonial rule by using humanitarian discourse and 
advocated intrusive colonial policies. This humanitarianism was not just 
compassion for human suffering; rather, it pathologized target societies.  
 
1-4 Practice of Colonial Trusteeship 
Utilitarianism not only constituted the theology of colonial 
trusteeship but also directly affected colonial administration in India. In the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries, there were the two kinds of colonial 
administrators in India: one type sought to introduce the basic British 
socio-political systems based on classical liberalism into Indian society 
according to Whig philosophy; the other tried to exploit indigenous systems 
and opposed those introduced from outside (Stokes 1959: 1-18; Metcalfe 
1998: 1-27). Utilitarian colonial administrators were different from those 
administrators in that they criticized Indian civilization and advocated the 
abolition of traditional institutions and the westernization of Indian society 
according to utilitarianism. 
Lord Bentinck, Governor-General in India, was a reforming colonial 
administrator and utilitarian. Before his departure to India, Bentinck said to 
James Mill as follows: ‘I am going to British India but I shall not be 
Governor-General. It is you that will be Governor-General’ (cited in Ghosh 
1995: 22). Bentinck reformed Indian traditional customs regarding the 
treatment of women. He criminalized sati (a social practice in which a 
widowed woman would immolate herself on her husband’s funeral pyre) and 
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abolished other indigenous customs such as female infanticide, despite ‘the 
Company’s policy of noninterference with native “religious usages and 
institutions” established in 1772’ (Cassels 1965: 78). In the 18th century, 
evangelists had sought to abolish these practices, regarding them as 
inhumane. Therefore, they highly praised Bentinck’s actions and the 
Governor-General enjoyed a reputation as a humanitarian. Such reforms 
signified the affinity between utilitarianism and evangelism. Both agreed in 
asserting the liberation of the Indian population from indigenous social 
practices.  
Another utilitarian colonial administrator was T. B. Macaulay, a 
Law-Member of the Governor-General’s Council since 1834. He contributed 
to the introduction of English education under Bentinck. Macaulay’s minutes 
of education stipulated the following: that English should be used as the 
official language instead of Persian; that English should be introduced in all 
educational institutions; that the colonial government should promote the 
translation of Western knowledge into vernacular languages and educate 
indigenous elites to act as a mediator between imperial government and the 
mass of Indian society (Macaulay 1920). His philosophy was deeply 
influenced by utilitarianism. His aim was to foster an educated middle class 
of Indians ‘who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we 
govern – a class of persons Indian in colour and blood, but English in tastes, 
in opinions, in morals, and in intellect’ (Macaulay 1920: 116; Stokes 1959: 45). 
This English educational system attempted to liberate the Indian population 
from the indigenous despotic regime.  
 Lord Dalhousie, one of the representative reforming administrators, 
was also influenced by utilitarianism (Stokes 1959: 248-251; Ghosh 1978). 
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He justified his decision to annex the Awadh region by insisting that it would 
contribute to the liberation of the people in Awadh from despotism. 
Dalhousie explained the situation of Awadh as follows:  
 
‘the Government of India has never taken the one measure which 
alone could be effectual, by withdrawing its countenance from the 
Sovereign of Oudh [Awadh], and its troops from his dominions. It is 
by these aids alone that the Sovereigns of Oudh have been enabled 
for more than half-a-century to persist with impunity in their course 
of oppression and misrule. Their eyes have never seen the misery of 
their subjects; their ears have never been open to their cry.’ (Cited in 
Hunter 1890: 172-173) 
 
Before the annexation, Awadh had been allowed self-government by 
indigenous rulers according to the treaty which Robert Clive concluded with 
the Mughal governor of the province in 1765 (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 113-114; 
Chakravarty 2005: 63). However, Dalhousie thought that the population of 
Awadh was suffering from despotism and misrule and that ‘the British 
Government would be guilty in the sight of God and man, if it were any 
longer to aid in sustaining by its countenance an administration fraught 
with suffering to millions’ (cited in Hunter 1890: 176). Finally in 1856 he 
decided to annex Awadh. His description of the annexation demonstrated the 
characteristics of utilitarianism and humanitarianism. 
 Thus, in practice, utilitarianism affected colonial administration. 
Furthermore, colonial reforms based on utilitarianism were supported by 
evangelists, who were typical humanitarians in the 19th century, because 
５９ 
 
 
 
these policies were humanitarian for British people. 
 
 This section has showed that utilitarianism represented Indian 
societies as oppressed by indigenous despotism and savagism. The objective 
of colonial administration was defined as the liberation of society from 
oppression. This pathologization exhibited characteristics of 
humanitarianism and justified prescriptions including social engineering 
policies and benevolent despotism by civilized nations. This 
humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering. Thus, the discourse of utilitarianism regarding India 
indicated that colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually 
constitutive and that they comprised a dispositive which defined the unequal 
relationship between Britain and India.  
 
 
2. Trusteeship and Post-utilitarianism after the Mutiny 
 In the mid-19th century, colonial trusteeship in India was challenged 
by Indian societies. The Mutiny by the Indian soldiers in the Bengal army of 
the British East India Company broke out at Meerut on 10 May 1857 and 
spread over two thirds of India. It shook the foundations of British India. 
Responding to this challenge, the theology and practice of colonial 
trusteeship radically changed. The British Empire began to research the 
causes of the Mutiny and criticized the hurried Westernization of Indian 
society and utilitarian colonial administration. The liberation of the Indian 
population from an indigenous despotic regime was no longer considered to 
be an objective of colonial administration, but instead to be a cause of the 
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Mutiny. Not only the conservatives but also the liberals observed that the 
pathologization and prescriptions based on utilitarianism were irrelevant in 
India. A new generation of colonial administrators and intellectuals 
attempted to understand the complexity of ‘traditional’ societies and 
re-pathologized India. They insisted that ‘traditional’ societies were so fragile 
that the British Empire had to protect them, otherwise the collapse of 
‘traditional’ socio-political systems would cause ‘anarchy.’ ‘Anarchy’ was 
characterized by irrational violence and imagined mainly from the Mutiny in 
1857. This new pathologization required a different prescription: ‘indirect 
rule.’ This was a new philosophy of colonial rule designed to exploit 
indigenous socio-political systems. 
 
2-1 Re-pathologization of India 
Interpretations of the Mutiny 
The Indian Mutiny was deeply shocking for the British Empire. 
Therefore, even during the Mutiny, various explanations for it were offered. 
For example, G. B. Malleson published the first part of The Mutiny of the 
Bengal Army: A Historical Narrative in June 1857, only two month after the 
first uprising at the Meerut (Chakravarty 2005: 19). After Malleson, many 
more books were published: The Indian Mutiny up to the Relief Lucknow 
(1857) by J. F. Lee and Captain F. W. Radcliffe; Complete Narrative of the 
Mutiny in India from its Commencement to the Present Time (1857) edited 
by Thomas Frost; E. H. Nollan’s Illustrated History of the British Empire in 
India and the East, from the Earliest Times to the Suppression of the Sepoy 
Mutiny in 1859 (1858-1860); The Indian Empire with a Full Account of the 
Mutiny of the Bengal Army (1858-1861) by R. M. Martin; and the History of 
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the Indian Mutiny (1859) by Charles Ball. In this series of interpretations of 
Mutiny, the representation of Indian societies changed. While Indian 
societies were described as savage and suffering from indigenous despotism 
before the Mutiny, now they were represented as suffering from anarchy. For 
the British Empire, the Mutiny was not interpreted as Indian opposition to 
the British colonial rule. Rather, it was considered as a sign of ‘anarchy’ in 
Indian societies.  
 ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence and it was 
interpreted as the savagism of the Indian population. F. O. Mayne, British 
Magistrate and Collector, observed it as follows:  
 
‘In the Pergunnahs [districts] the news spread like wild fire, and the 
villagers rose in every direction and plundered and murdered each 
other promiscuously. Old enmities and the long smothered wish for 
revenge were forthwith satisfied. Auction purchasers and 
decree-holders were ousted, travelers and merchandize plundered, 
and the servants of Government compelled to fly for their lives; and 
in all instance Government buildings and property of every 
description were plundered and destroyed. Every man’s hand was 
against his neighbour, and the natives reveled in all the license and 
madness of unchecked anarchy and rebellion, in a manner such as 
only Asiatics can revel in those pleasure. Tulwars and matchlocks 
were scarce in Bundelkund; but armed with spears and scythes, and 
iron-bound latties, and extemporary axes, formed of chopping knives 
fastened on sticks, they imagined themselves to be warriors, chose 
their own Kings, and defied all comers. Never was revolution more 
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rapid – never more complete.’ (cited by Wagner 2010: 216; see Roy 
1993) 
 
In this story, the Indian population perpetrated violence because of their 
barbarism. They were imagined as irrational, savage, and violent. Moreover, 
according to Sharpe (1991), the story that English women were raped and 
tortured in this Mutiny was invented and recurred repeatedly in the 
accounts of the Mutiny. This representation also marked the anarchical 
nature of Indian societies. 
One of the most influential interpretations of the Mutiny was J. W. 
Kaye’s History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58 (1864-76). He attributed 
the cause of the Mutiny to the Westernization policies that were conducted 
by reforming colonial administrators such as Lord Dalhousie. Whilst before 
the Mutiny he evaluated the Westernization of Indian societies as a success, 
the outbreak of violence made him change his mind (Chakravarty 2005: 59). 
For Kaye, there were three factors that caused the Mutiny: the annexation of 
Awadh; the utilitarian revenue resettlements; and Christianization. 
Many commentators presumed that the annexation of Awadh by Lord 
Dalhousie was one of the most important causes of the Mutiny. Kaye justified 
the intervention in Awadh as necessary because the native government in 
the province was tyrannical. He accepted the reason that Dalhousie gave 
when he decided to intervene. However, he criticized the manner of 
intervention. Kaye wrote that:  
 
‘[intervention] would be as politic as it would be righteous, to 
demonstrate to all States and Nations of India, that we had not 
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deposed the King of Oude [Awadh] for our own benefit – that we had 
not deposed a righteous act on broad principles of humanity, by which 
we had gained nothing.’ (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 144) 
 
However, Dalhousie annexed the territory and acquired the revenue of the 
land. This annexation provoked the antipathy of various classes in India. 
In addition to the annexation of Awadh, Kaye attributed a further 
cause of the Mutiny to the utilitarian revenue resettlements. As stated above, 
the utilitarian colonial policy aimed to relieve ryots (Indian peasants) from 
zamindars (Indian landlords). Instead of zamindars, the East India 
Company attempted to be the sole landlord (Stokes 1959: 94). However, Kaye 
criticized this strategy: 
 
‘These Talookhdars constituted the landed aristocracy of the country; 
they had recognised manorial rights; they had, in many instances, all 
the dignity and power of great feudal barons, and, doubtless, often 
turned that power to bad account. But whether for good or evil, in 
past years, we found them existing as a recognized institution; and it 
was at the same time a cruel wrong and a grievous error to sweep it 
away as though it were an incumbrance and an usurpation.’ (Kaye 
1857-1858: 1: 160) 
 
He thought that the dissolution of Indian traditional communities caused 
anarchy. 
The third cause of the Mutiny was Christianization. As in the 
abolition of sati, utilitarians and missionaries were the conspirators in 
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colonial education. They criticized Hinduism as savage superstition and 
sought to westernize the Indian population (Porter 1999: 231). Kaye thought 
that such a policy created ‘a new generation [of Indians] … not to be satisfied 
with absurd doctrines or captivated by grotesque fables’, while ‘the whole 
[religious] hierarchy of India saw their power, their privileges, and their 
perquisites rapidly crumbling away from them’ (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 181, 183). 
As indigenous religious systems had supported the order of Indian societies, 
the liberation of the Indian population from religious customs contributed to 
the growth of ‘anarchy.’ 
 As well as Kaye’s interpretation of the Mutiny, W. W. Hunter ’s 
account of the Mutiny also demonstrated the profound shift in the 
pathologization of India. Hunter served as a Bengal civil servant and 
published his own ‘Annals of Rural Bengal.’ After taking office as 
director-general of statistics to the Government of India, he conducted a 
census. It covered roads, railways, manufacturing, commerce and 
newspapers throughout India. In his book, The Indian Empire (1893), 
Hunter summarized the causes of the Mutiny, including two that Kaye did 
not mention. The first was a rumor that ran through the Native army ‘that 
the cartridges served out to the Bengal regiments had been greased with the 
fat of cows, the sacred animal of the Hindus; and even with the lard of pigs – 
animals which are unclean alike to Hindu and Muhammandan’ (Hunter 
1893: 489). It signified the misunderstanding and indifference of the British 
Empire regarding local religions. The second was the restriction of ‘the 
higher posts in its service to natives of education, talent, or proved fidelity’ 
(ibid.: 488-489). According to Hunter, this policy led to widespread 
dissatisfaction.  
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 Thus, the Mutiny was represented as the sign of the anarchical 
nature of Indian societies. ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence. 
Colonial administrators and intellectuals interpreted the Mutiny as a result 
of utilitarian colonial policies, hurried Westernization, and 
misunderstanding of Indian societies. The liberation of the Indian population 
from religious and political despotism was severely criticized as a cause of 
‘anarchy.’ However, by making this argument, Indian societies were 
re-pathologized as suffering from ‘anarchy.’  
 
New Philosophy for Pathologization 
 Utilitarianism could no longer provide the theoretical foundation of 
colonial trusteeship. Instead, a new philosophy for colonial trusteeship was 
created by Henry Maine, a jurist and a professor of law in Cambridge and a 
law member of the Viceroy’s Council in India.  
In his books, Ancient Law (hereafter, ‘AL’) and Village-communities 
(hereafter, ‘VC’), he proposed a model of ancient society and applied it to 
India and Europe. According to him, the East was certainly full of fragments 
of ancient society (VC: 7). In order to explain the nature of ancient society, 
Maine introduced the idea of ‘family’ which ‘is the type of an archaic society 
[…] but the family here spoken of is not exactly the family as understood by a 
modern’ (AL: 69). He argued that: ‘We must look on the family as constantly 
enlarged by the absorption of strangers within its circle, and we must try to 
regard the fiction of adoption as so closely simulating the reality of kinship’ 
(AL: 69). Finally, the families construct village communities (the clans and 
tribes) (VC: 9; Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (hereafter, 
‘LEH’): 70). In the families, various rights such as property rights belonged 
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to the community. The members of the family were not free individuals but 
restricted by traditional social systems.  
In the next stage of social development, the families would dissolve in 
‘The movement of the progressive societies’. In this process, ‘The Individual 
is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take 
account’ (AL.: 79). In the modern society, ‘all these relations arise from the 
free agreement of Individuals […] only contract gives its legal validity’ (AL.: 
85). In this sense, the societies evolve ‘from Status to Contract’ (AL.: 86). The 
village communities in India were in the stage of primitive societies and the 
process of feudalization would begin (VC: 66-67; LEH: 85). In this process, 
‘blood-hood’ by which a body of men is held together would disappear and 
‘territory’ would bind them together (AL: 56-57). This ‘transition from one 
state of society to another in modern India [was] not sudden but gradual and 
slow’ (LEH: 289-290).  
If the development of society was too rapid, Indian socio-political 
systems would disintegrate and lead to grave consequences for the stability 
of imperial rule. Maine stated that:  
 
‘The result is the immediate decline [of a peasant proprietary], and 
consequently bitter discontent, of the class above them, who find 
themselves sinking to the footing of mere annuitants on the land. 
Such was the land settlement of Oudh, which was shattered to pieces 
by the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, and which greatly affected its course.’ 
(VC: 70) 
 
Thus, he provided new philosophical foundation for pathologization of India. 
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Indian societies were represented as in the early stage of development and 
exceedingly fragile. Therefore, the British Empire had to prevent them from 
disintegrating. The protection of the Indian population from ‘anarchy’ 
replaced the liberation of them from despotism as the main objective of 
colonial administration and constituted colonial trusteeship in India. This 
discourse also marked the origins of the relationship between trusteeship 
and humanitarianism because the idea of anarchy was closely related to 
human suffering. As the danger of ‘anarchy’ was highlighted, discursive 
formation of colonial trusteeship was strengthened. This humanitarianism 
required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. 
 This new philosophy considered laws not as a vehicle of civilization 
but as a tool to prevent ‘traditional’ societies from dissolving. Maine argued 
that: ‘Law is stable; the societies we are speaking of are progressive.’ 
Therefore, a society needs the agencies by which ‘Law is brought into 
harmony with society’ (AL: 20). Legislation in India had two paradoxical 
effects. On the one hand, legislation would replace the native law. He stated 
that:  
 
‘the apparently inevitable displacement of native law and usage by 
English law, when the two sets of rules are in contact, is a 
phenomenon which may be observed over a great part of India at the 
present moment.’ (VC: 18) 
 
On the other hand, legislation would ‘give a solidity and a rigidity to native 
usage which it does not naturally possess’ (cited in Lyall 1893: 298). In order 
to control the transformation of Indian societies, he suggested as his 
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principle of legislation ‘timely legislation’ (cited in Lyall 1893: 298). 
As a colonial administrator, he made various laws such as the law on 
marriage. However, he sometimes failed to implement his ideas of laws. For 
example, his legislation on marriage was opposed by Shia and Sunni Muslim 
groups. Therefore, he had to adopt a special law to appease critics of the 
legislation. Also, the bill on contract, which Maine proposed, was 
disapproved by the Governor-General because it might result in the 
exclusion of native people from agricultural contracts and cause further 
rebellions like that of 1857 (Otter 2007: 103). 
While Maine’s legislation seemed to be ineffective, as Karuna 
Mantena (2010: 161) states, ‘For policymakers, Maine’s work drew attention 
to the crisis of native society and provided a theoretical framework through 
which to understand its origins and consequence’.  
 
2-2 New Prescriptions 
 As a prescription for ‘anarchy,’ the idea of indirect rule was created. 
This new colonial strategy aimed to create and solidify Indian ‘traditional’ 
socio-political systems. This shift of colonial strategy was represented by the 
Queen’s Proclamation that was read by Lord Canning as the Governor 
General on 1 Nov 1858. It declared that: 
 
‘We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in 
anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their 
religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal 
and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge to 
enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain 
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from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our 
subjects on pain of our highest displeasure … we will that generally, 
in framing and administration of law, due regard be paid to the 
ancient rights, usages and customs of India.’ (Cited in Philips, Singh, 
and Pandey 1962: 11) 
 
The British Empire abandoned the utilitarian strategy and began to focus on 
indigenous religious and political systems. However, this new colonial policy 
was not to respect the difference between Britain and India. Rather, it 
sought to manipulate the difference through the construction of ‘traditional’ 
institutions. Indirect rule was not ‘Non-Regulation system’ in which the 
British Empire arranged an alliance with native states and entrusted 
internal administration to ‘traditional’ rulers. As Mahmood Mamdani aptly 
describes, indirect rule was a ‘decentralized despotism’ (Mamdani 1996: 37). 
Furthermore, as Thomas Metcalf (1998) argues, the ideology of indirect rule 
was ‘to create a simulation of the Middle Ages, in which its institutions 
remained apparently intact even as they were fundamentally altered to suit 
the requirements of the new order’ (Metcalf 1998: 80).  
Thus, indirect rule attempted to unilaterally constitute local 
‘traditional’ institutions by manipulating the symbolic and cultural 
constitution of Indian societies. In this sense, it was a kind of social 
engineering policy and another form of despotism. This new prescription was 
legitimized to protect Indian societies from the danger of ‘anarchy.’  
 
2-3 Practice of Colonial Trusteeship 
 The idea of indirect rule was highly influential in British colonial 
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administration in the late 19th century. For example, the imperial assembly 
in 1877 was based on the idea of indirect rule. It declared that the British 
Empire was the top of the ‘traditional’ hierarchy of Indian native countries. A 
central planner for the assembly was Lord Lytton, who was appointed 
viceroy and governor general in 1876. His strategy was to direct ‘the native 
aristocracy of the country, whose sympathy and cordial allegiance is no 
inconsiderable guarantee for the stability [...] of the Indian Empire’ (Lytton 
to Queen Victoria, 21 April 1876, cited in Cohn 1992: 188), and to ‘place the 
Queen’s authority upon the ancient throne of the Moguls, with which the 
imagination and tradition of [our] Indian subjects associate the splendor of 
supreme power’ (ibid.: 187-188). Lytton thought that traditional and 
symbolic rituals should be employed because ‘they [Indian aristocracy] are 
easily affected by sentiment and susceptible to the influence of symbols to 
which facts inadequately correspond’ (Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, cited 
in Cohn 1992: 192). Also, as Trevithick observes, this strategy was ‘an 
economical method of rule’ (Trevithick 1990: 563). Actually, Lytton wrote that 
‘the cost of the Assemblage will really be very moderate, and the effect of it 
may save millions’ (Lytton to Morley, 29 Oct. 1876, cited in Trevithick 1990: 
563). 
The assembly was held at an historic site outside Delhi, the Old 
Mughal capital in which the planners ‘constructed a temporary city of tents 
and canvas’ (Cannadine 2001: 46). Finally, the assembly demonstrated that 
the native chiefs were put under the control of the British Empire. Lytton’s 
private secretary, O. T. Burne, reviewed the assembly as follows:  
 
‘[The imperial assemblage] brought the native chiefs into line, caused 
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them to realize clearly for the first time that they were under one 
Sovereign, induced them to offer from that moment their personal 
services and troops to the Government, and effected generally a 
change in tone and feeling towards the British Empire, which has 
from that period onwards been of great benefit.’ (Burne 1907: 222) 
 
 In addition to the assembly, Lytton planned to construct several 
systems for the manipulation of Indian aristocracy: an Indian Privy Council 
and a College of Arms. The College of Arms was the system that aimed to 
re-organize the Indian aristocracy on the basis of the British knighthood 
(Metcalf 1998: 77-78; Cohn 1993: 190). Likewise, the Indian Privy Council 
was proposed to legitimize the Viceroy (the Governor-General) in India. 
Bernard Cohn argues that:  
 
‘Lytton’s intention was to arrange the constitution of the privy 
council “to enable the Viceroy, whilst making parade of consulting 
native opinion to swamp the native members, and still secure the 
prestige of their presence and assent”’(Cohn 1993: 190).  
 
Although the ideology of indirect rule pretended to respect the 
difference between India and Britain, there is no doubt that it was little 
more than despotism. Traditional institutions created by the colonial 
government were imposed on the Indian population. The westernized natives 
were considered those ‘who represent nothing but the social anomaly of own 
position’ (Lytton to Queen Victoria, 16 Nov. 1876 cited in Cohn 1992: 192), 
though they had been thought to be useful agents of modernization before 
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the Mutiny. Furthermore, Lytton imposed severe restrictions on the Indian 
press and the employment of Indian as public servants (Moore 1999: 432). 
 Not only the conservatives but also liberals adopted the idea of 
indirect rule. While liberals did not deny the gradual development of Indian 
societies like conservatives,3 they attempted to prevent the disintegration of 
indigenous socio-political systems. Lord Lyall, who was ‘Maine’s most 
respected intellectual successor ’ (Mantena 2010: 165), was a liberal colonial 
theorist. His understanding of India was strongly influenced by Henry 
Maine. He highlighted the importance of the traditional society and 
advocated its protection (Lyall 1907a: 260, 263). In a similar observation to 
that of Maine, Lyall also claimed that traditional societies were so fragile 
that the British Empire ought to protect them (Lyall 1907a: 216, 219). It was 
dangerous to allow the disintegration of them without any understanding of 
‘how the void which they will leave can be filled up’ (Lyall 1907a: 264). He 
endorsed Maine’s opinion that it was wrong to assume that ‘political 
institutions could be imported like steam machinery, warranted to stand any 
climate and to benefit every community’ (Lyall 1893: 290). Therefore, in 
India, the construction of Westernized socio-political systems would 
endanger the stability of Indian societies. 
                                                   
3 The Ilbert Bill crisis in 1883 was the event which made a clear distinction 
between liberalism and conservatism. A point of contention was to what 
extent despotism could be allowed in Indian colonies. C. Ilbert submitted the 
bill which aimed the expansion of equality before the criminal law to the 
Indian population and this bill stirred up controversy. On the one side, a 
conservative administrator, J. F. Stephen, strongly opposed it because ‘[the 
British government of India] is essentially an absolute government, founded, 
not on consent, but on conquest’ (cited in Stokes 1959: 288). On the other side, 
the liberal administrators such as Lord Ripon, W. W. Hunter and Lord Lyall 
supported the bill because ‘equality before the law’ was leitmotif for 
liberalism. 
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The idea of indirect rule exploited indigenous symbolic and cultural 
institutions to subject Indian societies to the British Empire. There is no 
doubt that indirect rule was nothing but despotism. Not only conservatives 
but also liberals supported this colonial strategy because they agreed in the 
pathologization of Indian societies. Indian societies were represented as 
suffering from ‘anarchy.’ This new pathologization redefined the objective of 
colonial administration as the protection of the Indian population from 
‘anarchy’ and reconstituted colonial trusteeship. ‘Anarchy’ was characterized 
by irrational violence and interpreted as a sign of the savageness of the 
Indian populations. This discourse had characteristics of humanitarianism 
because it considered ‘anarchy’ as a kind of human suffering. However, this 
humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering. It imagined that, in the state of ‘anarchy,’ the Indian 
population would commit murder, plunder, and rape. Thus, after the Mutiny, 
colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constituted. And 
the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was reproduced.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Colonial trusteeship in India was a case of existing rule that 
subsequently required humanitarian discourse as justification. Although the 
idea of human suffering did not emerge explicitly, the theology of colonial 
trusteeship in India demonstrated a discursive structure of 
humanitarianism. Moreover, this kind of humanitarianism was not just 
compassion with human suffering; rather, it identified the nature of target 
societies as pathology. In the early 19th century, utilitarianism observed that 
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the Indian population was suffering from savagism and oppression by 
indigenous religious and political despotism. Compassion for savage and 
oppressed peoples in India seemed to be a kind of humanitarianism. It 
pathologized Indian societies and defined the objective of colonial 
administration as the liberation of the Indian population from indigenous 
religious and political despotism. Hence, it marked the origins of the 
relationship between colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism. After the 
Mutiny of 1857, ‘anarchy,’ which was considered to be caused by 
modernization, formed the new pathology of India. ‘Anarchy’ was 
characterized by irrational violence and interpreted as a sign of the savagism 
of the Indian population. Because of their nature, Indian societies would 
easily descend into a state of ‘anarchy.’ Therefore, the British Empire ought 
to protect them from ‘anarchy.’ Hence, the protection of Indian societies from 
anarchy was defined as the new objective of colonial administration. These 
pathologizations constituted the unequal relationship between Britain and 
India, and moreover, prescriptions such as social engineering and benevolent 
despotism. Thus, in the 19th century, the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship was formed and reproduced.  
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Ch. 3 Colonial Trusteeship and Humanitarianism in Africa:  
The Anti-slavery Movement and the Native Protection Movement 
 
In the analysis of the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship in 
India, the previous chapter showed the origins of the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship. This chapter will explore the theology and 
practice of colonial trusteeship in Africa in the 19th century. The theology of 
colonial trusteeship in India identified ‘oppression’ and ‘anarchy’ as 
unignorable human suffering. Similarly, the theology of colonial trusteeship 
in Africa also acknowledged ‘slavery,’ ‘anarchy,’ and ‘invasion’ as human 
suffering. Philip Curtin (1963) calls the mid-19th century ‘the age of 
humanitarianism,’ showing that humanitarian discourse was deeply related 
to the colonization of Africa. In the 19th century, unlike British India, there 
were not large African territories over which the British Empire had 
effective control. Humanitarianism, in this context, required practices above 
and beyond the direct relief of suffering and to a certain extent constituted 
colonial trusteeship before the British Empire began to rule African colonies.  
 This chapter will analyze two humanitarian movements in Africa: 
the anti-slavery movement and the native protection movement. The former 
aimed to eliminate the slave trade between Africa and Western countries, 
and, in doing so, called on the British Empire to colonize Africa. The latter 
sought to protect African native people from European colonists and place 
African native communities under the control of the British Empire. These 
movements directly influenced colonial trusteeship. As the next chapter will 
discuss, the development of native welfare and anti-slavery was recognized 
as one of the duties of trustees by the European powers in the Berlin Congo 
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Conference (1884-1885) and the Brussels Conference (1890). Analyzing 
humanitarian movements in the 19th century, Brian Stanley (1990) observes 
that:  
 
‘Evangelical Christians remained as staunchly committed to the 
causes of liberty for the gospel, freedom for the slave, and protection 
for the native. […] But those same concerns were now drawing them 
more frequently and more enthusiastically into the advocacy of 
explicitly imperial solutions.’ (Stanley 1990: 132)  
 
As many historians have shown, humanitarians had often adhered to 
‘imperial solutions’ (Curtin 1964; Ward 1969; Dachs 1972; Stanley 1990; 
Temperley: 1991; Porter 1999 and 2004). However, there remain some 
questions to be answered: how and why did humanitarianism constitute 
colonial trusteeship? Humanitarianism has not always constituted colonial 
trusteeship. This chapter will demonstrate that, as in the case of 
utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism, when humanitarianism pathologized 
African societies, it justified colonial administration as a solution. 
 The first section will examine how the anti-slavery movement 
pathologized African societies and justified colonial administration in Africa. 
The second section will analyze how the native protection movement 
pathologized native African countries and advocated the territorial 
expansion of the British Empire.  
 
1. Anti-Slavery Movement and Empire 
Until the mid-19th century, the anti-slavery movement had not 
７７ 
 
 
 
sought any imperial solution to slavery problems. However, after the 
emancipation of slaves in 1833-1834, the anti-slavery movement began to 
denounce the nature of African societies and advocate colonial rule in Africa. 
This section analyzes the transition from the early anti-slavery discourse to 
the later discourse by examining the pamphlets by William Wilberforce and 
T. F. Buxton. Wilberforce was a leader of the anti-slavery movement and 
Member of Parliament for Yorkshire. Buxton was Wilberforce’s successor as 
the leader of the parliamentary movement and a member of Anti-Slavery 
Society. 
 
1-1 ‘The War of Representation’ and W. Wilberforce 
In the late 18th century, the abolitionists’ argument against slavery 
had been accepted by many intellectuals and missionaries. For example, the 
productivity of slavery was questioned by Adam Smith and his followers 
(Drescher 2002). However, as the beneficiaries of plantation economies had 
exerted strong influence on the Parliament, slavery and its trade had not 
been illegalized. The early anti-slavery activists such as Thomas Clarkson 
and Granville Sharpe aimed to organize the networks of the anti-slavery 
movement and to mobilize public opinion. The anti-slavery movement 
gradually gained support from transatlantic religious networks such as the 
Quakers and the Methodists because missionaries regarded the slave trade 
as a sin against religion (Porter 1999: 202).  
The controversies over the Atlantic slave trade between abolitionists 
and anti-abolitionists turned the representation of slaves and African 
natives into a battlefield. This is what Catherine Hall terms a ‘war of 
representation’ (Hall 2002: 107). On one side, those who supported slavery 
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and the slave-trade dehumanized slaves and African natives; whilst on the 
other, abolitionists publicly advocated recognizing slaves and African natives 
as ‘human.’  
When Wilberforce published his pamphlet in 1807, A Letter on the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade Addressed to the Freeholders and Other 
Inhabitants of Yorkshire (hereafter, ‘LAST’), his aim was to persuade 
politicians and public opinion that African natives and slaves were ‘human.’ 
British society had treated slaves as objects, and any laws in the British 
Empire had not recognized slaves as having a legal personality. Wilberforce 
stated in the pamphlet:  
 
‘Surely, however, the rejection of the proposition [on the abolition of 
the Slave Trade] shews, that they not only do not themselves regard 
the Negroes as entitled to the consideration and treatment due to a 
human being, considered as such, but that they cannot even 
persuade themselves that he will be regarded as entitled to them by 
the world in general.’ (LAST: 170) 
 
The recognition of the personality of slaves and African natives was 
indispensable for the anti-slavery movement because public compassion for 
slaves and African natives required the humane treatment of slaves and 
African natives. For Wilberforce, the dehumanization of slaves and African 
natives was ‘the grand master vice of the colonial system’ (LAST: 172).  
In addition to the humanization of slaves and African natives, 
Wilberforce sought to demonstrate various immoral aspects of the slave 
trade. First, the slave trade had caused tribal wars in Africa because African 
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people tried to capture and sell each other as slaves to buy Western 
commodities. The wars had destroyed native communities and as a result, 
the morals, habits and manners of African societies had declined. Second, the 
treatment of slaves was cruel and inhumane when they were shipped to the 
colonies such as West India. In fact, ‘the average mortality on board the 
Slave ships was very considerable’ (LAST: 98). Third, the slave trade had 
obstructed the progress and prosperity of Africa. Without the slave trade, 
communication with Europe would have brought ‘the blessings of religious 
and moral light, and social improvement’ to Africa (LAST: 41). Moreover, 
according to Wilberforce, the slave trade had endangered the morality and 
manners not only of African societies but also of British society (LAST: 339).  
However, the missionaries’ representation of slaves and African 
natives was biased. The idea of ‘human’ to which Wilberforce and other 
missionaries referred meant Christians and heathens who had the potential 
for conversion. Previously, Spanish missionaries, such as Las Casas, in the 
16th century, had recognized Amerindians as potential Christians and 
ignored their identity (Todorov 1984). British missionaries too were likely to 
ignore the identity of slaves and African natives. The argument by Samuel 
Pearce, a member of the Baptist Missionary Society, demonstrated this 
‘indifference.’ He claimed that ‘[a] Christian’s heart ought to be as 
comprehensive as the universe. The Asiatic, the American, the African – all 
are our brethren’ (Hall 2002: 295). Furthermore, the missionaries confirmed 
the ‘savageness’ of Africa by presuming that Africa was ruled by ignorance 
and superstition. Wilberforce wrote that:  
 
‘When men began to question the soundness of that logic, which 
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grounded the right to carry off the natives of Africa into slavery, on 
their state of barbarism and ignorance; and still more, when it was 
resorted, that even granting the premises, that the Africans were 
thus dark and savage; the conclusion of a Christian reasoner ought 
naturally to be, that it was the duty of mere favoured nations to 
civilize and enlighten, not to oppress and enslave, them.’ (LAST: 90) 
 
Nevertheless, he did not develop this policy of civilization and 
Christianization of African societies because he considered slave trade to be 
the most serious obstacle to the progress of Africa. His chief aim was not to 
civilize Africans but to abolish slavery and its trade. Appealing to the House, 
he published a pamphlet just days before the crucial decision on the Slave 
Trade Abolition Act (1807) in the House of Lords (Hague 2008: 351). In this 
pamphlet, the root cause was attributed to slave traders and planters. On 
this point, his pathologization of Africa was inchoate, although African 
people and slaves were defined as ‘uncivilized’ and ‘savage.’ In his description, 
the representation of whiteness was split into the civilized and the savage. 
Analyzing the discourse of missionaries in the early 19th century, Hall (2002: 
113) argues that:  
 
‘Britishness and whiteness, in the discourse of the missionaries and 
their allies, should mean order, civilization, Christianity, domesticity 
and separate spheres, rationality and industry. When it carries 
another set of meanings, it was deeply disturbing: white people then 
became “savages”, uncultivated and uncivilized.’  
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As Wilberforce represented the British and white people as perpetrators of 
the problems of slavery, the civilization of Africa was not considered to be a 
solution to the problems.  
Even after the Slave Trade Abolition Act was passed, Wilberforce did 
not stop the ‘war of representation.’ He continued to advocate the 
suppression of illegal slave trading and the liberation of slaves. In 1823, 
Wilberforce published a new pamphlet, An Appeal to the Religion, Justice, 
and Humanity of the Inhabitants of the British Empire, in Behalf of the 
Negro Slaves in the West Indies (hereafter ‘ARJ’). This pamphlet focused on 
the terrible conditions of slaves and the laws oppressing slaves in West India. 
It claimed that: ‘The slaves were systematically depressed below the level of 
human beings’ (ARJ: 9). It was not planters and masters but the systems of 
slavery that allowed the oppression of slaves. These systems rested on the 
prejudice that slaves and African people were not ‘human’. Wilberforce 
denounced the prejudice against slaves and Africans: 
 
‘The Proofs of the extreme degradation of the slaves, in the latter 
sense, are innumerable; and indeed it must be confessed, that in the 
minds of European in general, more especially in vulgar minds, 
whether vulgar from the want of education, or morally vulgar,... the 
personal peculiarities of the Negro race could scarcely fail, by 
diminishing sympathy, to produce impressions, not merely of 
contempt, but even of disgust and aversion.’ (ARJ: 9) 
 
The prejudice among many European people and the discriminatory laws 
against slaves were mutually constitutive. These formed the systems of 
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slavery.  
Wilberforce suggested two prescriptions for the problems of slavery: 
the abolition of the slave trade and legislation to protect slaves. The abolition 
of the slave trade would prevent the planters from easily buying slaves from 
slave traders and simply letting their slaves die. The planters ‘would be 
forced to improve the condition of their slaves’ (ARJ: 26). The legislation to 
protect slaves would not only secure the slaves’ lives but also improve their 
social conditions (ARJ: 9). However, when Wilberforce’s approach reached its 
limits in the 1820s, the strategy of the anti-slavery movement radically 
changed. 
 
1-2 Security, Civilization, and Colonization: T. F. Buxton and Anti-Slavery 
Expedition 
According to Andrew Porter, ‘From 1823 [humanitarians] increased 
demands for direct imperial intervention, even in colonies with their own 
Legislative Assemblies, to secure improved conditions for the slaves’ (Porter 
1999: 202). In this period, the relationship between the anti-slavery 
movement and the British government was deepening. On the one hand, the 
missionaries needed help from the British government to emancipate all 
slaves and suppress illegal slave trading. As stated above, even after 
criminalizing the slave trade, the volume of the trading did not decrease and 
the conditions of slaves did not improve. On the other hand, it was difficult 
for politicians to ignore the anti-slavery movement because petitions from 
the latter to Parliament considerably increased. In this situation, T. F. 
Buxton, the Member of Parliament for Weymouth since 1818, succeeded to 
the leadership of the parliamentary movement on anti-slavery. He took over 
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from Wilberforce in 1821 (Hague 2008: 474-475).  
The 1830s was the heyday of the anti-slavery movement. According 
to Porter, ‘Slaves in Britain’s colonies were emancipated as from 1 August 
1834; subject to varying periods of “apprenticeship” to their former masters, 
all would be completely free in 1840’ (Porter 1999: 204). However, even after 
the emancipation of slaves, the slave trade did not disappear. Therefore, 
Buxton had to re-examine the structure of the slave trade and try to find a 
remedy. In 1837, new ideas for the abolition of slave trade came to him and 
he approached the government to put his plan into practice (Temperley 1991: 
9). These plans were published as a pamphlet in 1839 called The African 
Trade and its Remedy (hereafter ‘ATR’). This publication had a great impact 
on public opinion and Parliament.  
 
Pathologization of Africa 
 In this pamphlet, Buxton focused not on consumers but on providers 
of slaves. He wanted to explain how the slaves were being provided and who 
was doing the providing. He argued that African people were selling each 
other as slaves. According to him,  
 
‘The parent – debased and brutalised as he is – barters his child; the 
chief his subject; each individual looks with an evil eye on his 
neighbour, and lays snares to catch him, – because the sale of 
children, subjects, and neighbours, is the only means as yet afforded, 
by European commerce, for the supply of those wants which that 
commerce has created.’ (ATR: 7) 
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Africans were represented as cruel and greedy. They were so demoralized 
and degraded that they waged tribal wars as soon as slave trade ships 
arrived at the coast (ATR: 79). Villages were broken, and the survivors were 
carried off and sold to slave traders. Now, Africa was in a state of anarchy 
(ATR: 84).  
Why were they so cruel that they could sell and kill each other? 
Buxton identified cruel traditions and customs that forced Africans to kill 
each other. He observed that:  
 
‘Many slaves are killed at their various “customs,” […] the decease of 
a person is announced by a discharge of musketry proportioned to his 
rank, or the wealth of his family.’ (ATR: 233-234) 
 
Buxton concluded that ‘in the present state of things, human life and human 
suffering are very very lightly regarded’ in Africa (ATR: 226). 
However, according to Buxton, even if Africans were moralized, 
uncivilized Africans would have nothing to sell but slaves. Buxton explained, 
‘The pursuit of man, therefore, is to him not a matter of choice and selection, 
but of necessity, and after any interval of constrained abstinence he will 
revert to it as the business of his life’ (ATR: 278). Although African soil was 
remarkably fertile, they did not know how to avail themselves of their own 
resources. However, even after they learnt the required techniques, 
commerce could not develop because Africa was thought to be in a state of 
anarchy and security was not guaranteed. The civilization of Africa, 
thereafter, required the construction of security as well as the provision of 
agricultural techniques. 
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 Thus, Buxton pathologized African societies by reasoning that the 
slave trade continued because of the savageness of Africans. 
Humanitarianism required him to identify the root causes of this 
humanitarian crisis; it was concluded that the causes of the problems lay in 
the savage nature of African societies. This humanitarianism required what 
was above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. While Buxton’s aim was 
merely to find the primary causes of slavery, in the process he pathologized 
African societies. This pathologization, as the next section will show, 
contributed to the constitution of colonialism.4  
 
Establishment of Security 
Buxton tried to find a solution to the root causes of slavery and the 
slave trade.  Before suggesting his prescriptions, in his pamphlet, he 
examined the fruitless efforts that had been made for the suppression of 
slave traders. In 1835, Britain and Spain concluded the Anti-Slavery Treaty. 
It authorized British vessels to arrest suspected Spanish slave traders and 
bring them before the mixed commissions which were established at Sierra 
Leone and Havana. Moreover, Spain was required to supervise Spanish 
traders (Lloyd 1949; Ward 1969). Nevertheless, ‘there is no diminution in the 
Spanish Slave Trade’ (ATR: 211). The Anglo-Spanish agreement that was 
referred to as a model for an anti-slavery treaty had been ineffective. Even if 
Britain could conclude similar agreements with other powers, such as 
                                                   
4 According to Curtin (1964: 289-342), an ‘attitude of cultural chauvinism’ 
was a general tendency in British thought about Africa. Specialists such as 
missionaries, explorers, and traders were likely to attract public attention by 
giving sensational examples. However, their knowledge of Africa contained 
errors and these errors ‘had become “common knowledge”’ (Curtin 1964: 
342). 
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Portugal, it could not abolish the slave trade (ATR: 219).  
However, this does not mean that he thoroughly denied the 
possibility and validity of suppressing slave trade by using the British Navy; 
rather, he suggested strengthening and deploying the Navy on the coast of 
Africa from Gambia to Angola (ATR: iii and Ch. I in Part II). Moreover, 
Buxton suggested Fernando Po as the naval base to suppress the slave 
traders, and Sierra Leone as the foothold for the civilization of Africa (ATR: 
347, 365). Thus, his plan advocated the deployment of the navy and the 
colonization of African coasts. This arrangement of the imperial squadron 
was considered the first ‘preparatory measure’ in his plan (ATR: 299). 
It is not surprising that some other missionaries such as J. Sturge 
strongly opposed Buxton’s plans. This was because most missionaries 
principally disliked the employment of armed force (Curtin 1964: 316). Of 
course, ‘Unlike Palmerston, Buxton was no advocate of gunboat diplomacy’ 
(Temperley 1991: 32-35). However, the use of force seemed to be the means to 
an end to achieve the ‘great objective’ for Buxton. Furthermore, he 
‘disclaim[ed] any disposition to erect a new empire in Africa’ (ATR: 453). 
Clearly, he was in a dilemma into which humanitarians had often drifted 
when humanitarian objectives required the use of force.  
 The second ‘preparatory measure’ suggested by Buxton was to 
conclude ‘treaties with native powers interior ’ (ATR: 299). In this plan, 
associated native chiefdoms would suppress the slave trade in their own 
territory, prevent the slave traders from carrying through their dominions, 
and provide the facility and protection for the transport of legitimate 
merchandise. This plan would lead to the expansion of colonial rule in Africa. 
Buxton supported the opinion of General Turner, a governor of Sierra Leone, 
８７ 
 
 
 
as follows:  
 
‘a sovereignty which I will procure from the natives, if approved of, at 
a small expense; and I will establish and maintain the British flag on 
them, which will cause them to be considered British waters, and 
give us the power to exclude all nations from them […] I informed 
them that the only condition upon which I would grant them 
effectual security would be the giving up for ever the Slave Trade, 
making over to me for the King of England the sovereignty of their 
territories, acknowledging the laws of England, laying down their 
arms in the present war, and agreeing never to undertake any other 
without the consent of the government of Sierra Leone for the time 
being.’ (ATR: 402) 
 
Thus, Buxton proposed the use of the imperial squadron to regulate the slave 
trade, the construction of navy bases in Africa and supported for the 
acquisition of the sovereignty of African territories by the conclusion of the 
treaties with native chiefs. 
 
Social Engineering through Cultivation, Christianization, and Civilization 
After suggesting the ‘preparatory measures,’ Buxton argued for his 
main policies such as the encouragement of legitimate commerce and 
agricultural cultivation in Africa (ATR: 6). Why were legitimate commerce 
and agricultural cultivation important? As stated above, Buxton thought 
that three factors contributed to the continuation of the slave trade: immoral 
traditions and customs, tribal wars and the anarchical state of much of the 
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continent, and the uncivilized nature of people that meant they were unable 
to exploit the resources in Africa. It was supposed that legitimate commerce 
and agricultural cultivation would remove these root causes of slavery. He 
claimed that:  
 
‘How then shall we undeceive her chiefs, and convince them, that it is 
for their interest that the Slave Trade should cease? This we must do 
for Africa: we must elevate the minds of her people, and call forth the 
capabilities of her soil.’ (ATR: 281-282, emphasis in the original) 
 
For him, the sound expansion of commerce and agriculture would enable 
Africans to use their own resources and to improve their morality. In 
particular, Buxton assigned high priority to agricultural cultivation because 
it would provide the commodities to sell (ATR: 338). Moreover, the 
development of agriculture would indirectly contribute to the elevation of the 
native mind. For Buxton, agriculture was ‘obviously one of the first arts to 
which we ought to direct their attention.’ It would bring African people ‘into a 
condition of life most favourable for the reception and spread of Christianity’ 
(ATR: 483). He thought that agricultural cultivation would prepare the 
ground for missionary work, and concluded ‘that Christianity will meet the 
necessities of the case, and will prove a specific remedy for the moral evils of 
Africa’ (ATR: 511). 
Agricultural cultivation would lead to Christianity and this, in turn, 
would lead to the civilization of Africa. Buxton referred to Reverend William 
Ellis’ opinion: ‘True civilization and Christianity are inseparable; the former 
has never been found but as a fruit of the latter’ (ATR: 507). As Brian Stanley 
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(2001: 176) claims, ‘The substantial majority of the mission thought in the 
English evangelical tradition from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth 
centuries and was fully committed to the priority of Christianity over 
civilization’. Thus, in Buxton’s plan, cultivation, Christianization and 
civilization would improve the nature of African society. Buxton clearly 
summed up this social engineering plan as follows: 
 
‘Let missionaries and schoolmasters, the plough and the spade, go 
together, and agriculture will flourish; the avenues to legitimate 
commerce will be opened; confidence between man and man will be 
inspired; whilst civilization will advance as the natural effect, and 
Christianity operate as the proximate cause of this happy change.’ 
(ATR: 511) 
 
 Buxton raised another important point about missionaries and 
colonial administrators conducting social engineering projects in Africa. He 
wanted to know who the instructors of cultivation were to be (ATR: 491). His 
plan suggested that Africans were to be brought up as the agents for the 
social engineering projects. In the mid-19th century, Western missionaries 
attempted to create an African middle class and African missionaries in 
several regions such as Niger (Ajayi 1965: 17).5 Moreover, he advocated that 
the agency for these social engineering operations be protected by imperial 
force (ATR: 514). Thus, social engineering projects were likely to be 
                                                   
5 However, in the late 19th century, as racism was widespread in many 
European societies, African missionaries were excluded from colonial 
administration (Ajayi 1965: 235). 
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accompanied by greater use of armed force because of the security problem. 
In conclusion, Buxton suggested two kinds of anti-slavery policies: 
the establishment of security by the deployment of armed force and the 
colonization of Africa, and social engineering policies such as agricultural 
cultivation, Christianization and civilization. These plans were based not on 
geopolitical ambition but on humanitarian concern. 
Buxton strived to put his plan into practice by petitioning politicians 
and the government of the day. Finally, his plan led to the Niger Expedition. 
As stated above, he planned to colonize West Africa. Buxton’s plans raised 
considerable interest and enthusiasm among the public. The Edinburgh 
Review reported in January 1841: 
 
‘a new hope has been opened for Africa – a new opportunity [...] of 
bringing into cultivation some parts at least of this vast, neglected 
Estate, to the great benefit of the world; that it lies with England to 
improve this opportunity.’ (‘The Niger Expedition,’ Edinburgh Review, 
January 1841, vol. 72, p. 456) 
 
In April 1841, the Niger Expedition was carried out after careful preparation. 
However, 40 of 145 British explorers died of fever, and eventually the 
survivors had to be withdrawn from the Niger (Gallagher 1950; Temperley 
1991). The expedition was a complete failure. However, even after this 
tragedy, the colonization of Africa by the British Empire did not stop. The 
effort to make treaties with African rulers continued and ‘Forty-two 
anti-slave-trade treaties of this kind were in effect by 1850’ (Curtin 1964: 
468). British informal empire gradually expanded in West Africa. 
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 As explained above, Buxton’s objective was not the expansion of 
colonial territories in Africa. Rather, inspired by humanitarian motives, he 
just strove to eliminate the slave trade. The use of imperial squadron and the 
colonization of Africa were means to achieve his humanitarian objective. 
Although I do not intend to say that only the anti-slavery movement laid the 
foundation for colonial rule in West Africa, the activities of missionaries such 
as Buxton based on humanitarianism either intentionally or unintentionally 
contributed to the expansion of colonial rule in West Africa. Their 
humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering. Also, as the next chapter will discuss, the abolition of 
slavery and the slave trade was recognized as an objective of colonial 
administration by European countries in the late 19th century. Thus, the 
anti-slavery movement constituted the discourse of colonial trusteeship. 
 
 
2. Native Protection Movement and Empire 
 Another representative humanitarian movement in the 19th century 
was the native protection movement in colonies such as South Africa. 
Missionaries vigorously advocated the protection of natives from European 
colonists by the British Empire. The aim of this movement was not merely 
the protection of natives by the expansion of the British colonial territories. 
Rather, it sought to transform the natives into British subjects by social 
engineering policies because the natives could not enjoy their rights in the 
British Empire unless they had obtained a legal personality and literacy in 
the imperial legal systems. This section analyzes the discourse and practice 
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of two representative missionaries who led the movement, John Philip and 
John Mackenzie.  
 
2-1 Protection of Khoisan and Xhosa, and John Philip 
 In 1819, John Philip was nominated as a Director of the London 
Missionary Society and sent to supervise the missionary work at the Cape 
Colony. There, he found that:  
 
‘[Khoisan people] were violently dispossessed of every portion of their 
territory, deprived of every means of improving their condition as 
individuals, and, under various pretexts, fixed by law in a state of 
hopeless bondage in the land of their forefathers.’ (Research I: 2)  
 
In the summer of 1825, he started a campaign to protect the Khoisan people 
and sought to influence colonial policy. In 1828, his pamphlet, Research in 
South Africa: Civil, Moral, Religious Condition of the Native Tribes was 
published.  
 
Protection of Khoisan by the British Empire 
This book was devoted to revealing the hopeless situation of the 
Khoikhoin (called ‘Hottentots’ in the book) and the San (called ‘Bushmen’ in 
the book) (Research I: 2). He argued that the number of Khoisan (Khoikhoin 
and San) was decreasing because of oppression and depredation by European 
colonists. Moreover, the attacks by the colonists ‘had a deteriorating 
influence on [Khoisan] character, in the course of one hundred and fifty years, 
during which time they had been driven from the most fertile tracts of 
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country, and deprived of that independence to which they were passionately 
attached’ (Research I: 5). Philip claimed that the natives were ‘in a worse 
condition than the slave’ (Research I: 159). In such a situation, Khoisan 
societies could not improve and were in decline. 
 Philip’s aim was not to denounce European colonists who were 
oppressing the natives, but to revise the political and legal systems of South 
Africa which were described by him as ‘the system of cruelty and injustice’ 
(Ross 1986: 107). This system was composed of some impartial colonial laws 
such as the ‘Hottentot Code’ set by the Ordinances of 1809 and 1812, and the 
excessive power of the European colonist governments without any 
restraints or checks. The Ordinance of 1809 had been expected to strike at 
the root causes of this problem and to be a ‘Magna Charta of the Hottentots’ 
(Research I: 172). The report continued, ‘The very reverse is the case: it 
legalizes those [unjust] claims [by the European colonists], and it consigns 
the Hottentots and their posterity to universal and hopeless slavery’ 
(Research I: 172). Subsequently, the Ordinance of 1812 was adopted, but it 
was also cruel because it allowed the children of Khoikhoin to be slaves 
(Research I: Ch. 9).  
Why had such discriminatory laws been adopted in South Africa? 
According to Philip, it was because of ‘The barbarizing effects of uncontrolled 
authority on minds in least danger of being corrupted by its influence’ 
(Research I: 383). He claimed that European colonists controlled the colonial 
government and legislation, and their power and authority were not under 
the control of an independent body. Without any controls or checks, the 
power and authority would collapse and be exploited in the wrong way 
(Research II: 312). The colonists have at the moment a larger interest in 
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oppressing the natives than in improving them. In this situation, justice and 
humanity had nothing to expect from the colonists (Research I: 356, 385). 
Thus, as long as the colonial administration was corrupt, the oppression of 
the natives by the colonists would continue. Philip claimed that the decline of 
the Khoisan would lead to the corruption of a whole community of South 
Africa because a community was like a human body (Research I: 387). He 
wrote that: ‘if one member suffers, all the members of the body suffer; and, if 
one member is diseased, all the body is affected by its sympathy with this 
particular member’ (ibid.).  
While the colonial laws put the natives ‘in a worse condition than the 
slave’, these laws could afford a clue to the construction of fairer systems 
because they stated that the natives ‘are to be treated in their persons, in 
their properties, and in their possessions, the same as other free people’ 
(Research I: xxvi-xxvii). Khoisan ‘has a right to a fair price for his labour; to 
an exemption from cruelty and oppression; to choose the place of his abode 
and to enjoy the society of his children’ (Research I: xxvi). Thus, the legal 
systems were not only a tool for the oppression of the natives, but also 
potentially a tool for resistance by indigenous people. According to Philip, 
now the missionary stations in South Africa were the only places where the 
natives could be provided protection, and where they could claim an 
exemption from the most humiliating and degrading sufferings. He claimed 
that these institutions were not enough to secure the rights of Khoisan; 
therefore, the British government ought to afford the natives the protection 
of equal laws (Research I: xxx). The British Empire, Philip thought, should 
be a guardian of rights and justice in South Africa. 
However, the indigenous people were assigned some duties in return 
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for protection. They had to dedicate all possible efforts to the civilization and 
industrialization of themselves. Philip wrote that: 
 
‘I stated to [the native people], that it was vain to attempt to plead 
their cause, […] that the world, and the church of Christ, looked for 
civilization and industry as proofs of their capacity for improvement, 
and of the utility of our labours; that the men of the world had no 
other criterion by which they could judge of the beneficial effects of 
missions.’ (Research I: 213) 
 
The operations of the missionaries included not only a petition for the 
intervention in South Africa by the British Empire, but also the conversion of 
the indigenous people into British subjects who would obey the Empire and 
work as labor in capitalist economy. In Philip’s plan, the natives were 
required to be separated from their traditional sources of authority. By the 
propagation of Christianity and civilization by missionaries, the indigenous 
people would gradually change their preferences, morals, norms, and nature. 
As a result, traditional sources of authority and social systems would break 
down and European socio-economic systems would be introduced. New 
industry and agriculture, which would produce products for the Empire, 
would grow. Trade with the Empire would expand. Finally, the native people 
would ‘become the ally and friend of the colonial government’ (Research I: 
340). Philip stated that missionaries would conduct social engineering 
policies in local communities before the British Empire would extend to 
these communities (Research I: ix).  
His aim was not to colonize Khoisan territories but to protect them. 
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This humanitarian objective justified not only the colonization of these 
territories, but also the social engineering policies. It was because the 
integration of the natives into the British Empire required the social 
engineering of the indigenous communities.  
What the British Empire had to immediately provide to the natives 
was civil and political rights. Without civil rights, people could not secure 
their property and nor could they arrange any future plans for commerce and 
industry. The development of industry needed the protection of civil rights. 
However, ‘civil liberty cannot be secured without political liberty, 
consequently political liberty becomes almost equally essential’ (Research I: 
374). According to Philip, the native people had never enjoyed any political 
and civil rights in South Africa. Therefore, he demanded that the British 
Empire intervene in South Africa to protect the rights of the natives 
(Research I: 326-327). 
The function of laws, according to Philip, was not only the protection 
of native rights, but laws that would change the nature of the natives. Philip 
argued that:  
 
‘Bad laws generate bad morals, and good laws generate good morals. 
[...] While equitable laws and their impartial administration elevate 
the standard of morals, raise the tone of thinking, exalt the character 
of a country, and increase the patriotism of a people, they generate 
the principles and love of justice in the heart of a great and effective 
part of the population. […] Agriculture and commerce can never 
flourish, unless private property is respected, and the laws which 
guard the possessions of individuals are the first principles of 
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industry.’ (Research I: 381-382) 
 
The legislation by the British Empire would transform the natives into the 
docile citizens of the Empire. This idea was highly similar to utilitarianism 
(see Ch. 2 of this study). 
In addition to legislation, he suggested the introduction of laissez 
faire economics. Following Adam Smith, Philip thought that a laissez-faire 
economy would give the natives a fair price for their labor, and their masters 
would gain more work than at present, and this increase of value to their 
masters would contribute to the development of South Africa (Research I: 
327; Ross 1986: 96). Combining Malthus’ theory with Smith’s theory, he 
argued that if the British Empire protected the rights of the natives and 
relieved them from oppression by European colonists, the amount of labor 
would increase and this would bring prosperity to South Africa (Research II: 
324). 
 Thus, Philip suggested prescriptions based on enlightenment 
philosophy as well as Christianity. As Ch. 2 indicated, enlightenment 
philosophy such as utilitarianism had a strong affinity with Christianity. In 
this century, when humanitarianism attempted to identify the root causes of 
the humanitarian crisis and make prescriptions, enlightenment philosophy 
and Christianity were invoked. 
In 1828, Philip’s many years of hard efforts achieved success. T. F. 
Buxton brought a motion before the House of Commons on 15 July 1828. It 
stated that: 
 
‘This House humbly solicits His Majesty to cause such instructions to 
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be sent to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as shall most 
effectually secure to all the natives of South Africa, the same freedom 
and protection as are enjoyed by other free people of that Colony 
whether English or Dutch.’ (cited in Ross 1986: 109) 
 
After two days, a reforming Governor-General, Bourke enacted the 
Ordinance 50 which declared the equality of the natives in South Africa. 
Philip hailed this new law as a significantly important step towards the 
relief of the natives. On 11 July 1836 at the Aborigines Committee, he 
showed his appreciation for the Ordinance, stating that:  
 
‘I was confident that the Ordinance would produce a benefit, but the 
success of the experiment, the elevation to which the people were 
raised by that Ordinance, went even beyond my most sanguine 
expectations.’ (Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines 1836 
Part I: 642) 
 
While it is controversial how Philip influenced the promulgation of 
Ordinance 50 (Ross 1986: 110-111; Lester 2001: 31-35), there is no doubt that 
this legislation fulfilled his vision. 
 
Protection of Xhosa by the British Empire 
After this achievement, Philip went on a journey to the eastern 
frontier in 1830 (Ross 1986: 118). This journey turned his attention to the 
problems of the relationship between the Xhosa (then called ‘Kaffir’) and the 
Cape Colony. While the Khoisan were potential citizens of the British colony, 
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the Xhosa had their own country outside. The relationship between the 
Xhosa and the British Empire was quasi-international. When the war broke 
out between the Xhosa and European colonists in December 1834, the 
British Empire began to pay attention to the frontier problem of the Cape 
Colony. Before then, the Xhosa had suffered from the ‘patrol system’ by 
European colonists. In this ‘patrol system,’ European colonists plundered the 
Xhosa’s cattle. In addition, in 1819, the Xhosa lost a large area of their land 
because of an invasion by European colonists. Furthermore, in 1833, they 
were forced to migrate to the east. This eventually led two Xhosa groups to 
invade the Cape Colony in mid-December 1834. The Cape Colony started to 
fight back under the direction of its commander, Sir Harry Smith and 
eventually expanded its territory. The new territory was named the Province 
of Queen Adelaide, and Smith was appointed as the governor of the new 
Province. 
 Immediately after this incident, Philip sent T. F. Buxton and Rev. J. 
Ellis (Secretary of the London Missionary Society) letters telling them that 
the war had resulted from the patrol system by European colonists and had 
caused the expulsions of the Xhosa from their land (Ross 1986: 139). 
However, the result of the war was ambivalent for Philip. The cause of the 
war was evil, but the extension of the Colony might become an important 
step in the civilizing of the Xhosa (Galbraith 1963: 115; Ross 1986: 140-141). 
While Philip expected enlightened administration by the Cape Colony, the 
outcome was the opposite of what he hoped. John Galbraith (1963: 121) 
argues that:  
 
‘The state of Queen Adelaide Province was thus the force at Smith’s 
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disposal and the exhaustion of the tribes, rather than upon the 
enlightened character of Smith’s measures or the power of his 
personality.’ 
 
 When the British government established the Select Committee on 
Aborigines, the chairman from 1835-1837 was T. F. Buxton. Philip suggested 
an alternative frontier policy to the Committee that was composed of two 
parts. The first suggestion was the introduction of international law into the 
frontier problem. Before the committee, he stated that: 
 
‘[Questioner] What would you recommend for the protection of the 
colonists from the aggressions of the Caffres [Xhosas]?’  
 
‘[Philip] I think a system of international law introduced on the 
frontiers of the country, would prove the most efficient and best 
protection that the colonists could have; the system containing for its 
basis the principles of justice.’ (Report of the Select Committee on 
Aborigines 1836 Part I: 677) 
 
For Philip, the protection of the Xhosa was more important than that of 
European colonists. As one of the most serious issues was the patrol system 
by European colonists, Philip considered the introduction of international 
law a remedy for this problem. The international law between the Xhosa and 
the Cape Colony would settle the frontier line, and prevent European 
colonists from plundering the cattle and land from the Xhosa. He stated that: 
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‘One of the first steps towards the establishment of amicable 
relations with the tribes on the frontiers of the colony will be the 
abandonment of the commando and patrol system.’ (ibid.: 628) 
 
However, the questioner asked Philip whether the Xhosa could 
understand and observe a system of international law. In other words, it was 
the question of whether they could have legal personality. Philip clearly 
stated that ‘I think the Caffres [Xhosas] are quite capable of understanding a 
system of international law, and of appreciating it’ (ibid.: 677). Before Philip 
began to address this issue, various missionaries had already worked 
amongst the Xhosas. In fact, as Alan Lester observes, ‘The [Aborigines] 
Committee could not fail to point out that those Xhosa chiefs who had 
assisted the British in the recent war were those most under the influence of 
the colony’s missionaries’ (Lester 2001: 111). The social engineering in the 
Xhosa’s territories had already been conducted by the missionaries. 
 The second suggestion for the frontier problem was the employment 
of the Griqua and other tribes. The Griqua were living on the northern 
frontier. According to Philip, they ‘are a people already made to our hands, 
and who may, by a just and liberal policy, be retained, as they have been, the 
cheapest and best bulwark of the colony’ (Report of the Select Committee on 
Aborigines 1836 Part I: 608). The missionaries had practiced social 
engineering projects by the propagation of Christianity, and transformed 
their customs such as polygamy (ibid.). The Griqua themselves ‘looked 
forward to their country being received into the colony, as the only remedy to 
the evils to which they have been exposed’ (ibid.: 625). Thus, the missionaries 
succeeded in establishing the foundation of imperial rule. Furthermore, 
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Philip insisted that the Empire employ the Griqua as its agency for 
diplomacy with other savage tribes (ibid.: 625). As argued above, for Philip, 
one of the functions of missionaries was the social engineering of native 
societies to make them the agents of the Empire. In Research in South Africa, 
he summarized his strategy in the following way: 
 
‘While the missionaries have been employed in locating the savages 
among whom they labour, teaching them industrious habits, creating 
a demand for British manufactures, and increasing their dependence 
on the colony, there is not a single instance of a tribe thus enjoying 
the labours of a missionary making war against the colonists, either 
to injure their persons or deprive them of their property. 
Missionary stations are the most efficient agents which can 
be employed to promote the internal strength of our colonies, and the 
cheapest and best military posts that a wise government can employ 
to defend its frontier against the predatory incursions of savage 
tribes.’ (Research I: 228) 
 
This was the colonial strategy that was suggested by a representative 
humanitarian in the 19th century. His aim was to protect the Xhosa from 
European colonists. This humanitarian objective required practices which 
were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering, that is, the social 
engineering of Xhosa society because the Xhosa had to obtain a legal 
personality in the system of international law. Furthermore, the conclusion 
of the treaty would require the imperial agency that could help the Empire to 
negotiate with other savage tribes. Thus, in South Africa, humanitarianism 
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constituted colonial trusteeship. At the same time, the power relations 
between the British Empire and the native communities were reflected in 
humanitarian discourse as humanitarians sought to employ the power of the 
British Empire to alleviate the human suffering of the native people.  
 
2-2 Establishment of a Crown Colony in South Africa and John Mackenzie 
Bechuanaland and Missionaries 
In the late 19th century, one of the places where missionaries had 
actively operated was Bechuanaland on the northern end of the Cape Colony. 
The missionaries strived to prevent Transvaal, a Boer republic, from 
annexing Bechuanaland. This struggle had begun in the 1840s when the 
London Missionary Society began expanding into the northern Tswana 
chiefdoms (Chirenje 1976: 404). David Livingstone set up a mission station 
there in 1844. According to Anthony Dachs, he ‘deliberately directed his 
efforts to the north to occupy the interior before the Transvaal settlers could 
“enter their claims to the exclusion of those of missionaries” [...] For him 
“pre-occupation was the only remedy”’ (Dachs 1972: 649). Responding to the 
expansion of missionaries, Boers strived to impede the operations of 
missionaries such as Livingstone. 
The propagation of Christianity by missionaries had gradually 
penetrated into the native societies. Christianity undermined traditional 
authorities which had played a role as both a religious head and a political 
leader. For example, rainmakers were criticized as a mere fraud by the 
missionaries. New technology such as irrigation also encroached upon the 
authority of rainmakers. The decline of religious authority was necessarily 
accompanied by the reduction of political authority. As a result, some native 
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communities were in danger of breaking up (Dachs 1972: 649; Chirenje 1976: 
406-410). As John Philip hoped, the missionaries had continued social 
engineering projects in South Africa and encroached upon traditional native 
communities. 
After Livingstone, John Mackenzie led the humanitarian movement 
in South Africa. When the Boers began to invade the territories given to the 
natives, Mackenzie realized that only intervention by the British Empire 
would stop them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 7) and realized the necessity 
of the construction of a new imperial order in South Africa. He had two aims: 
to form the unified community in which the natives and European colonists 
could enjoy equal rights; and to establish a Crown Colony over the whole of 
South Africa. 
Since 1868, Mackenzie began to advocate for British rule over 
Bechuanaland. While Gladstone rejected the territorial responsibility in 
Bechuanaland and the extension of the Empire in South Africa in 1880, after 
four years, the Convention of London of February 1884 declared that two 
tribes in Bechuanaland, Mankoroane and Montsioa, would gain 
independence from Transvaal and become a British Protectorate. In the 
same year, a military expedition under Colonel Warren was conducted to 
implement the Convention of London and expel the Transvaal invaders 
(Mackenzie participated in this expedition). In 1885, the British Empire 
established a Protectorate over Kwena, Ngwaketse and Ngwato in 
Bechuanaland, and proclaimed the region south of the Molopo River to be 
integrated into the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. While this 
extension was not only a response to Mackenzie’s agitation, but also the 
result of German expansion in South-West Africa (Dachs 1975: 152; 
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Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 9; Zins 1997), there can be no doubt that 
humanitarian discourse contributed to the justification of the colonization. 
However, Mackenzie was not satisfied with the expansion of the British 
Empire because the antagonism between European colonists and the 
indigenous people was growing, and the Boers did not stop expanding into 
the native land. 
 
‘Special Measure’ for South Africa 
The book published by Mackenzie in 1887, Austral Africa: Losing It 
or Ruling It, proposed his plan of a new order for South Africa. In this book, 
Mackenzie highlighted the unique characteristics of South Africa as a colony. 
While natives in South Africa, unlike Australia, had not died out due to the 
invasion of European settlers, there were vast lands where new European 
immigrants could settle and rich mineral deposits to develop industry as in 
Australia. On these points, South Africa was different from India, Canada, 
and New Zealand as well as Australia. Therefore, it was not possible to 
employ ‘a cut and dried scheme, which shall be similar to the method of our 
government of Canada, or of India, or of Australia’ (AA II: 472-473). 
Despite the vast lands, the current situation did not allow the 
residents to coexist because the Boers ‘would seize all the land of the natives, 
disqualify them from owning an acre of it, and only allow them to remain on 
it as vassals, in practical servitude on account of their colour’ (AA II: 
425-426). They attempted to move northward ‘to obtain cheaper and better 
land, and secure an easier and pleasanter life, from the pastoral farmer’s 
point of view’ (AA II 426-427). Mackenzie claimed that: 
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‘[I]f the new and most promising work […] of regulating the growth 
and development of the European civilisation, and of protecting and 
governing the natives in South Africa, is to be conducted successfully 
under the control of Her Majesty’s Government, special measures 
must be devised for the purpose.’ (AA II: 472-473) 
  
As ‘special measures,’ he suggested a dual political system: ‘the local 
self-government of certain European communities and the personal or 
paternal government of native territories by the Imperial Government’ (AA I: 
6). In this system, the imperial government would play the role of a mediator 
to enable the European colonists and the natives to coexist. The first of all, 
the imperial government would protect the native territories them from the 
Boers. The government of the European community ought to ‘restrain its 
subjects from open menace and violence against those who were under the 
Queen’s protection’ (AA I: 376). Mackenzie claimed that ‘Our only danger was 
the Transvaal’ because ‘the Afrikanders [Boers] regarded [the natives] as 
born to be their servants, and as their natural enemies’ (AAI: 369; AAII: 453). 
Second, the development of unoccupied territories was also considered a duty 
of the imperial government. For Mackenzie, the unoccupied territories 
belonged to the imperial government. Therefore, the imperial government 
should develop them. A part of them would be distributed to the European 
colonists; and the rest would be allocated to the natives (AA II: 472-474). In 
the case of the native territories, local administrators would be posted from 
the imperial government. The imperial government would re-educate the 
natives as its subjects. The government of the native territories, in his plan, 
would deny traditional customs and sources of authority. The traditional 
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native chiefs would not possess the jurisdiction over their people (AA I: 413). 
The natives would be gradually and peacefully separated from their chiefs, 
and, instead, put under the authority of Her Majesty’s Government. The 
imperial government would dissolve the traditional territorial systems (AA 
II: 488). The natives would be prohibited to sell their lands freely. Thus, the 
imperial government would have complete control of the native territories. 
The native laws would not be adopted; instead, the common law of the 
Colony would govern the territories (AA II: 431). The government would 
educate the natives to understand the common law and enjoy the civil rights 
and privileges (AA II: 432). Mackenzie argued that: 
 
‘No doubt paternal government is best for a country where these 
people predominate. To them it represents the kingdom superseding 
mere tribal control. Local native councils, local territorial 
government, central control by the Imperial Government, the police 
and the army chiefly South African; there is no real difficulty in the 
future management of the country.’ (AA II: 456) 
 
As this statement implies, benevolent despotism by the British Empire was 
considered the best political arrangement to civilize the natives.  
His dual political system required some revisions of the imperial 
administrative institutions. It was necessary to separate the High 
Commissionership of South Africa from the Governorship of the Cape Colony 
(AA II: 478, 479). He suggested that: ‘the High Commissioner would be the 
supreme officer of the Crown in South Africa, and the Governor the Cape 
Colony would be an officer exercising that office only’ (AA II: 474). In addition, 
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Mackenzie proposed the confederation of South Africa. Thus, in this new 
imperial order, the Executive of the British Empire would supervise both the 
self-government of European communities and the paternal government of 
native communities. 
 In sum, Mackenzie suggested that the British Empire transform the 
natives into the imperial subjects by social engineering policies. This process 
necessarily would dissolve the traditional native socio-political systems. 
Dachs argues that:  
 
‘Mackenzie, at the head of the Bechuanaland missionaries, aimed 
openly at weakening “the communistic relations of the members of a 
tribe among one another, letting in the fresh, stimulating breath of 
healthy individualistic competition; and slowly, but surely and in the 
general tribal interest, to supersede the power and influence of the 
chiefs by an evidently helpful Queen’s Government”.’ (Dachs 1972: 
651; see Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 12-14) 
 
After publishing his book, Austral Africa, he continued to call for the British 
government to extend the protectorate to the inner regions of South Africa 
(Mackenzie 1975: 232-235). However, as Dachs argues, ‘the final dream of a 
full Crown Colony continued to the last to elude the efforts and achievement’ 
(Dachs1975: 154). The imperial order dreamt of by Mackenzie might not 
have empowered the natives but it did strengthen the Empire. However, it is 
not open to doubt that his idea was derived from humanitarianism. His 
humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct 
relief of suffering and, as in other cases, constituted colonial trusteeship. And 
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the power relations between the British Empire and the native communities 
were reflected in humanitarian discourse.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that, in the 19th century, humanitarianism 
constituted colonial trusteeship in Africa, and that the unequal relations 
between the British Empire and target societies were reflected in 
humanitarian discourse. I do not intend to say that the expansion of the 
British colonies in Africa was based only on humanitarianism. Rather, the 
conclusion of this chapter is that humanitarianism intentionally or 
unintentionally not only contributed to the legitimization of colonial 
trusteeship in Africa, but also helped to determine the nature of target 
societies and designed the political arrangement of colonial trusteeship. 
Humanitarianism did not maintain a critical distance from the power of the 
British Empire; on the contrary, humanitarianism required the power of the 
British Empire to alleviate human suffering, though it does not mean that 
all humanitarians in this period tend to constitute colonial trusteeship. Thus, 
the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was formed.  
As this chapter indicated, there were two types of discourse structure 
of humanitarian trusteeship. The anti-slavery movement in the 19th century 
recognized not only slave traders but also Africans as the supporters of slave 
trade because the latter were providing slaves to markets. The 
humanitarians observed that the African people were so savage that they 
assailed other African villages to capture and sell the people as slaves and 
claimed that they lacked morality and agricultural technology. For this 
１１０ 
 
 
 
pathology, cultivation, Christianization, and civilization were suggested as 
prescriptions. These policies, which aimed to transform the nature of African 
societies, required the colonization of Africa. The activists of the native 
protection movement considered European colonists to be the main culprits 
of the humanitarian problems in South Africa. While they advocated the 
protection of the natives by the imperial government, they claimed that the 
natives ought to be transformed into imperial subjects if they hoped to enjoy 
civil and political rights in the British Empire. Therefore, as in the 
anti-slavery movement, social engineering policies were required.  
On the one hand, the discourse of the anti-slavery movement 
pathologized target societies as anarchical and suggested social engineering 
to transform the nature of target society. On the other hand, the discourse of 
the native protection movement considered European colonists a threat to 
the security of the natives. However, the protection of the natives by the 
imperial government required the native societies to adopt westernized 
socio-economic systems. In either case, humanitarianism led to the 
imposition of social engineering policies and colonization on Africa. 
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Ch. 4 Internationalization of Trusteeship:  
Empire and International Organization 
 
 The previous chapters indicated the co-constitutive nature of the 
relationship between colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism and the 
formation of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship in the 19th 
century. This chapter will show that internationalization of trusteeship was 
led by humanitarianism around the time of the First World War. The 
legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was challenged by various intellectuals 
and politicians who argued that imperialism would bring on war and that 
colonial administration had abused indigenous peoples. However, these 
critics of empire did not cast doubt on the necessity of trusteeship, 
presuming that non-European people needed civilization and security for life. 
They suggested international trusteeship as an alternative to colonial 
administration by empires, claiming that the former was better than the 
latter in terms of humanitarianism. The internationalization of trusteeship 
was accompanied by the re-pathologization of non-European countries. At 
the Paris Peace Conference, the mandate system, a kind of international 
trusteeship, was established. 
There are many existing works on the mandate system. William 
Roger Louis has analyzed the beginning of the mandate system in his 
research (Louis 1965; 1967; 1969). While he elucidates the historical context 
of the B mandates (ex-German colonies in Africa), he barely analyzes that of 
the A mandates (ex-Ottoman Empire’s territories). As this chapter will show, 
the mandate system was invented as an alternative not only to colonial 
empires but to dynastic empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
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Ottoman Turkey. Michael Callahan (1999; 2004) examines the influence of 
the League of Nations supervision on the colonial administration in the B 
mandates, using many primary sources, and shows that the League of 
Nations succeeded supervising the imperial administration in the B 
mandates to some extent. However, his focus was not on the social 
engineering aspect of the mandate system but on its influence over 
diplomats and bureaucrats and, as a result, the power of the mandate system 
over local societies remains to be analyzed. In contrast, Anthony Anghie 
(2002) refers to the social engineering aspect of the mandate system, but he 
rarely analyzes what had happened in the mandate territories.  
 The first section of this chapter will explore how colonial trusteeship 
was internationalized around time of the First World War and what role 
humanitarianism played in this process. The second section will analyze how 
different the mandate system was from colonial administration by 
examining the practice of the former. 
 
 
1. Internationalization of Colonial Trusteeship 
 Around the time of the First World War, colonial trusteeship was 
gradually internationalized. In the late 19th century, two international 
conferences were held. The general acts of these conferences defined the 
obligations of trustees and constituted the unequal relationship between 
European countries and non-European countries. Subsequently, the scandal 
of the Congo Free State and the South African War occurred. They severely 
undermined the legitimacy of colonial empires and inspired British 
intellectuals to suggest internationalization of colonial trusteeship. 
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Furthermore, during the First World War, the Soviets and the US denounced 
the colonialism of European countries. As a result, in 1919, the League of 
Nations was established became a new agent of colonial trusteeship. Also, in 
this period, dynastic empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
Ottoman Empire were collapsing. Therefore, European countries sought to 
construct new regional order. International trusteeship was thought to be a 
prescription for anarchy in these regions. This section will show that these 
two contexts for the internationalization of trusteeship were related to 
humanitarianism.  
 
1-1 Two Conferences on Africa: Dawn of International Trusteeship 
In 1884-1885, the Berlin Congo Conference was held. The duties of 
trustees such as the development of native welfare were defined by the 
general act of this conference. However, the main objective of this conference 
was not to internationalize trusteeship but to re-stabilize international 
relations in Europe. In the late 19th century, European order became 
unstable due to strong colonial competition. Russia, Austria, Italy and 
Britain sought to enlarge their influence in Eastern Europe and the Near 
East. France, Italy and Britain tried to acquire the territories of North Africa 
such as Tunis and Egypt. In 1878, Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire in 
the Russo-Turkish War and sought to rule the Balkan region, but other 
European powers strongly opposed it. In 1881, France conquered Tunis and, 
in 1882, Britain occupied Egypt. Germany and Belgium were not indifferent 
to Africa. Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire, assembled a 
conference on the colonial division of Africa to re-stabilize the international 
relations – namely, the Berlin Congo Conference. 
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 In this conference, there were three main issues: (i) freedom of trade 
in the basin of the Congo and Niger; (ii) freedom of navigation in the Congo 
and Niger; (iii) clarification of the requirements for colonial acquisition 
(Louis 1971: 193). In addition to these, the problem of slavery was also 
suggested as an important issue (Miers 1988). Britain basically supported 
freedom of trade and the establishment of the International Navigation 
Commission which would supervise the application of acts in the basin of 
Congo. However, it strongly opposed the supervision of the basin of the Niger 
because they feared that they would lose the lower Niger, earlier colonized by 
George Goldie and his company. Although Germany under Bismarck was 
allied with France on colonial issues before the conference, now he decided to 
compromise with Britain and accepted their assertion. Therefore, Britain 
also accepted the articles on the Congo and the Niger in return. As a result, 
the International Navigation Commission of the Congo was established 
(Articles 8, 17-24), and the freedom of trade and navigation in the basin of 
the Niger and Congo River was declared (Articles 13-25, 27-33).  
Apart from the main issues, Britain actively employed anti-slavery 
diplomacy and advocated the construction of the international institutions to 
prevent slavery. However, as other countries opposed this idea, the Berlin 
Act just stated the prohibition of slave trade and the development of native 
welfare (Articles 6 and 9). After all, ‘no machinery was established for 
enforcement of the declarations, no common action was agreed upon, and no 
concrete measures were suggested’ (Miers 1988: 337). As William Bain (2003: 
63-74) observes, this Act marked the dawn of the internationalization of 
trusteeship. However, most of the articles of the Berlin Act were not 
implemented. In fact, the International Navigation Commission of the Congo 
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was never founded by any of the Western countries.  
 In contrast to the Berlin Conference, the Brussels Conference (1890) 
was held because of petitions by the Anti-Slavery Society. They demanded 
that the British government show leadership of the anti-slavery movement 
and urge other countries to address this issue. Subsequently, the British 
government asked the Belgian King Leopold II to assemble a conference 
(Miers 2003: 20). The general act of this conference embodied the idea of 
trusteeship and humanitarianism which the anti-slavery movement 
constituted in the 19th century. According to Suzanne Miers, it declared that:  
 
‘the best means of attacking the slave trade on land was by 
establishing colonial administrations, controlling the trade routes, 
constructing road, rail and water communications, and telegraph 
systems, and protecting trading companies and missionaries of all 
denominations’ (Miers 2003: 21). 
 
Furthermore, it defined the establishment of the international supervisory 
machinery (bureaux in Brussels and Zanzibar) to exchange ‘information on 
the slave traffic and on the antislavery legislation of signatory powers’ (Miers 
1998: 19). Thus, this conference internationalized colonial trusteeship which 
had been constituted by humanitarianism in the early 19th century. 
 
1-2 From Colonial Empires to an International Organization 
 Despite the legitimization of colonialism by international law, the 
legitimacy of colonial empires was challenged in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. There were three crucial events which undermined the legitimacy 
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of colonial empires: the scandal of the Congo, the South African War, and the 
First World War. The scandal of the Congo revealed the cruel nature of 
colonial administration and appealed to humanitarianism as in the 
anti-slavery movement. The South African War inspired some intellectuals 
such as J. A. Hobson to notice the possibility that the current political 
economic systems of colonial empires would cause inter-imperial wars and 
formulate a theory of imperialism. The First World War was interpreted by 
Western radical thinkers as resulting from severe competition amongst the 
colonial empires. However, most of the critics of colonial empires did not 
deny the necessity of trusteeship. Therefore, as an alternative to colonial 
administration by empires, international trusteeship was proposed. 
 
The Scandal of the Congo: Cultural Relativism and Trusteeship 
 In the 1900s, the scandal of the Congo Free State sent shock wave 
through the European countries. The Belgian King Leopold II, a governor of 
this African state, exploited indigenous people to produce rubber and ivories 
and cruelly abused them. The ‘atrocity pictures,’ that showed boys who had 
had their hands cut off, appeared in pamphlets and strongly appealed to 
European public opinion (e.g. Morel 1904). Edward Grey stated that: ‘No 
question has so stirred the country for thirty years’ since the Bulgarian 
Horrors in which Bulgarian rebellions were brutally suppressed by the 
Turkish forces in the late 1870s (Taylor 1957: 119). The Congo Free State 
was created through the bilateral treaties between the Congo International 
Association founded by King Leopold II and each European state in the 
Berlin Congo Conference. King Leopold II, who was considered to be a 
philanthropic monarch by other European diplomats, became the ruler of the 
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Congo. However, he was not a philanthropist but a cruel dictator. The Berlin 
Congo Conference did not develop native welfare but rather led to mass 
murder in the Congo. 
While the Aborigines Protection Society engaged in agitation against 
the atrocities of the Free State, a British journalist, E. D. Morel, bitterly and 
strenuously fought against the Free State and led the Congo reform 
movement as a new leader of humanitarians. Using his Quaker network, he 
waged a campaign against the Congo Free State (Louis 1968; Cline 1980). He 
‘viewed the anti-Congo crusade as the last chapter in the history of the 
abolition of slavery’ (Louis 1965: 31). However, he did not suggest liberation 
of the Congo from European powers because he presumed that the native 
population ought to be provided protection from Western influence. Morel, 
adopting incipient cultural relativism, considered the Europeanization of 
Africa to be harmful to African natives.  
This cultural relativism was advocated by Mary Kingsley, an explorer 
of Africa and a writer. Morel was friends with Kingsley and learned incipient 
cultural relativism from her. As P. B. Rich argues, Kingsley was highly 
influential intellectual in left-wing political circles and ‘one of the first 
English social anthropologists as well as an early propagator of the concept 
of “indirect rule”’ (Rich 1986: 31; and see Porter 1968: 150-154). She criticized 
the Europeanization of Africans:  
 
‘I am aware that there is now in West Africa a handful of Africans 
who have mastered white culture, who know it too well to 
misunderstand the inner spirit of it, who are men too true to have let 
it cut them off in either sympathy or love from Africa [...] That 
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handful of African men are now fighting a hard enough fight to 
prevent the distracted, uninformed Africans from riding against 
what so looks like white treachery, though it is only white want of 
knowledge; and also against those “water flies” who are neither 
Africans nor Europeans, but who are the curse of the Coast – the men 
who mislead the white man and betray the black.’ (cited in Rich 1986: 
32) 
 
She argued that Africans had to develop ‘along their own line.’ Morel and 
other critics of colonial empires supported such a paternalistic idea. African 
societies were redefined as fragile societies threatened by Europeanization. 
This argument strengthened the colonial philosophy of indirect rule.  
Furthermore, it had eerie similarities to South African politician Jan 
Smuts’ legitimization of the racial segregation policy in South Africa. In 
several of his speeches, Smuts showed his recognition of the value of native 
political systems and insisted that they ought to be preserved from European 
influences because such political systems were their ‘highest good’ (Smuts 
1944: 40-41). He claimed that:  
 
‘the British Empire does not stand for assimilation of its peoples into 
common type, it does not stand for standardization, but for the fullest 
freest development of its peoples along their own specific lines. This 
principle applies not only to its European, but also to its Asiatic and 
its African constituents.’ (Smuts 1944: 78) 
 
The idea of development ‘along their own specific lines’ was similar to 
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Kingsley’s cultural relativism. However, South Africa was different from 
West Africa because in the former multi ethnicities were living within the 
same country. How was it possible to protect the native political systems 
from European influences? The prescription made by Smuts was racial 
segregation policy. He argued that:  
 
‘We have realised that political ideas which apply to our white 
civilisation largely do not apply to the administration of native 
affairs. To apply the same institutions on an equal basis to white and 
black alike dose not lead to the best results, and so a practice has 
grown up in South Africa of creating parallel institutions — giving 
the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines with 
institutions for whites.’ (Smuts 1917: 88) 
 
Mahmood Mamdani aptly observes that ‘neither institutional segregation 
nor apartheid was a South African invention. If anything, both idealized a 
form of rule that the British Colonial Office dubbed “indirect rule”’ (Mamdani 
1996: 7). It is not surprising that John Harris, a follower of the Kingsleyite 
school, ‘supported the South African Natives Land Act on the grounds that it 
entailed a separation of African and white land holdings as opposed to a 
complete segregation of the races’ (Rich 1986: 39). 
 Despite the fact that his argument was similar to indirect rule, Morel 
did not support the colonization of Africa because the Congo Free State 
showed the cruel nature of European colonial rule. Instead, he suggested 
international administration of the Congo as an alternative to 
administration by colonial empires (Morel 1906: 201-202, 205-206). His aim 
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was not to civilize African societies but to protect their right to soil because 
‘he believed that alienating land from Africans reduced them to slaves while 
safeguarding their right to the soil guaranteed them prosperous 
development as free men’ (Louis 1965: 30-31). In his scheme, Africans would 
cultivate their soil and freely trade their commodities. It was characterized 
by a kind of laissez-faire. On this point, his vision was different from the 
missionaries of the anti-slavery movement. For Morel, internationalization 
of colonial trusteeship meant an international protectorate to secure 
economic freedom of Africans. Although this plan was not implemented, the 
idea of internationalization of colonial trusteeship reappeared during the 
First World War. 
 
The South African War: Imperialism and Trusteeship 
The South African War (1899-1902) seriously damaged the legitimacy 
of the British Empire. This war erupted between the British Empire and the 
two independent Boer republics, embroiling various African tribes. As J. A. 
Hobson described in Psychology of Jingoism (1901), British public opinion 
was bitterly divided over this war. Many British people became jingoistic and 
severely oppressed the critics of the war. In this war, the British Empire 
engaged in a hard fight and attacked not only soldiers but also civilians. 
Despite its humanitarian diplomacy in the late 19th century, the British 
Empire caused a humanitarian crisis in this war.  
 The South African War seriously influenced British intellectuals and 
led them to produce a theory of imperialism. Hobson, in Imperialism: a 
Study (1902), analyzed two aspects of imperialism: economic structure and 
political structure. According to him, financial circles had carried out foreign 
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investment of surplus capital and colonization. The British internal 
economic structure had inequitable distribution of wealth and thereby 
contributed to the production of surplus capital. Surplus capital would 
facilitate colonization of non-European countries and lead to destabilization 
of inter-imperial relations. Imperialism was beneficial only to the financial 
circles. However, the mass of people had supported imperialism because of 
the manipulation of mass media by the financial circles.  
In addition to the economic analysis, Hobson denounced the political 
aspects of imperialism in Part II of the book. Imperialism could not expand 
democracy around the world but it could export despotism. Moreover, it 
would erode British democracy. Although imperialists had advocated that 
surplus population needed colonization for immigration, the increase of the 
European population was not so rapid and the immigration from Europe into 
colonies did not rise. Also, imperialists argued that colonization had 
contributed to the protection of human dignity of the natives and facilitated 
the Christianization of them. However, it had already been indicated that 
such opinions were a fallacy in the scandal of the Congo. Thus, the 
legitimacy of colonial administration was denied in terms of security and 
humanitarianism. 
However, he did not deny the necessity of colonial trusteeship and 
justified it by presenting two reasons. First, he predetermined that native 
people could not develop their natural resources on their own and therefore 
needed help from civilized nations to utilize them. He wrote that:  
 
‘the resources of the tropics will not be developed voluntarily by the 
natives themselves. […] We cannot, it is held, leave these lands 
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barren; it is our duty to see that they are developed for the good of the 
world. White men cannot “colonize” these lands and, thus settling, 
develop the natural resources by the labour of their own hands; they 
can only organize and superintend the labour of the natives.’ (Hobson 
1938: 227; see Porter 1968: 230-231) 
 
This idea was justified by ‘a supreme standard moral appeal, some 
conception of the welfare of humanity regarded as an organic unity’ (Hobson 
1938: 233; Long 1996: 19). It is obvious that Hobson is known to have been 
influenced by utilitarianism and Herbert Spencer ’s organic social model. 
Second, without colonial trusteeship, ‘private adventurers, slavers, piratical 
traders, treasure hunters, concession mongers’ would exploit and abuse the 
natives (Hobson 1938: 230-231; Porter 1968: 230-231). As Ch. 3 observed, 
this justification of colonial trusteeship had been provided by anti-slavery 
activists since the early 19th century. However, while the missionaries 
considered colonial trusteeship by the British Empire to be the best 
prescription, Hobson did not think so. Instead, he suggested ‘genuine 
international council […] which shall accredit a civilized nation with the 
duty of educating a lower race’ (Hobson 1938: 239). Thus, the theory of 
imperialism justified colonial trusteeship by an international organization. 
This vision of international trusteeship was shared by other radicals such as 
Ramsay MacDonald (Porter 1968: 189). 
 
World War I: Wilsonianism and Trusteeship 
As Arno J. Mayer (1969) argues, the period around the time of the 
First World War was marked by ideological struggle which was launched by 
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Lenin. Colonial problems were one of the most important issues. Lenin 
severely criticized Western countries for colonial competition as well as 
secret diplomacy by disclosing secret treaties. Adopting Hobson’s theory of 
imperialism, he argued that colonial competition among Western countries 
would cause inter-imperial wars and it would provide a favorable 
opportunity for revolutions (Lenin 1939). The political leaders among the 
Allies had to respond to this ideological challenge.  
US President Woodrow Wilson demonstrated his vision for the 
postwar world in his address on May 27, 1916. An international society, he 
insisted, should achieve ‘an equality of rights’ that would ‘neither recognize 
nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those who are 
powerful and those that are weak’ (Wilson 1982: 533-537). And international 
and internal political arrangement should be constituted on the basis of ‘the 
consent of the governed’ (ibid.). These principles were recognized as 
Wilsonianism. However, while he denounced imperialism and colonial 
competition, it was not clear whether he intended to apply these principles to 
dependent territories. Erez Manela (2007: 25) observes that:  
 
‘he […] did not exclude non-European peoples from the right to 
self-determination as a matter of principle. Rather, he envisioned 
them achieving it through an evolutionary process under the 
benevolent tutelage of a “civilized” power that would prepare them 
for self-government.’ 
 
His understanding of US duty to the Philippines demonstrated his idea of 
colonial trusteeship. He regarded the Philippines as a dependent territory 
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which required gradual civilization and insisted that it be supervised by the 
US to prepare the Philippines for self-government (Curry 1952; Manela 
2007: 28-29). Before the outbreak of the First World War, Wilson declared 
that: 
 
‘We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the 
United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine 
Islands. Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate 
independence of the Islands and as a preparation for their 
independence, and we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as 
the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. 
After each step taken, experience will guide us to the next.’ (cited in 
Curry 1954: 439-440) 
 
Thus, Wilson shared the idea of colonial trusteeship with other European 
politicians. Therefore, he had never demanded that colonial empires grant 
independence to dependent territories. However, as he renounced colonial 
competition among European powers, he refused to support the partition of 
ex-German colonies and the territories of the former Ottoman Empire among 
the allied powers. During the war, German colonial administration was 
severely criticized and, as the next section will explain, the Ottoman Empire 
had also lost its legitimacy in international society. Therefore, it was seen as 
undesirable to return these territories to Germany and Ottoman Turkey. 
That is why Wilson strongly insisted on the internationalization of colonial 
trusteeship at the Paris Peace Conference.  
In the US, George Louis Beer, a member of the ‘Inquiry’ which was an 
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informal organization to study plans for the peace settlements under Wilson, 
suggested his international trusteeship plan during the war. He was one of 
the few Americans who were well informed about the colonial issues because 
he was a historian of the British Empire (Louis 1963).  
 In Britain, as Wilson did, intellectuals and politicians on the left, 
mainly Labor party members, criticized colonial competition and advocated 
international administration of colonies. They warned of the perils of 
imperialism and criticized colonial atrocities in terms of humanitarianism 
(Louis 1967: 87). Moreover, various intellectuals, following Hobson, 
denounced the relationship between financial circles and imperialism. For 
example, in his book, The War of Steel and Gold (1918), H. N. Brailsford 
argued that a ruling class ‘regards Empires as a field for the careers of its 
sons, and with finance which treats it as a field for investment’ (Brailsford 
1918: 93). It was not for the profits of the majority of British people and 
colonized people. Brailsford warned that imperialism would lead to arms 
competition and war. Leonard Woolf, one of the main authors of Labor Party 
policy on the colonial issue, also claimed that imperialism since the 19th 
century had had an ‘economic motive’ (Woolf 1920: 22).  
 International trusteeship was thought by critics of empires to be a 
solution to colonial competition among Western countries. Hobson, in his 
book, Towards International Government (1915), proposed the establishment 
of an International Council with power to control colonial development in 
order to prevent frictions among colonial states and inhumane abuses of the 
natives (Hobson 1915: 141-146). Other left-wing intellectuals such as Woolf 
also proposed international government of colonial development (Louis 1967: 
87). However, they did not believe blindly that the international government 
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would be a solution to colonial problems. Woolf stated that 
‘internationalization is by itself no solution of the African problem’, but ‘The 
substitution of any form of international control for national ownership 
would be the sign and symbol that the notion of ownership and exploitation 
had given place to that of trusteeship’ (Woolf 1920: 364).  
 While they seemed to achieve consensus about the need for 
internationalization of colonial trusteeship, they were divided on the way of 
internationalization. There were two kinds of internationalization of colonial 
trusteeship: ‘international control by sovereign powers’ and ‘administration 
by an international state’ (Louis 1967: 90-91). Morel, MacDonald, and Webb 
supported the latter. Morel, in his book, proposed the internationalization 
and neutralization of ‘non-colonizable’ Africa ‘between the 18th Parallel of 
Lat. N. and the 15th Parallel of Lat. S.’ (Morel 1917: 21). As a result of the 
division of opinion among the left-wing intellectuals and politicians, the 
Labor Party’s ‘Memorandum on War Aims’ just stated that ‘With respect to 
these colonies, the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, 
established by international agreement under the League of Nations’ (cited 
in Kellogg and Gleason 1919: 361). 
 Some of the right-wing intellectuals also supported the 
internationalization of colonial trusteeship. The Round Table group 
including Philip H. Kerr and Lionel G. Curtis proposed an international 
supervisory system of colonial administration (‘Windows of Freedom’: 25-26). 
While they argued that Africans required the tutelage of civilized nations 
because of their savagism, they thought that colonial administration by the 
European empires without any supervision would cause the abuse of 
indigenous people like the scandal of the Congo. Since the late 19th century, 
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they had suggested the idea of Empire Federalism in which white settler 
colonies would be integrated into an imperial federation. For them, the 
British Empire was a model for the League of Nations (Kendle 1975; Bosco 
1996). Therefore, although they belonged to the conservative ranks, they 
were not suspicious about the idea of an international organization.  
Thus, while the left-wing intellectuals and some of the right-leaning 
intellectuals criticized colonial empires because of humanitarian and 
security concerns, no one denied the necessity of colonial trusteeship. Rather, 
they strengthened the pathologization of Asia and Africa. As many Victorian 
intellectuals and politicians did, they considered colonial administration to 
be the best means for the civilization and protection of natives. Instead of 
colonial trusteeship by empires, they suggested international trusteeship. 
While humanitarianism undermined the legitimacy of colonial empires, it 
protected the legitimacy of trusteeship. 
 
1-3 From Dynastic Empires to an International Organization 
 As stated at the beginning, internationalization of trusteeship was 
suggested as an alternative to dynasty empires such as the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. During the First World 
War, a South African politician, J. C. Smuts, proposed his mandate plan to 
reconstruct the regional order of dynastic empires. This plan was adopted by 
President Wilson and institutionalized as the mandate system under the 
League of Nations. His main concern was security and minority problems in 
this region. However, at the Paris Peace Conference, only the territories of 
the Ottoman Empire were placed under the mandate system. This 
arrangement was motivated not only by geopolitical interests of Western 
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countries but also humanitarian concern because a considerable number of 
Armenians, in the Ottoman Empire, were slaughtered during the war. This 
humanitarianism required not just the direct relief of suffering but the 
colonization of the territories of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Smuts’ Mandate System 
J. C. Smuts was one of the foremost politicians in South Africa, who 
contributed to the acquisition of self-government of South Africa on the 
imperial stage, joining the British Imperial War Cabinet, and being sent to 
conduct diplomatic and truce negotiations. Directed by Lloyd-George, he 
drafted a scheme for a League of Nations. His report received support in the 
Cabinet and was later published as the League of Nations: a Practical 
Suggestion (1918). Thereafter, Wilson expressed his admiration and adopted 
it into his draft of the League of Nations.  
The idea of a mandate system comprised the core of his suggestion. 
For Smuts, one of the most urgent tasks was the reconstruction of the 
regional order in the former dynastic empires such as Austro-Hungary, 
Ottoman Turks and parts of the Russian Empire. He argued that:  
 
‘In the place of the great Empires we find the map of Europe now 
dotted with small nations embryo states, derelict territories. Europe 
has been reduced to its original atoms. […] Europe is being 
liquidated, and the League of Nations must be heir to this great 
estate.’ (Smuts 1918: 10-11)  
 
He thought that instability of dynastic empires, especially Austro-Hungary, 
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mainly contributed to the outbreak of the World War rather than colonial 
competition among European countries. As dynastic empires had sought to 
control the nations of the empires by oppression, it had bred their discontent 
and finally led to the explosion of nationalism. As the First World War 
indicated, the nationalism of the East and Central European nations would 
disturb international order. Smuts’ mandate plan aimed to control the 
nationalism of newly-independent nations by constructing the new order in 
the former empires. He claimed that oppression would be replaced as an 
administrative principle by British-style liberalism. It was presumed that 
the liberation of the nations of these regions from oppression would 
contribute to the stability of the regional order. 
Smuts’ report was comprised of three sections: part A ‘the Position 
and Powers of the League,’ part B ‘the Constitution of the League,’ and part 
C ‘the League and World-Peace.’ It suggested 21 articles for the League of 
Nations covenant. Article 4 through 7 suggested basic institutions: Article 4 
stipulated that the administration authority of the former dynastic empires 
would be vested in the League of Nations; Article 5 defined the delegation of 
its authority to some civilized countries as ‘mandatary’; Article 6 stated that 
the mandatory state shall be laid down by the League of Nations; and Article 
7 specified open door policy and non-militarization. In the Paris Peace 
Conference, this series of plans was institutionalized as the mandate system, 
though it was radically different from the original plan. It is worth noting 
that in his plan, newly-independent countries would form the economic 
union and be put under measures for arms control (Igarashi 2009). In other 
words, this mandate plan attempted to regionally administer the 
newly-independent countries of the former empires. The function of the 
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League of Nations was defined as ‘reversionary of the Empires’ (Article 9) 
In this plan, the League of Nations was composed of three 
institutions: ‘a General Conference… of all the constituent States,’ ‘the 
Council of the League of Nations’, whose permanent members were the 
Great Powers, and the ‘Courts of Arbitrations and Conciliation’ (Smuts 1918: 
Part B). Smuts assigned the greatest power, including the authority to carry 
out mandates, to the Council of the League of Nations. This institutional 
design was adopted when the allied powers established the League of 
Nations. 
 Thus, Smuts’ mandate plan was different from the context of the 
criticism of colonial empires. He recognized Austro-Hungary and the League 
of Nations by analogy with the ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’ (Smuts 
1917: 29-32). As he experienced, South Africa had gradually developed from 
colony to more independent dominion in the British Empire. For him, the 
British Empire was not incompatible with self-determination, but rather it 
helped the dominions to develop into self-governing states (Smuts 1917: 9). 
Smuts explained the unique nature of the British Empire in his speech: 
 
‘This Commonwealth is peculiarly constituted. It is scattered over 
the whole world. It is not a compact territory. […] We are not a State. 
The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very 
expression ”Empire ” is misleading, because it makes people think 
that we are one community, to which the word “Empire” can 
appropriately to applied. […] But we are a system of nations. […] We 
are far greater than any Empire which has ever existed, and by using 
this ancient expression we really disguise the main fact that our 
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whole position is different, and that we are not one State or nations 
or empire, but a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations, 
of many States, and all sorts of communities, under one flag. We are 
a system of States, and not a stationary system, but a dynamic 
evolving system, always going forward to new destinies. […] I prefer 
to call [the British Empire] “the British Commonwealth of Nations.”’ 
(Smuts 1917: 29-32) 
 
Therefore, the British Empire ought to be a political model for the regions of 
the former dynastic empires. When he negotiated a truce with 
Austro-Hungary as a representative of the Allies, he recommended that 
Austro-Hungary follow the British Empire (Lloyd George 1933: 2460-2480). 
Also, he designed a League of Nations by analogy with the British Empire. 
He defined the British Empire as a precursory system of the League of 
Nations. 
 
‘People talk about a league of nations and international government, 
but the only successful experiment in international government that 
has ever been made is the British Empire, founded on principles of 
freedom and equality, it has continued to exist for a good time now, 
and our hope is that the basis may be so laid for the future that it 
may become an instrument for good, not only in the Empire but in 
the whole world.’ (Smuts 1917: 13) 
 
Thus, he thought that the British Commonwealth embodied a principle of 
liberalism and that it would provide a good political model for the former 
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dynastic empires and international society. The reform of European order 
according to British-style liberalism would lead to the liberation of European 
people from despotism and oppression and a lasting peace of the world 
(Smuts 1917: 74, 110).  
 Smuts’ mandate plan seemed less paternalistic than other 
international trusteeship ideas which were proposed by critics of colonial 
empires. However, his political visions constructed excluded ‘Others’: the 
indigenous people in South Africa; India and Egypt in the British Empire; 
and dependent territories in international society. First, his plan was not for 
the colonies but only for the former dynastic empires because he 
predetermined that non-European countries were too savage to stand alone 
(Smuts 1918: 14). Second, while Smuts was one of the founding fathers of the 
League of Nations, he established a racial segregation system in South 
Africa which would develop into apartheid. Third, while he advocated the 
autonomy of dominions such as South Africa and Australia, he strenuously 
opposed the suggestion that India and Egypt be granted dominion status as 
South Africa (Smuts 1966: 273). Moreover, Smuts planned to reform the 
British colonies in Africa on the lines of South Africa by facilitating 
European settlements and dreamed of building a confederation composed of 
the British African colonies (Smuts 1944; Hyam 1972: Ch. 2).  
 Thus, he was a founding father of the mandate system. Smuts 
suggested his mandate system as an alternative to dynastic empires. He 
thought that a mandate system could reconstruct the regional order of the 
former empires and prevent newly-independent countries from oppressing 
minorities and waging wars. His main aim was the liberation of European 
people from oppression and despotism and the re-stabilization of European 
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order. On this point, his concern was deeply related to humanitarianism.  
 
Armenian Problem in the Ottoman Empire 
Although Smuts sought to apply his mandate plan to the former 
empires, his main concern was for Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, in 
1919, while the territories of the former Ottoman Empire were placed under 
the mandate system, the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire 
gained independence. This was because the Allies applied the principle of 
self-determination not to the Arab regions but to East European countries.  
During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had been described 
as cruel despotism by European countries. As the Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire started in 1916, this biased representation of the Ottoman 
Empire was strengthened. The despotism of the Ottoman Empire was 
legitimizing its own dissolution (Dodge 2003: 44).  
Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had carried out the compulsory 
migration and massacre of Armenians since 1915. A number of public and 
private organizations including newspaper companies and Christian 
societies reported the inhumane treatment of Armenians and sought to 
support the victims. Britain and France criticized the Ottoman Empire in 
terms of humanitarianism. While they were already fighting against the 
Ottoman Empire, the US was reluctant to touch this humanitarian problem 
because they maintained neutrality. Although Henry Morgenthau, US 
ambassador to Turkey, strived to change the policy of the Wilson government, 
the President had never decided to intervene in the Armenian problem 
(Power 2002: Ch. 1). However, there can be no doubt that this humanitarian 
crisis legitimized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Lloyd-George wrote 
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in his memoirs:  
 
‘There was not a British statesman of any party who did not have it 
in mind that if we succeeded in defeating this inhuman Empire, our 
essential condition of the peace we should impose was the 
redemption of the Armenian valleys for ever from the bloody misrule 
with which they had been stained by the infamies of the Turks.’ (cited 
in MacMillan 2001: 189) 
 
Even the British Labor Party declared that ‘The Conference condemns the 
handing back to the systematically violent domination of the Turkish 
Government any subject people’ (cited in Kellogg and Gleason 1919: 360). 
 However, French and British policies toward the Ottoman Empire 
were motivated not only by humanitarianism but also by blatant 
imperialism. In 1916, the secret Sykes-Picot agreement on the partition of 
Arabian provinces was concluded between Britain and France. 
Lloyd-George’s remark on the region during the Peace Conference 
demonstrated British imperialism:  
 
‘Mesopotamia... yes... oil... irrigation... we must have Mesopotamia; 
Palestine... yes... the Holy Land... Zionism... we must have Palestine; 
Syria... h’m... what is there in Syria? Let the French have that.’ (cited 
in Macmillan 2001: 392) 
 
As the Sykes-Picot agreement was revealed by Lenin after the Russian 
Revolution, British and French imperialism was challenged by the US, the 
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left intellectuals, and public opinion. 
 Thus, while humanitarianism legitimized the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, geopolitical interests demanded the colonization of the 
Arab regions. Because of the ideological competition between Lenin and the 
Allies, the colonization of these regions was not a realistic option. However, 
for European politicians, Arab countries were not yet quite ready for 
self-government. Humanitarian crisis in the Ottoman Empire was 
interpreted as evidence for this assertion. As internationalization of 
trusteeship seemed a better option for European politicians, they adopted 
the plan to put Arab countries under the mandate system in 1919.  
 
1-4 Establishment of the Mandate System 
Before the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson prepared his 
draft of the Covenant. While he applauded and adopted Smuts’ mandate plan, 
he sought to apply it not to the former Austro-Hungary but to Arab regions of 
the former Ottoman Empire and the ex-German colonies in Africa and the 
Pacific. Furthermore, the British ministers did not support the application of 
the mandate system to Austro-Hungary. 
 At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilsonianism and old-fashioned 
colonialism clashed. The US and other Western countries were bitterly 
divided over the ex-German colonies. The colonial empires such as Britain 
and France demanded the annexation of them, ignoring their war aims 
which were announced during the war. The British representatives 
suggested their own mandate plan in which mandate territories were 
classified into two categories: ‘vested territories’ and ‘assisted states’ (Miller 
2002: 106-107). The former seemed to be the ex-German colonies where 
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slavery, forced labor and trade of alcohol would be prohibited; and the latter 
seemed to be the former Ottoman territories where the will of inhabitants 
would be respected. However, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand 
strongly hoped to annex the ex-German colonies such as German South-West 
Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa. However, Wilson bitterly opposed 
such annexation and asserted that all the ex-German colonies must be 
controlled under the mandate system. After the negotiations stalled, Smuts 
proposed a revised mandate plan in which the territories were classified into 
three categories (A, B, C type mandates) and Wilson accepted this 
proposition. Although Australia and New Zealand were reluctant to agree to 
this plan, it was decided to establish the mandate system as the majority of 
the representatives supported it.  
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant stipulated three kinds 
of mandate territories: A type mandate was for ‘communities formerly 
belonging to the Turkish Empire’ which ‘have reached a stage of development 
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized 
subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a 
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone’; B type mandate 
was for communities, such as Central Africa, which were still in the ‘stage 
that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the 
territory’; C type mandate was for communities, such as South-West Africa 
and South Pacific Islands, ‘which, owing to the sparseness of their population, 
or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or 
their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other 
circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as 
integral portions of its territory’.  
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 While the mandate system was based on colonial trusteeship, it was 
novel for two reasons. First, as the mandate system classified dependent 
territories into three categories, ‘it introduced the concept of “stage of 
development” into the literature of international organizations’ (Rist 2010: 
61). Characterizations of dependent territories changed from ‘barbarism’ or 
‘savageness’ to ‘immature’ or ‘not yet quite ready for self-determination.’ It 
implied a unilinear model of social development. Second, at least on the face 
of the Covenant, as the definition of A type territories stated, achievement of 
self-government was defined as the long term goal of the mandate system.  
 
 
2. The Mandate System and Colonial Administration 
While mandate territories were placed under the League of Nations, 
they were actually administrated by colonial empires as mandatories. 
Moreover, the mandate territories were limited to the ex-German colonies 
and the former Ottoman Empire territories, and the jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Mandate Commission was restricted to supervision of colonial 
administration. The League of Nations’ sphere of influence was quite small. 
How different was the mandate system from colonial administration? 
 This section will examine the practice of the mandate system by 
analyzing two mandate territories: Tanganyika (B type mandate) and Iraq (A 
type mandate). In this period, the idea of indirect rule was still a ruling 
theology of colonial trusteeship. Tanganyika was a laboratory for indirect 
rule because its second governor was Donald Cameron, who elaborated the 
colonial philosophy of indirect rule. The analysis of Tanganyika will show 
how the mandate system was different from colonial administration. On the 
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other hand, Iraq was the sole case in which a target society gained 
independence during the mandatory period. This section will examine 
whether or not the A type mandate respected self-determination of target 
societies.  
 
2-1 Tanganyika: a Laboratory for Indirect Rule 
 As other East African colonies such as Kenya did, Tanganyika 
confronted the problem of European settlement. The governor had two 
choices: one was to follow the example of Kenya where the white settlers 
were allowed to have strong power and rule the national economy; another 
was to follow the example of Nigeria whose administration principle was 
indirect rule. ‘In 1921 the Colonial Office agreed that Tanganyika should be 
a “black man’s country” on broadly West African lines’ (Roberts 1986: 672). In 
1925 Donald Cameron, the second governor of the British mandate of 
Tanganyika, stated that:  
 
‘Everyone, whatever his opinion may be in regard to direct or indirect 
rule, will agree, I think, that it is our duty to do everything in our 
power to develop the native on lines which will not Westernise him 
and turn him into a bad imitation of a European – our whole 
education policy is directed to that end. We want to make him a good 
African.’ (cited in Chidzero 1961: 118) 
 
According to this principle, the governor introduced a dual legal system: 
English law and ordinary courts for European settlers and native law and 
native courts for natives (Chidzero 1961: 58-59).  
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Cameron developed Lugardian indirect rule in his administration. 
While he learned a lot of lessons from Nigeria and its governor Frederick 
Lugard, his administration was slightly different from Lugard’s in that he, in 
some degree, accepted gradual modernization of the natives. Margery 
Perham observed that: ‘In the six years of this governorship he [Cameron] 
introduced the Nigerian system, but in a form adapted to the different 
conditions and the different racial stock of East Africa’ (Perham 1967: 94). 
Cameron defined his colonial administration policy as follows: 
 
‘The system of “native administration” [...] known as “Indirect 
Administration” [is] based on several principles, [and] is designed to 
adapt for the purposes of local government the tribal institutions 
which the native people have evolved for themselves, so that the 
latter may develop in a constitutional manner from their own past, 
guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they 
have inherited, molded or modified as they may be on the advice of 
British officers. It is an essential feature of the system that [...] the 
British Government rules through these native institutions which 
are an integral part of the machinery of government (just as the 
administrative officers are an integral part of the government) with 
well defined powers and functions recognized by the Government and 
by law, and not dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.’ 
(cited in Dougherty 1966: 210) 
 
Thus, the administrators of Tanganyika adopted indirect rule as their 
administrative principle because they were trained in British colonies. 
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According to the principle of indirect rule, the indigenous people were 
administered through the native authorities. However, the top of the 
administrative structure was a British governor who was appointed by the 
Crown (Dougherty: 1966 213). In this system, the governor had executive 
power and legislative power. Although there was the Executive Council and 
the Legislative Council, the governor could ignore their recommendations 
(Chidzero 1961: 50). Moreover, as Callahan observes, ‘By merging judicial 
and executive power, the colonial state was able to penetrate much deeper 
into African society, to reorder local communities into often artificial cultural 
categories, and to form static definitions of “native rule” and African 
“customary law”’ (Callahan 1999: 141).  
For example, the determination to alienate the native land signified 
the governor’s despotic power. The mandate system defined the protection of 
the native land rights and the mandatory states had no ownership of land. 
Therefore, the alienation of land by the government was basically prohibited. 
However, the governor actually had discretion over land. Cameron justified 
the alienation of land for European enterprise as long as it would be 
beneficial to Tanganyika as a whole (Chidzero 1961: 226). In fact, in the late 
1940s, the Groundnut Scheme, which was an early colonial development 
project, was conducted not in the British colonies but in Tanganyika (see Ch. 
5 of this study).  
Thus, the legal and political systems of Tanganyika were marked by 
two features of colonial administration: the imposition of native systems and 
the despotism of the British governor. On this point, B type mandate was not 
different from colonial administration in terms of administrative principles 
and practice.  
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2-2 Iraq: Constructing an Informal Colony 
 When the British Empire started the administration of Iraq, the 
colonial officials had little knowledge about Iraqi society (Yaphe 2004: 20, 24). 
Their image of Iraq was influenced by their bias against the Ottoman 
Empire, Orientalist discourse and the experiences of British India. They 
assumed that the Ottoman Empire was despotic and corrupt, and therefore 
politicians and officials trained under the Ottoman Empire must also be 
corrupt (Dodge 2003: 64, 66). Orientalist discourse predetermined the nature 
of the urban-based population and the rural population by applying the 
urban-rural division to Iraqi society. The urban-based population was 
imagined as corrupt because of capitalism, European influence, and the 
administration of the Ottoman Empire (Dodge 2003: 71-73). On the other 
hand, the rural population was recognized ‘as the noble bedouin, untouched 
by all that was negative about the modern day’ (Dodge 2003: 69-70). As 
Dodge argues, the ‘Orientalist discourse through which the British perceived 
Iraqi society robbed the majority of the Iraqi population of agency’ (Dodge 
2003: 67).  
Following this distorted image of Iraqi society, the British Empire 
inaugurated legal and land reform. The regulations which the British 
Empire introduced divided the Iraqi population into two categories: the city 
dwellers who were subject to the Iraqi civic law based on Ottoman codes, and 
the tribal population who were subject to the tribal regulations (Dodge 2003: 
Ch. 5). On land reform, they sought to find indigenous community units and 
owners or leaders to collect tax. However, it took time to decide the 
administrative policy in Iraq because several departments, especially the 
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India Office and the Arab Bureau of the Foreign Office, competed in the 
administration model of Iraq (Yaphe 2004: 21-22; Dodge 2003: 129). Finally, 
according to Yaphe, ‘The tone was set by British administrators sent out 
from the India Office who sought to model Iraq on Britain’s imperial style of 
rule in India’ (Yaphe 2004: 22). They attempted to identify ‘natural’ leaders 
in traditional communities and constructed autocratic government (ibid.: 25). 
The imposition of socio-political models ‘did ontological violence to Iraqi 
society’ (Dodge 2003: 129). Moreover, local municipal councils ‘were headed 
and run by British officers; Iraqi council members had responsibility only for 
public health and sanitation, parks, trade, assistance to the poor, and road 
building’ (Yaphe 2004: 27). In addition, the British Empire exercised a 
despotic power through air strikes on many villages in order to oppress 
rebellions (Dodge 2003: Ch. 7). Moreover, even after Iraq was granted 
independence, the British Empire controlled it by sending civil and military 
advisers and experts to Iraq and exploiting Iraqi military bases and facilities 
(Stanfield 2007: 49; Balfour-Paul 1999: 501).  
Thus, mandate administration in Iraq was characterized by social 
engineering and despotic rule as in other colonial territories. On this point, 
the mandate system helped to create an informal colony of the British 
Empire.6  
 
                                                   
6 ‘[I]n contrast to the situation in Iraq,’ according to Yoav Alon (2005: 222), 
‘by the second half of the 1920s British officials had developed a better 
understanding of Transjordanian society’. They exploited the tribal political 
systems to maintain law and order. The Legislative Council established by 
the British Empire introduced indigenous leaders into the imperial 
administration structure (Alon 2005: 223; Cleveland and Bunton 2009: 
213-215). As a result, the British Empire succeeded to manipulate and 
strengthen the tribal order and norms.’ 
１４３ 
 
 
 
 Both cases of the mandate system demonstrated principal 
characteristics of colonial administration. First, in these territories, colonial 
administrators sought to exploit indigenous socio-political systems. It did not 
mean that they respected self-determination of target societies. This strategy 
was based on the colonial philosophy of indirect rule. Second, these cases 
demonstrated the despotic tendencies of colonial administration. They had 
despotic administrative structures. Moreover, in Iraq, the British Empire 
employed military power to suppress rebellions. Thus, the mandate system 
was hardly different from colonial administration. It means that the 
mandate system was a part of colonial trusteeship. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter examined internationalization of trusteeship in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. In this period, while the legitimacy of colonial 
empires and dynastic empires was challenged, the necessity of colonial 
trusteeship was accepted by critics of empires. Humanitarianism was 
playing an important part in internationalization of colonial trusteeship, as 
well as security concerns. Humanitarian crises in colonial empires and 
dynastic empires undermined the legitimacy of these empires. However, it 
was argued that dependent territories had to be supervised by civilized 
nations in terms of humanitarianism. In this process, the pathologization of 
non-European societies was strengthened by critics of empires. While 
Wilsonianism created the idea of ‘the rights to self-determination,’ it 
represented dependent territories as uncivilized and constituted a unilinear 
model of social development. Furthermore, incipient cultural relativism 
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sought to solidify the indigenous nature of non-European societies. This 
argument was marked by a typical essentialism. In either discourse, 
non-European societies were deprived of their political agency and described 
as requiring the supervision of civilized nations. Thus, the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship was reproduced.  
International trusteeship was suggested as a solution to colonial 
problems, although there was no consensus about an institutional design of 
internationalization. At the Paris Peace Conference, the mandate system 
was established to administer the ex-German colonies and the territories of 
the former Ottoman Empire. However, the practice of the mandate system 
was not different from colonial administration because the administrative 
regimes of the mandate territories were despotic and because the 
administrators of the mandate territories conducted social engineering 
policies as in other colonial territories. Thus, the mandate system was a part 
of colonial trusteeship.  
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Ch. 5 Development Trusteeship since the 1940s 
 
 The previous chapter showed that humanitarianism was playing an 
important part in the internationalization of colonial trusteeship around the 
time of the First World War and that this process was accompanied by the 
re-pathologization of dependent territories. During and after the Second 
World War, as this chapter will show, the legitimacy of trusteeship was 
challenged. As a result, the theology and practice of trusteeship changed 
from indirect rule to development trusteeship. As in other periods of the 
history of trusteeship, humanitarianism contributed to the reconstitution of 
trusteeship. The dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship did not 
disappear in spite of the crisis of trusteeship.  
This chapter will analyze the relationship between development 
trusteeship and humanitarianism by tracing the history of development 
trusteeship from British colonial administration in the 1940s to the 
development policy of international aid agencies such as the World Bank in 
the 1980s. In the 1940s the British Empire, which was under internal and 
external pressure, began to invoke the idea of poverty, as a kind of 
humanitarian discourse, in order to reconstruct the legitimacy of colonial 
trusteeship. In the late 1960s, international aid agencies such as the World 
Bank took over the projects of the modernization of non-European countries 
from colonial empires. As in the 1940s, the discourse of poverty was playing 
an important part in the construction of the new regime of development 
trusteeship.  
Although there are a variety of studies which find the origin of 
development in colonial administration (Lee 1967; Havinden and Meredith 
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1993; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Cooper 1997), they do not analyze 
development policy after decolonization. Other scholars, who adopt a 
historical approach in the analysis of contemporary development policy 
(Escobar 1995; Jahn 2007), do not analyze the relationship between colonial 
trusteeship and humanitarianism. This study will show the historical 
continuity between colonial administration and contemporary development 
policy.  
 This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part of this chapter 
analyzes how and why the British Empire shifted from indirect rule to 
development trusteeship in the 1940s, and what happened in practice after 
that. The second part examines how international organizations such as the 
UN and World Bank took over development trusteeship in the late 1960s, 
and how they sought to transform the socio-political institutions of 
developing countries. 
 
1. Emergence of Development Trusteeship since the 1940s 
 Development trusteeship was the antithesis to indirect rule in that 
the former sought to make target communities move along the transitional 
path which the Western powers predetermined, while the latter sought to 
protect or create indigenous ‘traditional’ institutions. On this point, 
development trusteeship seems to have been a revival of colonial trusteeship 
before indirect rule. However, development trusteeship was different from 
colonial trusteeship, as advocated by utilitarianism, because it reflected a 
new state model in which the government actively intervened in society and 
the market by planning economic policy and maintaining the standards of 
living of its population through welfare programs (Lewis 2000: 24-80). 
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Development trusteeship aimed to develop colonial communities by investing 
ample capital, constructing infrastructure, and developing agricultural 
techniques, health systems and educational institutions. The policy target of 
development trusteeship was mainly economic institutions although it 
actually affected socio-political institutions, and was unilaterally planned 
and imposed by the government of the British Empire and later the 
headquarters of international organizations.  
This new state model appeared in the late 19th century. The 
journalist, J. L. Garvin stated in 1904 that:  
 
‘Economic progress no less than the political presentation of it must 
largely depend upon the conscious purpose and efficient action of the 
state itself. Government, in a word, should be the brain of the state, 
even in the sphere of commerce’ (cited in Cowen and Shenton 1991: 
146).  
 
Around the time of the First World War, new liberals such as J. A. Hobson 
insisted that the government intervene in the market in order to prevent the 
gap between rich and poor from widening (Long 1995: Ch. 3). However, they 
were supporting indirect rule as colonial policy. Ironically, at the time, an 
advocate of colonial development policy was Joseph Chamberlain, who was 
neither a liberal nor a socialist (Cowen and Shenton 1991; Havinden and 
Meredith 1993: Ch. 4). As Colonial Secretary from 1885 to 1903, he ‘pressed 
hard for imperial action to improve colonial economies’ (Fieldhouse 1999: 81). 
However, the British Treasury deterred his attempt to obtain public funds 
for development in the colonies because they believed ‘that limited capital 
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resources were better spent in the metropole, and […] development would 
disrupt colonial societies’ (Cooper 1997: 65). These ideas arose around the 
time of the Second World War. ‘A New Philosophy of Colonial Rule,’ Lord 
Hailey’s address to the Royal Empire Society in 1941, marked a 
turning-point. It stated that ‘the position of the Colonial Office would become 
more and more to resemble that occupied by British departments of state 
“which are actively concerned in protecting and developing the standards of 
life of our population”’ (Lee 1967: 17). In this new philosophy, the colonial 
administrator would not protect or invent ‘traditional’ institutions; rather, he 
would westernize the local institutions and population through social 
engineering. In the 1940s, this ‘new philosophy’ of trusteeship would become 
the consensus in the British Empire.7 
 
1-1 Shift from Indirect Rule to Development Trusteeship 
 Three factors led to the shift in British colonial policy from indirect 
rule to development trusteeship: the rise of the discourse of poverty from the 
late 1930s onwards; internal and external criticism of British colonial policy; 
and the shortages of resources such as food, raw materials and dollars as a 
result of the Second World War. 
                                                   
7 As this chapter will demonstrate, the shift from indirect rule to 
development trusteeship occurred in the 1940s. However, some researchers 
highlight the changes of colonial administration in India during and after 
the First World War. For example, in this period, the British India 
government began to intervene in the Indian economy by reconsidering its 
traditional laissez-faire policy (Tomlinson 1979: Ch. 3) and launched new 
social development policies such as the introduction of primary education 
(Aspendren 2009). While these changes were precursory cases of 
development trusteeship, they did not affect the colonial philosophy of 
indirect rule. As Ch. 4 showed, the India Office developed indirect rule in 
Iraq after the First World War. The shift of the theology of trusteeship had 
not occurred until the 1940s. 
１４９ 
 
 
 
 
The Rise of the Discourse of Poverty 
 In the 1930s, as Frederick Cooper (1996, 1997) highlights, riots and 
strikes in the British colonies shocked colonial administrators and 
politicians. These events led to new pathologization of dependent countries – 
the discourse of poverty. The discourse of poverty contributed to the rise of 
development trusteeship. In 1935, strikes and riots broke out in Northern 
Rhodesia and the West Indies. Subsequently, in 1937 and 1938, riots erupted 
in the West Indies again, and in 1938 strikes occurred in the sugar 
plantations of Mauritius. In 1939, strikes in the Gold Coast and general 
strikes in Mombasa took place. In order to investigate this series of riots and 
strikes and find a remedy, the British government established the West 
Indies Royal Commission. This commission submitted a report on the series 
of riots and strikes. It ‘was so critical that it was suppressed until the end of 
the war – it saw disorder as the result of unremedied legitimate grievances 
and called for metropolitan efforts both to increase production and 
employment and to remedy the miserable state of social services’ (Cooper 
1997: 66-67). Thus, the British Empire recognized the deficient state of the 
social policies in its colonies as a main cause of disorder. Therefore, the 
remedy would be the improvement of social service by the colonial 
government. Capitalism had extended its reach over all the African colonies, 
and the labor market had rapidly grown. Thus, indirect rule was no longer 
relevant to the African colonies. It was no longer possible to confine natives 
to ‘traditional’ institutions. Rather, it required a welfare state to improve 
standards of life.  
The Royal Commission’s report marked the new pathologization of 
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dependent territories by the Empire. Poverty, caused by malnutrition, 
primitive agricultural methods, and inadequate education and health 
provisions, was considered to be the pathology of the British colonies. For 
example, in 1945, Rita Hinden, a leading intellectual of the Fabian Society, 
declared that ‘The poverty of Africa is a challenge. […] Nor do we seek to 
deny the wretchedness of African conditions or our responsibility for 
improving them’ (Hinden 1945: 51). She classified the African people into two 
types: the peasants and the wage-earners. The former had no ‘Modern ideas 
of crop rotation, the use of fertilizers, proper irrigation, [and] machinery’. As 
they had only primitive agricultural techniques, they could not produce a 
large amount of agricultural produce. Moreover, they had to sell their 
products to powerful trading firms and could not obtain adequate money. The 
wage-earners were also ‘ignorant, easily exploitable, poor in the weapons of 
self-defense’. The wages were ‘miserably inadequate’ (Hinden 1945: 52-53, 
56-57). Similarly, Arthur Creech Jones, ‘the most influential Colonial 
Secretary since Joseph Chamberlain’ (Porter and Stockwell 1987: 9), argued 
in 1945 that: ‘Labour recognises that the fundamental social problems of 
colonial regions are ignorance, poverty and disease’ (Jones 1945a: 111). This 
diagnosis was shared with the Conservative party. C. E. Ponsonby, as a 
representative of the Conservative party, stated that ‘All political parties are 
agreed on the necessity of insuring freedom from want and freedom from 
disease’ (Ponsonby 1945: 118). Thus, the poverty of the British colonies 
provided the British Empire with new reason to intervene in colonial 
societies. ‘Poverty’ was considered to be unignorable human suffering in this 
period. The alleviation of poverty was a kind of humanitarianism. This 
humanitarian discourse was not just compassion for the suffering of Others; 
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rather, it attributed the causes of poverty to the nature of Others. This 
pathologization contributed to the constitution of relations of inequality and 
required practices were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. 
 A prescription for the pathology of Africa was ‘development and 
welfare’ policy which would be based on ‘planning from above’ (Hinden 1945: 
60-61). As stated above, Lord Hailey’s new philosophy that the government 
and state ‘are actively concerned in protecting and developing the standards 
of life of our population’ became the new strategy of trusteeship. Not only the 
Conservative party but also the Labor party denied the democratic idea of 
colonial development that ‘changes must come from the people themselves’ 
(Hinden 1945: 62). They presumed that Africans were so ignorant that they 
could not develop on their own and demanded that the British Empire 
educate and train Africans, cultivate soil, plan economic policy, protect 
laborers and peasants from powerful firms, and construct infrastructure 
such as roads (Jones 1945a: 112). It required ample capital which the private 
companies could not provide, but only government could inject (Hinden 1941: 
Ch. 19).  
 In addition to the riots, the fall of Malaya in 1942 also contributed to 
the constitution of new pathology of dependent territories. Japanese troops 
attacked and occupied the British colony in Malaya. This was a shock to the 
British Empire because it could not believe that an Asian army could defeat 
a European army. Some European people were likely to presume that ‘Asian’ 
was inferior to ‘European’ in terms of physical ability (Wolton 2000). 
Moreover, that the local population refused to cooperate with the British 
Empire also challenged the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship. Margery 
Perham, one of the most influential intellectuals on colonial administration, 
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stated in the Times as follows: ‘The Malayan disaster has shocked us into 
sudden attention to the structure of our colonial empire.’ She continued that:  
 
‘elsewhere peasants and workers, almost if not quite so ignorant and 
backward as those of our colonies, have fought as men fight only for a 
cause they recognize as their own. This forces us to ask the 
long-range question whether British rule does develop that solidarity 
which society needs for health in peace as well as for strength in war.’ 
(Perham 1967: 225) 
 
She called the British people’s attention to the welfare of dependent 
territories. The Second World War revealed that the British Empire had 
hardly improved the well-being of the colonized societies.   
The colonial administrators proposed the construction of colonial 
welfare systems not only because of their humanitarian concern, but also 
because of their geopolitical concern. The British Empire aspired to local 
cooperation and sought to alleviate disorder and resistance in its colonies. 
Colonial development was an attempt to ‘buy continued acquiescence in alien 
rule’ (Fieldhouse 1999: 227). The idea of ‘partnership’ signified how 
hypocritical colonial development of the British Empire was. In the 1940s, a 
variety of intellectuals and politicians suddenly began to advocate the idea of 
‘partnership’ instead of ‘trusteeship.’ Lord Hailey, on the fall of Malaya, 
addressed the House of Lords as follows:  
 
‘No-one can deny that the sentiment of trusteeship has played a great 
and most beneficent part in the development of our system of civil 
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administration in the Colonies, but [...]trusteeship has today a new 
and more positive meaning for us. [...] And there is another point. 
The use of the term is irritating to the colonial people. It was 
intensely unpopular in India. It is becoming equally unpopular in the 
Colonies, for it has implications on which it is unnecessary to enlarge 
but which, if I were a native of the Colonies, I should equally resent 
[...] let it be said that our contract of partnership involves the 
progressive increase of the share which the junior partners have in 
the conduct of the undertaking.’ (cited in Hinden 1949: 146) 
 
In addition to Hailey, Harold Macmillan, a leading Conservative politician, 
and Oliver Stanley, then a Secretary of State for the Colonies, also supported 
the idea ‘partnership’ (Hinden 1949: 147-148). According to J. M. Lee, ‘By the 
middle of 1943 several ministers at the Colonial Office had erected this 
suggestion into a “principle of partnership” ’ (Lee 1967: 18). However, Hinden 
aptly pointed out the following:  
 
‘[The British colonial administrators and politicians] give pretty 
names to their policy – they may call it benevolent paternalism, 
trusteeship, or partnership, and inspire it with the most noble of 
intentions; but they remain blind to the one over-riding fact that, in 
the eyes of the colonial peoples, all that they do remains alien 
domination’. (Hinden 1949: 168)  
 
The idea ‘partnership’ was nothing but hypocrisy. Colonized people could not 
have any political agency. The British Empire had never allowed the 
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Africans and Asians to decide their economic and political policies. Not only 
the Conservative party but also the Labor party presumed that ‘economic 
and social development had to preceded political independence’ (Gupta 1975: 
310). Although British colonial administrators and politicians had oppressed 
educated natives according to the dogma of indirect rule in the late 19th 
century, they suddenly changed their minds and required ‘suitably qualified 
local candidates’ as a condition of political autonomy (Porter 1987: Doc 58).  
 
Internal and External Pressure 
 The second factor which caused the shift from indirect rule to 
development trusteeship was internal and external criticism and pressure. 
As in the late 19th century, British intellectuals seriously criticized British 
colonial administration, although they still supported the idea of colonial 
trusteeship in this period. In 1940, the Fabian Colonial Bureau was 
established as a department of the Fabian Society by Arthur Creech Jones 
and Rita Hinden. The strategy of this organization was different from that of 
the previous generation of intellectuals of the left. The new critics of the 
British Empire demanded that the imperial government deliberately plan 
colonial development and intervene in local societies with ample capital and 
advanced technology. As stated above, the welfare state model was applied to 
colonial administration. In the Fabian Colonial Essays (1945), A. C. Jones 
highlighted the importance of state functions such as the construction of 
infrastructure, the control of industrial development and the regulation of 
employment in colonies (Jones 1945b: 15-17). Margery Perham, who had a 
strong connection with A. C. Jones (see Lewis 2000: 93), also advocated the 
application of the welfare state model to colonial administration. She argued 
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that:  
 
‘The so-called welfare state of today, even in a social democracy like 
Britain, now controls almost the whole life of society; it runs the 
major utilities and industries; it manages and allocates the entire 
national income and it applies science and the art of administration 
to the betterment of the standard of living – the golden calf of the 
modern world. […] Most colonial societies need them as much or even 
more, because there is much more to be done and done quickly if they 
are even to start to catch up with the rest of the world’ (Perham 1949: 
337).  
 
These criticisms from the left-wing seemed to influence British colonial 
policy because the Labor party had been in power from 1945 to 1951. Thus, 
the internal pressure against the colonial administration contributed to the 
shift of the British colonial policy. 
 In addition to the internal criticism, the pressure from without, 
especially the US, was also important. As the Ch. 4 explained, the US did not 
support European colonialism at the Paris Peace Conference. Similarly, 
during the Second World War, the US brought pressure on the British 
Empire to change its colonial policy. Therefore, the British Empire had to 
revise the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship. However, the US did 
not desire the immediate independence of colonies because it presumed that 
non-Western countries were still savage and because it was reluctant to 
change the balance of power by decolonization in the Cold War. As a result, 
even after the Second World War, most of the British colonies could not 
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achieve independence and the supervision by the international organization 
did not expand. Only the mandate territories were taken over by the 
Trusteeship system under the UN. Furthermore, the US and the colonial 
empires concluded the article regarding ‘non-self-governing territories’ 
(Article 73 of the UN Chapter XI). This article approved the universality of 
trusteeship as a responsibility of civilized countries by declaring that:  
 
‘Members of the United Nations which have or assume 
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples 
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the 
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are 
paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to 
the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants 
of these territories.’  
 
By stipulating the responsibility of the colonial empires, this statement 
reconstituted the relations of inequality between civilized countries and 
dependent territories, although it meant neither the establishment of 
international supervision systems nor international administration systems.  
 Thus, in the 1940s, the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was 
challenged by internal and external criticism. By defining the objective of 
colonial administration as the alleviation of poverty in the British colonies, 
the British Empire attempted to reestablish the relations of inequality 
between civilized countries and dependent territories – that is, the 
relationship between trustees and target societies.  
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Shortages of Resources 
 The third cause of the shift of trusteeship was directly related to the 
geopolitical interests of the British Empire. The Second World War 
exhausted the people and the resources of Britain. Therefore they were 
suffering from shortages of food, raw materials and dollars. The British 
colonies were expected to provide a satisfactory solution to this problem. 
Minister for Economic Affairs Stafford Cripps stated in his speech:  
 
‘Tropical Africa is already contributing much, both in physical 
supplies of food and raw materials and in quite substantial net 
earnings of dollars for the sterling area pool. The further 
development of African resources is of the same crucial importance to 
the rehabilitation and strengthening of Western Europe as the 
restoration of European productive power is to the future progress 
and prosperity of Africa. Each needs and is needed by the other.’ 
(cited in Porter and Stockwell 1987: Doc 44) 
 
Thus, the British Empire attempted to make their colonies produce raw 
materials and earn US dollars by selling agricultural products from the 
colonies to the US. As Porter and Stockwell observe, the task of colonial 
development and the task of reconstructing the Empire merged (Porter and 
Stockwell 1987: 42). This self-interested motivation was not inconsistent 
with humanitarianism. According to Cripps, the empire and its colonies 
‘[e]ach needs and is needed by the other.’ Furthermore, colonial development 
and the reconstruction of Europe were important for America’s new world 
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order. The US sought to strengthen the capitalist Western bloc against the 
communist Eastern bloc. In order to do this, European economies needed to 
have access to raw materials and markets in Asia and Africa (Wood 1986: 42). 
Thus, development trusteeship aimed to exploit the resources of Asia and 
Africa for the reconstruction of the British Empire. 
 
This section has explored three factors which led to the rise of 
development trusteeship. Among these factors, the discourse of poverty was 
the most important in the shift of trusteeship. This humanitarian discourse 
required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering 
and helped the British Empire to restore the legitimacy of colonial 
administration, although it could not stop the decolonization movement. Due 
to humanitarian concerns, even the intellectuals of the left supported the 
colonial development projects. The geopolitical motivation was highly 
important, but without the discourse of poverty, it was impossible to launch 
the new social engineering projects. However, I do not intend to say that 
development trusteeship was normatively good; rather, in the 1940s, 
humanitarian discourse reconstituted trusteeship by re-pathologizing 
dependent territories as suffering from poverty. 
 
1-2 Failure of Development Trusteeship 
 As the theology of trusteeship shifted from indirect rule to 
development, the practice of trusteeship also changed in this period. The 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 marked the starting-point of 
development trusteeship in practice. Although the Colonial Development Act 
had already been introduced in 1929, the 1940 Act was not just an extension 
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of the 1929 Act but innovative in two respects. As D. K. Fieldhouse (1999: 86) 
aptly summarizes, ‘First, it included “welfare”, thus accepting that Britain 
should subsidize current expenditure in the colonies; secondly, payments did 
not have to be approved for colonial administration by the hard-headed 
Advisory Committee, as had been necessary from 1929.’ 
 The most important problem was how to use the funds from the 1940 
Act. In 1941, the Colonial Ministry established a committee on post-war 
reconstruction in the colonies to decide to make such a decision. Its chair was 
Lord Hailey, who was a leading intellectual on colonial administration and 
published African Survey in 1938. In addition to him, this committee 
included W. Arthur Lewis, Charlotte Leubuscher, Sir William Beveridge, and 
C. K. Meek. Lewis was a West Indian economist. After earning his Ph. D at 
the London School of Economics in 1940, he worked for the Fabian Society to 
formulate the colonial policy of the British West Indies. Later, he became one 
of the most influential economists in development studies and received the 
Nobel Prize for economics. In this committee, he stated that:  
 
‘The economic development of the colonies deserves to be carefully 
planned and as carefully controlled. Unless British colonial 
administration takes this to heart, it will not attain those new 
standards of trusteeship which the modern world demands.’ 
(Havinden and Meredith 1993: 216-217) 
 
Due to the intensification of the Second World War, the colonial development 
project was interrupted and the debates of this committee did not have 
immediate influence. 
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 After the Second World War, the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act (1945) was passed. The colonial development project was launched again. 
Subsequently, the British colonies initiated the ten-year plans and made the 
allocation of the funds from the 1945 Act. They would spend the funds for 
mainly improving agriculture, education, medical provision and water 
supply networks (see Havinden and Meredith 1993: 256). In 1941, Hinden 
analyzed African colonies and gave a prescription as follows:  
 
‘The intense poverty of colonial areas, even at their most prosperous, 
is directly due to lack of capital. Through lack of capital the colonies 
have been deprived of the fundamental public services on which all 
economic progress is based. Communications and transport either do 
not exist at all, or are expensive and inefficient; water supplies are 
inadequate; electricity or any other power supply has barely begun to 
be developed; drainage systems are expensive toys confined to 
European settlements; hospitals and schools cannot hope to deal with 
more than a fraction of the community.’ (Hinden 1941: 187) 
 
Thus, she thought that the lack of capital was part of a vicious circle of 
poverty in Africa. In other words, the investment of ample capital could 
improve agriculture, industry, and social services such as education in Africa. 
The 1945 Act and the subsequent colonial practices corresponded with her 
plan. Even in the 1950s, the capital resource transfer was regarded as the 
most effective development strategy (Thorbecke 2000: 16). From 1947 to 
1956, the public expenditure for colonial development rose from £150 million 
to £581 million (Havinden and Meredith 1993: 260). The British Empire was 
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no longer so restrictive over spending. 
 In the 1930s, scientists sought to collect detailed statistics on African 
societies. The Colonial Office utilized statistics and expert knowledge on Asia 
and Africa. Before that, the strategy of colonial administration depended on 
local administrators’ initiative, and the budget was strictly limited by the 
Treasury. Missionaries and journalists were the main groups providing 
information on the colonial territories to the British public. The African 
Survey, published in 1938 by Lord Hailey, implied a new trend of colonial 
administration which relied on scientific research and statistics. This 
literature was a result of the African research project launched by J. C. 
Smuts and P. H. Kerr (Hailey 1957: Preface). They sought to 
comprehensively acknowledge the diversified conditions of Africa. The 
African Survey included extensive information about Africa from 
ethnography to agriculture, law, and colonial administration systems. This 
project aimed to dissect developing areas and continued even after the 
colonial empires dissolved. Furthermore, in the same year, a separate Social 
Services department at the Colonial Office was established. This 
department’s officials had responsibility for social service issues such as 
public health, labor conditions, and housing. This new department brought 
external experts into the decision-making process of the colonial 
administration (Ittman 1999). Thus, development trusteeship began to be 
practiced by experts on the basis of scientific data.  
 However, the colonial development projects in the 1940s did not 
succeed. First of all, as Cooper (1997: 78) states, ‘in 1955, nearly a third of 
the [Colonial Development and Welfare] funds appropriated in 1945 and 
1950 remained unspent, mostly because the system was so clogged that 
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spending more was “physically impossible,” even though the original 
appropriation was regarded as modest in relation to the colonies’ needs.’ 
Second, some colonial development plans were so extemporaneous that they 
could not achieve any results. The Tanganyika Groundnuts Scheme 
(1946-1954) was a typical instance of the failure. It is even now cited as a 
classic development failure in the development studies’ literature. This plan 
was proposed by the United Africa Co., a subsidiary of Unilever Ltd, and 
implemented by the Ministry of Food. Its aim was to alleviate Britain’s acute 
oil and fat shortages. The Ministry of Food accepted this plan without pilot 
schemes or agricultural experiments. Furthermore, the proposers did not 
research the characteristics of East African climate and calculated the cost 
erroneously. One of the members stated that: ‘It was all guess work, and our 
guess was as good as anybody else’s’ (cited in Havinden and Meredith 1993: 
282). When they introduced this plan, they soon realized that the original 
plan was impossible to implement and had to be re-examined. By 1953 it was 
obvious that it would not alleviate Britain’s oil and fat shortages and would 
not develop Tanganyika. Due to the misunderstanding of the local conditions, 
the project completely failed. This kind of failure would be repeated even 
after the 1960s. 
 Finally, in the 1950s, the British Empire realized that colonial 
administration could not bring benefits. They ‘could in most cases get little 
more economically out of a colonial rule than out of a cooperative postcolonial 
relationship’ (Cooper 1997: 79). In the 1960s, the colonial empires 
disintegrated in the decolonization movement and newly independent 
countries required development aid. In a world where the US was hegemonic, 
America and international organizations such as the UN and the World 
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Bank began to conduct development trusteeship instead of the colonial 
empires. 
 
 
2. Development Trusteeship by International Organizations since the 1960s 
 In the 1940s, the British Empire created the theology of development 
trusteeship and implemented it. This new theology regarded ‘poverty’ as a 
pathology of target societies and justified social engineering policies 
including Westernized educational systems, construction of health 
institutions and development of infrastructure. Even after the colonial 
empires dissolved, development trusteeship did not disappear. International 
organizations substituted for the colonial empires in reconstituting the 
relations of inequality between trustees and target societies and conducting 
the practices of development trusteeship. 
 
2-1 Emergence of Multilateral Development Systems under US Hegemony 
Development Trusteeship by the US 
 Around the time of the Second World War, the multilateral 
development system was constructed under US hegemony. Unlike the 
British Empire, the US had only a few formal colonies. Therefore, they had a 
different context of development trusteeship. As usually explained, the 
beginning of the international development system is the Marshall Plan in 
which $ 12.4 billion was provided to Western Europe by the US from 1948 to 
1951. During the Second World War, the US government thought that a 
dollar shortage of European countries would be a fatal obstacle to the 
reconstruction of post-war economics. The aid from the US was not only for 
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the reconstruction of Europe but also for the expansion of US exports (Wood 
1986: 35-36). In fact, in February 1948, the US News and World Report 
observed that:  
 
‘The foreign aid program also may promise an easier way of keeping 
U.S. business active and of getting rid of surpluses. Most industrial 
orders will be for heavy goods – machinery, trucks, tractors, electrical 
equipment – a sector of industry that the New Deal never could 
revive until the war. Foreign outlets for surplus grains and fruit and 
cotton may prove more effective than relief stamp programs at home.’ 
(cited in Wood 1986: 36) 
 
As stated above, the British Empire also worried about a dollar shortage. 
Therefore, they decided to make their colonies dollar earners through their 
raw material exports to the US. Thus, the British Empire and the US shared 
common interests in developing the British colonies. Supporting the 
reconstruction of post-war Europe meant sacrificing Asian and African 
self-determination. As Robert Wood observes, ‘There were potential dangers 
from the US point of view in legitimating the European countries’ reliance on 
their colonies’ (Wood 1986: 48). My point is that the Marshall Plan 
contributed to the reconstitution of trusteeship.8 
 In addition to the Marshall Plan, President Truman’s Four Points 
(1949) was also important because it stipulated the theology of development 
                                                   
8 It is controversial whether the Marshall Plan facilitated Western Europe’s 
post-war economic recovery. Recent scholars suggest that there is little 
evidence to prove the effectiveness of the Marshal Plan (Reichilin 1995: 40). 
However, this section does not explore this point. 
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trusteeship. Truman’s Four Points assumed that the Eastern Communist 
countries were the enemies of the US and suggested four strategies for the 
Cold War: the first point declared full support for the UN; the second point 
was to facilitate Western Europe’s economic recovery; the third point 
suggested the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and 
the fourth point proposed technical assistance for developing countries. This 
statement was path-breaking in several respects. First of all, it adopted the 
adjective ‘underdeveloped’ instead of ‘colonies’ and ‘dependencies.’ 
‘Underdeveloped’ implied a more vertical relationship between developed 
areas and developing areas (Rist 2008: 72-75). Second, although the British 
Empire sought to provide technical assistance and capital investment to 
their colonies, this statement suggested not empire-internal but 
international aid.  
Despite the uniqueness of the statement, it shared several 
characteristics with colonial development. First, this statement 
demonstrated the same pathologization as colonial development. It stated 
that:  
 
‘More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of 
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty 
is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
areas.’ (The Inaugural Address of United State president Harry S. 
Truman, delivered on January 20, 1949: para. 45) 
 
Like the British Empire, the US found ‘poverty’ as the pathology of 
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developing countries. As in the 1940s, the pathologization based on 
humanitarian discourse still functioned as the strong justification of 
development trusteeship. Furthermore, the prescriptions in this statement 
were not different from those of colonial development: technical assistance 
and capital investment.  
 
Emergence of Multilateral Aid Regime 
As Wood (1986: 69) summarizes, ‘The 1950s were a period of the 
dominance and diversification of bilateral aid programs of the advanced 
capitalist countries’. On the other hand, ‘The 1960s were marked by the 
emergence of new forms of multilateralism, largely either under the auspices 
of, or modeled after, the World Bank’. In 1946, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, so called the World Bank) was 
founded. The primary objective of this organization was to ‘provide or 
otherwise stimulate long-term, low-interest-rate loans for reconstruction and 
for the development of capital-poor areas’ (Oliver 1975). The establishment of 
the International Development Association (IDA) in the World Bank in 1960 
ushered in a multilateral aid era. Before that, developing countries could 
rarely receive loans from the World Bank because of high market rates. 
According to Catherine Gwin, ‘IDA activities are confined to a group of 60 
“IDA countries” – mainly in Africa and South Asia – which have a low GDP 
per head’ (Gwin 1997: 205). In the 1950s and 1960s, the number of new 
independent countries drastically increased and they formed a strong 
pressure group in the UN. Therefore, their request for the establishment of 
new development agency was hard to dismiss.  
While the establishment of the multilateral aid regime, especially 
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IDA, embodied the hopes of newly independent countries, it was thought to 
be a part of security strategy by the US. In the 1960s, the US launched 
economic development programs in developing countries, especially Latin 
American countries. In the 1950s Latin American countries ‘made clear the 
importance of industrialization in the consolidation of democracy and asked 
the United States to help with a program of economic transition’ (Escobar 
1995: 29). However, the US ignored this request. After the US faced various 
crises of the third world including communist revolutions, it had to change 
its policy in developing countries. As Michael Latham (2000) argues, the 
officials and policy makers thought that economic development would 
weaken the communist forces. In order to help the developing countries 
fulfill the preconditions of development, the US addressed institutional 
building and social engineering (Latham 2000: 69f). Thus, the US 
development policies in the 1960s were based on geopolitical considerations. 
In addition to the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) was also one of the main actors in the multilateral aid 
system. Although the establishment of UNDP was in 1966, two organizations 
which made up the UNDP were created before the 1960s. The Expanded 
Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was established in 1949 and the 
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) was 
founded in 1958. The main function of UNDP was not to lend loans but to 
provide technical assistance to developing countries. They helped with the 
reconstruction of infrastructure in Macedonia after an earthquake in 1963, 
supported the creation of the Indian Institute of Technology in 1950s, helped 
with the construction of a civilian administration in Libya in the 1950s and 
in Democratic Republic Congo in the 1960s, and ‘established training centres 
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for civil aviation personnel – from aircraft mechanics to air traffic controllers 
– in every region of the world’ (Murphy 2006: 83, 85, 93, 94). In addition to 
UNDP, there are some aid agencies of the UN such as the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) established in 1945; 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) founded in 1948.9  
Thus, in the 1960s, a new international aid regime was created. 
While it was based on the requests from developing countries, it was a part 
of the US security strategy in the Cold War.  
 
2-2 Re-finding Poverty and Enlarging Power since the late 1960s 
 Thus, the multilateral aid system had demonstrated the continuity of 
colonialism from the beginning. In the late 1960s, international aid agencies 
vastly enlarged their power in the development of developing countries. 
Re-finding the poverty of developing countries was the most important tool 
to strengthen the power of international aid agencies as in the 1940s. 
 
Re-finding Poverty 
Before beginning the analysis of the process in which the 
international aid agencies enlarged their power, it is better to explore the 
theology of development trusteeship in the 1950s. In this period, ‘the idea 
that growth and inequality were inseparable’ was powerful (Ravi 2000: 89). 
Arthur Lewis presumed that ‘inequality is necessary to generate the surplus 
required for the accumulation of capital’ (ibid.). Similarly, Simon Kuznets 
                                                   
9 However, correctly speaking, WHO was not a new organization because it 
took over the Office International d’Hygiène Publique in Paris (1909) and the 
League of Nations Health Organization (1923). FAO and WHO have also 
addressed poverty problems in developing countries. 
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suggested that growth would lead to income inequality at the first stage in 
which the population move from the agricultural sector to other sectors, but 
after this movement was completed, income inequality would fall again. 
Thus, poverty was not regarded as a main target of the development 
trusteeship in the 1950s and the early 1960s. International aid agencies 
presumed that poverty would be resolved by ‘trickle-down effect’ or 
appropriate income distribution (e.g. UN 1962). Therefore, they sought to 
increase national income and employment in developing countries.  
However, although developing countries recorded impressive 
economic growth, poverty was not eliminated. This means that the 
assumption of economists and aid agencies were questionable. Therefore, ‘a 
group at the newly founded Institute for Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex, including Dudley Seers, began talking about poverty as 
part of development’ (Finnemore 1997: 208). Economists and aid agencies 
offered new observations: that the gap between rural and urban incomes was 
too large to narrow naturally; that the excessive rates of population growth 
were a severe obstruction to economic growth and the alleviation of poverty; 
and that advanced technology contributed not to creation of jobs but to labor 
saving (Streeten 1979: 29). 
 The World Bank shifted its approach after Robert S. McNamara was 
inaugurated as the bank’s president in 1968. The Nairobi Speech, which he 
delivered in 1973, marked this policy shift. He stated that: 
 
‘I emphasized the need to design development strategies that would 
bring greater benefits to the poorest groups in the developing 
countries particularly to the approximately 40% of their populations 
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who are neither contributing significantly to economic growth nor 
sharing equitably in economic progress. […] In the twelve months 
since our last meeting, we in the Bank have given high priority to 
further analysis of the problems of poverty in the developing 
countries and to an evaluation of the policies available for dealing 
with them.’ (McNamara 1973) 
 
Now, the target of development policy was the poorest groups who could not 
receive the benefits of economic growth. He acknowledged that economic 
growth would not resolve poverty problems and distinguished two kinds of 
poverty: relative poverty and absolute poverty. The latter ‘is a condition of 
life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its 
victims basic human necessities’. The alleviation of this kind of poverty 
should take priority over equality. However, it could not be measured by 
conventional criteria such as GNP. Therefore, ‘Adopting this kind of a 
socially oriented measure of economic performance would be an important 
step in the redesign of development policies’. This new approach was called 
‘basic needs approach’ which focused on natural and social needs such as food, 
habitat, health and education. It was adopted not only by the World Bank 
but by some UN Organizations (see the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report on 
Development and International Cooperation). The ILO developed this idea in 
the 1970s with assistance from UN and the World Bank. 
Adopting this new policy, McNamara launched a comprehensive 
reform of the World Bank. First, he drastically enlarged the organization. 
According to Bereket Selassie, ‘By 1971 the total staff exceeded 2,500, 
reaching 4,100 five years later and 6,300 by 1981. McNamara’s presidency 
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was responsible for a sharp increase in the number of the staff-perhaps his 
greatest impact on the Bank’ (Selassie 1984: 42). Moreover, he sought to 
increase the volume of Bank lending: while the total loan amount in 1969 
was $1,399 million, the amount in 1981 was $8,809 million. Furthermore, 
the increase of IDA was considerable: the credits amount in 1969 was $385 
million, but the amount in 1971 was $3,482 million (see the World Bank 1971, 
1981). Lancaster observes that:  
 
‘[A]t least since the McNamara presidency, there has been pressure 
within the Bank – on individual staff, divisions, and regions – to 
fulfill notional lending quotas by country and region. This pressure to 
lend has been especially strong when and where the Bank has sought 
to expand its lending rapidly’ (Lancaster 1997: 172).  
 
McNamara addressed not only quantitative, but also qualitative reform. As 
Martha Finnemore observes, ‘He proposed expanding education lending to 
all levels of education, emphasizing fundamental illiteracy problems as well 
as more advanced technical training’ (Finnemore 1997: 212). He also 
highlighted the nutritional and agricultural problems of developing 
countries. The share of agriculture, rural development and education of total 
World Bank lending was significantly increased. Agriculture and Rural 
Development increased from 8.2 percent in 1968 to 30.6 percent in 1981. The 
share of education also increased 1.2 percent in 1968 to 5.9 percent in 1981 
(The World Bank 1981: 12). 
 
Power of Development Trusteeship 
１７２ 
 
 
 
 As stated above, the World Bank enlarged its organization and 
strengthened its influence on developing countries by increasing lending 
loans. Although expanding lending loans might be based on humanitarian 
concern, it contributed to the dependence of some developing countries on 
international aid. Although the nominal policy target of development 
trusteeship was socio-economic institutions, it also severely affected 
socio-political institutions in target societies. These social engineering effects 
are classified into three categories: (i) pathologization of target societies; (ii) 
misapplication of standard policy package; and (iii) undemocratic tendency 
and disempowerment. 
 
(i) A Unilinear Model of Development 
 James Ferguson (1990) shows that the Thaba-Tseka Development 
Project by the World Bank and FAO in Lesotho from 1975 to 1984 
represented the people and society in Thaba-Tseka district in a different way 
from their actual status. The World Bank stated that: 
 
‘In spite of the fact that Lesotho is an enclave within highly 
industrialized South Africa and belongs with that country, Botswana, 
and Swaziland to the rand monetary area and the Southern African 
Customs Union, it was then virtually untouched by modern economic 
development.’ (cited in Ferguson 1990: 25) 
 
The society of Thaba-Tseka was imagined by the World Bank and FAO as a 
traditional peasant society which had no modern technology and as an 
independent community totally isolated from large-scale markets. However, 
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this district was actually ‘a producer of cash crops for the South African 
market’ and ‘a reservoir exporting wage laborers in about the same 
quantities, proportionate to total population’ (Ferguson 1990: 27). Target 
societies were read on a linear scale from tradition (developing) to modernity 
(developed). According to this unilinear model of development, the 
international aid agencies, without any detailed social research, 
pathologized the target societies of development trusteeship. 
 
(ii) Misapplication of Standard Policy Package 
 Such incorrect representation has sometimes led to the 
misapplication of standard policy package. The World Bank and FAO 
conducted a livestock and range management project in which local stock 
owners were forced to convert to purebred stock and commercial practices. 
However, ‘livestock is culturally constituted […] as kind of property that is 
not to be unnecessarily converted into cash, it is usually sold only in response 
to dire need or personal emergency’ (Ferguson 1990: 182). Therefore, the 
local stock owners refused to follow the project. Yet, the aid agencies 
interpreted this resistance as ignorance due to a lack of education (Ferguson 
1990: 186). 
 Also, the World Bank and FAO sought to switch the local production 
from ‘subsistence’ crops to cash crops for the market. Therefore, they 
constructed infrastructure such as roads in expectation that the local 
community would obtain access to large-scale markets and sell the cash 
crops to the market. However, they had not been completely isolated from 
large-scale markets. Roads did not empower local farmers because ‘Instead 
of providing a channel for the export of agricultural surpluses, the new road 
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only lowered the price of cheap imported food, making it harder than ever for 
a local farmer to profitably produce for the market’ (Ferguson 1990: 230). 
 The aid agencies were likely to prepare a standard policy package 
before analyzing local society. This kind of mistake can be found in other 
development cases. The following episode in Zimbabwe is one of the cases. 
 
‘In Zimbabwe, in 1981, I was struck to find local agricultural 
“development” officials eagerly awaiting the arrival and advice of a 
highly paid consultant who was to explain how agriculture in 
Zimbabwe was to be transformed. What, I asked, did this consultant 
know about Zimbabwe’s agriculture that they, the local agricultural 
officers, did not? To my surprise, I was told that the individual in 
question knew virtually nothing about Zimbabwe, and worked mostly 
in India. “But,” I was assured, “he knows development.”’ (Ferguson 
1990: 258) 
 
Wade (1982) also indicates similar mistakes by the development agencies by 
the analysis of India’s Irrigation Reform by the World Bank and its social 
impact. According to him, the World Bank’s approach to Indian canal 
systems did not suit the local environment and did not satisfy the needs of 
local population. He concluded that:  
 
‘Perhaps the major single weakness of the Bank’s approach is 
methodological: the package is to be applied more or less uniformly 
everywhere, with little research being done to match the ingredients 
against the environments into which they are to be introduced’ (Wade 
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1982: 172). 
 
 The Vakolori Irrigation Project in Nigeria in the 1970s was even 
more disastrous because it caused many casualties. A large scale irrigation 
project on the river Sokoto was proposed by the FAO in the 1960s. The 
construction of the dam was conducted from 1975 to 1982 (Adams 1988: 317). 
Without a socio-economic survey, the contractors carried out the 
expropriation of farmland to construct canals, drains, roads and service 
centres. Local farmers lost not only farmland but also village water sources. 
According to W. M. Adams, ‘In August 1978 the first serious action by 
farmers complaining about non-payment of compensation occurred’ and ‘In 
September 1979, […] confrontations between farmers and the contractor 
increased’ (Adams 1988: 324). In response to such resistance, the 
government severely oppressed the local people and caused many casualties.  
Thus, the misapplication of standard policy package tended to 
change the socio-economic institutions of target societies and sometimes led 
to the suppression of the weak. In some cases, poverty reduction as a main 
goal was not achieved; on the contrary, the weak were driven into a more 
difficult situation. 
 
(iii) Undemocratic Tendency and Disempowerment 
 As colonial trusteeship had affinity with authoritarianism, so too did 
development trusteeship by the international aid agencies. While the British 
Empire sought to bolster colonial despotism by advocating development 
trusteeship, the international aid agencies did not have any formal colonies 
or overseas territories. Instead, the international aid agencies tended to 
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strengthen the local undemocratic regimes of developing countries, and to 
make them economically and politically dependent on international aid. 
 According to Ferguson (1990: Ch. 7, 236-241), the Thaba-Tseka 
Development Project contributed to the centralization of Lesotho. At the 
beginning, the international donors planed to devolve some of the authority 
to the district level and increase popular participation in decision-making 
process on development. However, the central government bitterly resisted 
this plan and prevented it from being realized. On the contrary, by building a 
road to link Thaba-Tseka from the capital and by helping the establishment 
of a new district administration, the central government of Lesotho became 
stronger than before. 
 Doug Porter (1995) also demonstrated the undemocratic tendency of 
development trusteeship by analyzing the Zamboanga del Sur Development 
Project (ZDSDP) which was launched by the Philippine-Australian 
Development Assistance Programme (PADAP) in 1974. The ZDSDP 
mid-term evaluation team commented that: ‘it is desirable that 
centralization of service facilities should be encouraged. […] It should be an 
objective of (project) planning to encourage such centralization’ (cited in 
Porter 1995： 78). Porter observes that:  
 
‘Consequently, the authority of centralized institutions was enhanced, 
first at the provincial level and logically then nationally through the 
National Council of Integrated Area Development, then chaired by 
President Marcos’ (Porter 1995: 78).  
 
Not only Australia but also Japan contributed to the undemocratic regime 
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under Ferdinand Marcos. In 1986 when the Marcos regime was defeated, the 
scandal that Marcos had received substantial kickbacks of Japanese loans to 
the Philippines was uncovered (Lancaster 2007: 123; Potter 1996: 132). 
Moreover, during the Cold War, the US also provided a lot of aid to the 
undemocratic regimes in South Vietnam and South Korea to counter the 
communist parties. Development aid to undemocratic regimes enabled local 
elites to ignore the welfare of their citizens because necessary resources had 
not come from their citizens but from international aid agencies. According 
to William Reno, these phenomena can be found in some African countries 
such as Democratic Republic of Congo (Reno 1999; and see Lancaster 1999). 
Thus, development trusteeship has strengthened undemocratic central 
governments of developing countries.  
Moreover, it has made the developing countries economically and 
politically dependent on international aid. In the 1960s, international aid 
moved from programme assistance to project aid. The latter required a more 
specific statement of objectives and led to more precise monitoring and 
evaluation by the donors. These kinds of project aid demanded a lot of 
resources from recipient countries. Above all, the recipient countries had to 
provide local staff as counterparts to aid agencies, and they were required to 
submit a massive number of reports to donors (Morss 1984; Brautigam and 
Knack 2004). As a result, the local governments were deprived of their 
resources to provide basic service to their citizens. Elliot Morss (1984: 468) 
observes that:  
 
‘the most important difference between development assistance in 
the 1970s and earlier decades was not the emphasis on the rural poor 
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and “participatory” approaches but instead the “institutional 
destruction” effects of donor and project proliferation.’ 
 
 Thus, development trusteeship has severely changed the local 
political institutions by strengthening the undemocratic regimes and 
weakening the recipient governance capacity. Therefore, it has led to the 
disempowerment of the citizens of the recipient countries.  
 
 
3. Structural Adjustment and Good Governance in the 1980s and 1990s 
 In the 1980s, the World Bank and IMF launched structural 
adjustment when many developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, 
faced severe economic crises. Although conditionality had been added to 
international aid before the 1980s, it was less intrusive than structural 
adjustment.  
The discourse of structural adjustment pathologized African 
countries by attributing economic crises to domestic politics of African 
countries. This pathologization underpinned the intrusive policies of the 
World Bank and IMF. In 1981, the World Bank issued ‘Report on Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action’ (so called ‘Berg 
Report’), which provided the theoretical foundation of structural adjustment 
policies. It presumed that ‘domestic policy issues are at the heart of the crisis 
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (the World Bank 1981: 121). In this report, the World 
Bank highlighted internal factors and underestimated external factors. 
According to it, ‘past trends in the terms of trade cannot explain the slow 
economic growth of Africa in the 1970s because for most countries [...] the 
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terms of trade were favorable or neutral’ (ibid.: 19). These internal factors 
meant inefficient economic policies of African countries. Local governments 
were criticized for wasting limited human and financial resources.  
Therefore, as Mosley and Weeks (1993: 1583) observe, ‘The purpose of 
the policy packages was to remove economically damaging government 
interventions in markets, especially those for foreign exchange, credit, 
agricultural commodities, and labor ’. Structural adjustment included 
large-scale institutional reform such as ‘currency devaluation, trade 
liberalization, deficit reduction, elimination of controls on prices, wages, and 
interest rates, and a host of other economic policy changes’ (Lancaster 2007: 
44). John Williamson, an economist who coined the term ‘Washington 
Consensus,’ argued that the policy packages of structural adjustment ‘seems 
to me to be in some sense the economic equivalent of these (hopefully) 
no-longer-political issues’ (Williamson 1993: 1330). Some theorists 
considered structural adjustment to be ‘universal convergence’ (ibid.: 1329). 
For them, politics seemed to be an obstacle to efficient economic policies. 
Williamson argued that ‘political mafia’ had damaged public policies (ibid.: 
1330). William Clausen, World Bank President during 1980-1986, stated 
that: ‘the Bank is not a political organization, the only altar we worship at is 
pragmatic economics’ (cited in Williams and Young 1994: 93). Furthermore, 
in the preface to the ‘Berg Repot,’ he argued that the policy packages derived 
not from political and ideological considerations but from considerations of 
efficiency.  
Despite the apolitical rhetoric of the World Bank, according to David 
Gordon, structural adjustment had implicit political strategy. He argued 
that: ‘first, gain leverage over recipient governments through the carrot and 
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stick of conditionality; second, use that leverage to diminish the role of the 
state; and, third, shift influence over policy decisions from politicians to 
technocrats’ (Gordon 1996: 1528). Therefore, some African officials resisted 
the reforms by international aid agencies because they recognized such 
intrusive policies as a kind of colonialism (Lancaster 1997: 169). 
 Moreover, structural adjustment was severely criticized for 
undermining the welfare of vulnerable groups – ‘poor nutrition, less 
accessible health care, and declining educational opportunities’ (Cornia 1987: 
35). As the Berg Report implied, the policy packages of structural adjustment 
tended to underestimate the importance of basic needs (Loxley 1983: 201). 
Thus, the discourse of structural adjustment was slightly different from the 
theology of development trusteeship in the 1960s in that the former focused 
on economic efficiency and growth rather than poverty. However, the 
discursive structure of pathologization and prescriptions was still 
reproduced.  
 In the late 1980s as the Cold War ended, the Western countries began 
to pathologize not only the economic policies but also the governance of 
developing countries. As David Williams and Tom Young (1994: 89) observe, 
‘whether it was viewed as a success or a failure the experience of adjustment 
lending led the Bank to take account of political factors such as interest 
group pressure and government legitimacy as somehow important’. The 
World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
argued that: 
 
‘Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of 
governance. [...] Because countervailing power has been lacking, 
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state officials in many countries have served their own interests 
without fear of being called to account. In self-defense individuals 
have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the 
all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failures. In this way 
politics becomes personalized, and patronage becomes essential to 
maintain power.’ (The World Bank 1989: 60-61) 
 
This report acknowledged ‘poverty’ as an important problem of development 
unlike the ‘Berg Report.’ It admitted that: ‘The economic crisis of the early 
1980s diverted attention from basic needs programs. This was a mistake; 
every effort should be made to protect basic needs expenditures in times of 
recession’ (The World Bank 1989: 45). 
This new pathologization led to the idea ‘good governance’ as a new 
conditionality. The US added demands for multiparty elections and 
democratization in exchange for aid (Harrison 2004: 21; Lancaster 2007: 84). 
Although the World Bank was reluctant to address governance reform, they 
adopted ‘good governance’ as a new approach, recognizing that effective 
public institutions for markets were important for economic growth (Craig 
and Porter 2003: 57). As Lancaster observes, ‘They did not push any 
particular types of political organization – like democracy’ (Lancaster 1997: 
187). However, they demanded accountability, transparency, and the rule of 
law as the conditions of aid projects. As Mick Moore (1995: 94) argues, ‘At the 
ideological level, the emphasis placed by donors on the inadequacy of the 
governance arrangements of aid recipients comes close to a denial of the 
assumption of the fundamentally equal status of all states in the 
international state system’.  
１８２ 
 
 
 
 Since the 1980s, development trusteeship has become more intrusive 
than ever. However, as this chapter showed, development trusteeship had 
already conducted social engineering policies since the late 1960s. 
Furthermore, when the discourse of poverty reconstituted development 
trusteeship in the late 1960s, the international aid regime established a solid 
foundation for its power.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter explored how development trusteeship emerged and 
developed and what role humanitarian discourse played in this process. 
During the Second World War, the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was 
challenged. Using the discourse on poverty, the British Empire 
re-pathologized colonized societies and, as a result, development trusteeship 
emerged. In this period, ‘poverty’ was considered to be unignorable human 
suffering. In this sense, the discourse on poverty was a kind of humanitarian 
discourse. After the Second World War, hegemonic transition from the 
British Empire to the US changed the regime of development trusteeship. 
Due to the dissolution of the colonial empires, development trusteeship was 
established between developed countries and developing countries. In the 
1960s, a multilateral aid regime emerged because of pressure from the Third 
World and the security strategy of the US. Despite the transformation of the 
regime, the discourse of poverty enlarged the power of international aid 
agencies, as in the 1940s. Developing countries were re-pathologized as 
suffering from poverty. Although international aid agencies have sometimes 
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failed to grasp the nature of target societies, this pathologization justified 
social engineering policies for recipient countries. These policies tended to 
affect the socio-political institutions of target societies. Both intentionally 
and unintentionally, development trusteeship tended to strengthen 
undemocratic governments of developing countries and sometimes weakened 
the basic capacity of the governments of recipient countries.  
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Ch. 6 Peacebuilding Trusteeship after the Cold War 
 
As previous chapters showed, colonial and development trusteeship 
and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive. This chapter will argue 
that peacebuilding trusteeship after the Cold War was also in part 
constituted by humanitarianism and moreover that humanitarianism was to 
some extent affected by the power structure of international society.  
 As stated in Ch. 1 of this study, a fundamental debate relating to 
peacebuilding concerns its ‘paradigm’ (Paris 1997) or ‘framework’ (Richmond 
2009). Paris and some other theorists argue that the conduct of 
peacebuilding operations has been shaped by liberal internationalism. The 
notion of liberal internationalism assumes that internal and international 
peace ought to be based on ‘a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented 
economy’ (e.g. Paris 1997: 56; Heathershaw 2008). In practice, many 
mandates of peacebuilding operations called on international peacebuilders 
to construct liberal democratic institutions such as multi-party systems. 
While it is controversial whether liberal internationalism is appropriate as 
the ‘paradigm’ or ‘framework’ of peacebuilding, not only supporters of liberal 
peacebuilding but also its critics presume that peacebuilding operations have 
embodied liberal internationalism (e.g. Lidén, MacGinty and Richmond 
2009; Richmond 2009: 560-561; Pugh 2004: 47-48).  
However, this chapter will indicate that peacebuilding trusteeship 
was likely to be underpinned and constituted not just by liberal 
internationalism but by humanitarianism, in particular, when international 
peacebuilders were provided with governing functions. ‘Failed states,’ ‘civil 
wars,’ and ‘genocide’ were considered to be unignorable human suffering in 
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the post-Cold War era. These notions formed the new pathology and led to 
new prescriptions such as responsibility to protect (R2P), human security, 
and liberal peacebuilding. In practice, the authority of international 
peacebuilders has often been underpinned by humanitarian discourse, 
although humanitarianism has been affected by geopolitical considerations. 
The first half of this chapter will map out the discourse of 
peacebuilding trusteeship. The discourse of new pathologization is composed 
of various representations such as ‘failed states,’ ‘civil wars,’ and ‘genocide.’ 
They are interpreted as internal to southern countries and linked to the ‘new 
barbarism’ (Duffield 2001: 109-121). The root causes of these problems are 
found in the tribalism, ethnicity, indigenous culture, and unique political 
economic systems of southern countries. The second half of this chapter will 
turn to practice. It will indicate that, in practice, peacebuilding trusteeship 
has been rooted not only in liberal internationalism but also 
humanitarianism. This chapter will focus mainly on the cases of Cambodia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo. The name ‘new trusteeship’ has been applied to these 
cases because international peacebuilders exercised executive and legislative 
authority. As these regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship were undemocratic, 
international peacebuilders needed to justify them by humanitarian 
discourse.  
 
 
1. Theology of Peacebuilding Trusteeship after the Cold War 
 The theorization of peacebuilding trusteeship was inaugurated in the 
late 1990s. However, the pathologization of southern countries began in the 
early 1990s. Some southern countries were represented as ‘failed states,’ 
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‘collapsed states,’ and ‘fragile states.’ Civil conflict was considered to be a 
cause and effect of state failure. It was called ‘new wars’ and interpreted as 
the pre-modern form of fighting by some commentators. Moreover, the root 
causes of these conflicts were attributed to the tribalism, ethnicity, 
indigenous culture, and unique political economic systems of southern 
countries. This new pathologization led to new prescriptions such as liberal 
peacebuilding. These prescriptions were contradictory to the principle of 
sovereign equality. Hence, some theorists and practitioners tried to 
deconstruct the sovereignty of southern countries by humanitarian 
discourse.  
 
1-1 New Pathologization: ‘Failed States’ and ‘New Wars’ 
‘Failed States’ 
 Since the late 1980s, the notion of ‘weak states,’ ‘quasi states,’ ‘failed 
states,’ and ‘collapsed states’ has been used to represent some southern 
countries. As well as researchers of development studies, IR theorists tend to 
use these terms when they analyze developing countries. The meanings of 
these terms are so varied that they cannot be used as a coherent analytical 
framework. However, these notions constituted new pathologies of 
peacebuilding trusteeship.  
As Jonathan Hill states, ‘Despite differences between these works [on 
‘failed states’] in focus and emphasis, they are united by a variety of shared 
assumptions’ (Hill 2005: 139). One of the main assumptions is related to 
governing functions of sovereign states. When theorists use terms such as 
‘failed states,’ they predetermine the main functions of sovereign states and 
argue that some developing countries fail to fulfill these functions (Jackson 
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1990: 46-47; Helman and Ratner 1992-1993; Zartman 1995: 5; Gros 1996: 
456). Although there exists no consensus about the main functions of 
sovereign states, theorists, who use the terms such as ‘failed states,’ tend to 
problematize human suffering in ‘failed states.’ For example, Robert Jackson, 
in his book Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World, states that: 
 
‘Every government can guarantee [human] rights at least in principle 
because it requires only responsible and resolute conduct. Failure to 
protect human rights accordingly is misconduct and indefensible 
everywhere. […] Since most Third World states are not only 
underdeveloped but also authoritarian and therefore unconstrained 
domestically, they are inclined to deny human rights. Serious and 
frequent human rights violations are not likely to occur in successful 
democracies.’ (Jackson 1990: 46) 
 
He identifies human rights protection as a duty of sovereign states and 
argues that many Third World states (‘quasi-states’) have failed to fulfill this 
function (also see Jackson 2000: 296). In his book, Collapsed States: the 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, William Zartman 
(1995: 5) argues that ‘[collapsed states] can no longer perform the functions 
required for them to pass as states’ and that ‘the basic functions’ of the state 
include decision-making, legislation, and maintenance of social order. 
Although this definition does not refer to human rights, Francis Deng, in the 
same book, claims that:  
 
１８８ 
 
 
 
‘the collapse of the state is associated with humanitarian tragedies 
resulting from armed conflict, communal violence, and gross 
violations of human rights that culminate in the massive outflow of 
refugees and internal displacement of the civilian populations.’ (Deng 
1995: 207) 
 
In the early 1990s, ‘failed states’ was considered to be a kind of humanitarian 
crisis. Similarly, Jean-Germain Gros (1996) highlights human suffering in 
‘failed states’ in order to confirm the seriousness of ‘failed states.’ At the 
beginning of his article, he states that: 
 
‘Whether it be ethnic genocide in Rwanda, its cleansing counterpart 
in the Balkans, anarchy in Somalia, or Haitian “boat people” heading 
towards south Florida, events in failed states cannot be ignored at 
least not long before calls, faxes and electronic communications 
urging politicians to “do something” start pouring in.’ (Gros 1996: 
455) 
 
 These theorists ask why these countries failed. Zartman and Gros 
suggest similar scenarios of state failure. According to them, at first, a 
regime loses ‘its ability to satisfy the demands of various groups in society’ 
(Zartman 1995: 8) because it failed to achieve economic growth or because 
population growth damaged environmental conditions (Gros 1996: 460-464). 
It would deepen the ethnic divisions of this society (Gross 1996: 464-465). 
While the regime would oppress the opposition groups due to its 
authoritarianism and militarism, it could not develop its resources to unify 
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the society (Zartman 1995: 8). Finally, this state would collapse and the state 
of anarchy would emerge. Jackson argues that, although Third World 
countries had little capacity for self-government and did not actually 
constituted nations, the right to self-determination and decolonization 
movement allowed them to become independent states (Jackson 1990: 40-47). 
These theorists attributed the causes of state failure mainly to internal 
factors of southern countries.  
 The notion of ‘failed states’ was used in the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) report and some literatures by the members of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). For example, 
according to R2P, the first principle for military intervention is: ‘large scale 
loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or 
a failed state situation’ (ICISS 2001: xii). Writing in 1994, Gareth Evans, 
foreign minister of Australia from 1988 to 1996 and co-chair of the ICISS, 
analyzed Third World countries by using the notion of ‘failed states’ and 
stated the following:  
 
‘Throughout what has been called the “zone of conflict,” which 
includes the former communist states, much of sub-Saharan Africa, 
and parts of Central and Latin America and South Asia, a downward 
spiral of economic decline, often exacerbated by official corruption 
and mismanagement, has created governments that are at or near 
the point of collapse and that are being challenged, often violently, by 
their own citizens. Economic decline has hastened the process of 
national disintegration, and vice versa. The combination has led in 
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extreme cases to the “failed state” syndrome evident in Rwanda, 
Somalia, and elsewhere.’ (Evans 1994) 
 
As shown later, the deconstruction of sovereignty by the ICISS and other 
theorists and practitioners was premised on the notion of ‘failed states.’  
 The UN has not explicitly employed the term ‘failed states’ or 
‘collapsed states,’ but it has problematized the collapse of state institutions. 
Boutros-Ghali’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) states that:  
 
‘[One of the features of civil conflicts] is the collapse of state 
institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting 
paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general 
banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government 
suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials 
are killed or flee the country.’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995: para. 13) 
 
Thus, the notion of ‘failed states’ has been used by many theorists and 
practitioners.  
 
‘New Wars’ 
According to the accounts of ‘failed states,’ civil conflicts would occur 
during and after the process of state failure. These are considered to be both 
the cause and effect of state failure. In the same report, Boutros-Ghali states 
that: ‘One is the fact that so many of today’s conflicts are within States 
rather than between States’ (ibid.: para 10). ‘New war’ is another key term of 
new pathologization. Various scholars such as Donald Snow, Mary Kaldor, 
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and Chris Allen call civil conflicts after the Cold War ‘new wars’ and link 
them to ‘failed states’ (Snow 1996: 93-119; Kaldor 1999: 91; Allen 1999: 
379-380). As in the case of ‘failed states,’ each theorist does not hold the same 
line of argument. However, it is possible to generalize the characteristics of 
‘new wars’ because theories on ‘new wars’ share some arguments. First, in 
‘new wars,’ the distinction between combatants and civilians is blurred. 
Because of state collapse, combatants are poorly organized. Private armies 
and warlords are fighting, in addition to the (ex-) national army. Second, 
they deliberately target civilians. Therefore, civilian casualties are 
increasing as a proportion of all casualties in conflict. Third, warfare tends to 
be brutal. Mutilation, torture, and rape are used as tactics. Fourth, the 
conflicting parties rarely have a political ideology. Instead, combatants are 
likely to be mobilized by religion or ethnic nationalism.  
 Some commentators interpret these characteristics of ‘new wars’ as 
‘new barbarism.’  Robert D. Kaplan argues in his article ‘The Coming 
Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, and Disease Are Rapidly 
Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,’ as follows:  
 
‘West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, 
environmental, and social stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges 
as the real ‘strategic’ danger [...] throughout West Africa and much of 
the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central 
governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked 
spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war [...] [In 
Africa] the threat is more elemental: nature unchecked.’ (Kaplan 
1994: 5, 10) 
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He considers conflicts, anarchy, and violence to be the irrational and criminal 
response to environmental and economic pressures such as overpopulation 
and epidemic. He implicitly suggests dichotomies between 
civilization/barbarism, society/anarchy, and Western countries/African 
countries. This essentialism was shared by Michel Ignatieff, one of the R2P 
report authors. He explores civil wars in the 1990s in his book, Warrior’s 
Honor: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience (1998). He argues that laws of 
war (international humanitarian law), which seek to protect fundamental 
human rights, were created in modern Europe, and that non-European 
societies do not respect these laws. He identifies as the most serious problem 
of civil conflicts how to teach Islamic extremists to respect international 
humanitarian law. He states that contemporary civil wars are becoming 
more savage than before (Ignatieff 1998: 109-163). The cruel nature of ‘new 
wars’ is attributed to the nature of Islamic extremism. Contemporary civil 
wars are placed on the boundaries of Western civilization. These discourses 
form the ‘new barbarism’ account. Duffield criticizes it, as follows:  
 
‘new barbarism tends to emphasize one aspect of this racial 
discourse: the notion of a primordial, innate and irrational cultural 
and ethnic identity […] For new barbarism, the anarchic and 
destructive power of traditional feeling and antagonisms is usually 
unleashed in times of change when overarching political or economic 
systems are either weakened or collapse. (Duffield 2001: 110). 
 
 Other theorists see ‘new wars’ not as a reversion to barbarism nor as 
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essentially irrational, but as a rational response to changing economic 
conditions since the 1980s (Keen 1998; Reno 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Allen 1999; Kaldor 2001). In the 1980s, economic crises began in developing 
and post-communist countries. In communist countries, the highly planned 
economy tended to fail. As the state structures of these countries gradually 
weakened, competition over resources became intense. Similarly, many 
developing countries faced debt crises because of the failure of development 
policies and the loss of Cold War sponsorship. Structural adjustments 
undermined the fragile state structures of these countries. Finally, the 
patron-client relations which supported central governments collapsed. 
Various political actors such as warlords sought to secure exportable natural 
resources and sometimes challenged central governments. Ethnic and 
religious identities were exploited to recruit the population into militias. 
This kind of explanation argues that ‘new wars’ are rooted to the nature of 
the regimes of developing countries and the dark side of globalization. 
Conflict, even its brutality, is interpreted as the rational tactics of political 
actors in developing and post-communist countries.  
 Thus, ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars’ were considered to be new 
pathologies of southern countries in the post-Cold War era. Southern 
countries were represented as anarchical, violent, and brutal, whether or not 
commentators saw these pathologies as rational response to the changing 
conditions after the Cold War. Human suffering, caused by conflicts, violence, 
and anarchy, was considered to be a grave symptom. As this chapter will 
show, both ‘new barbarism’ accounts and ‘rational response’ accounts agree 
that new trusteeship tends to alleviate this kind of human suffering. This 
discourse of new pathologization was similar to the discourse of colonial 
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trusteeship in the 19th century. As Ch. 2 and 3 of this study showed, 
‘anarchy,’ which was characterized by violence and savagism, formed the 
pathologies of Indian and African societies in the 19th century. Thus, new 
pathologization after the Cold War demonstrated a similar structure to 
pathologization in the 19th century.  
 
1-2 New Prescriptions 
New Trusteeship 
In the 1990s, as human suffering in ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars’ was 
pathologized, new trusteeship in which external actors such as the UN 
govern target societies was proposed as a prescription by some theorists and 
practitioners. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992-1993: 7) insist that: 
‘the emergence of additional failed states suggests the need for a more 
systematic and intrusive approach.’ They propose three options: governance 
assistance, delegation of governmental authority, and direct U.N. trusteeship 
(ibid.: 12-18). The first option is a kind of development policy and less 
intrusive than other options. The second option, delegation of governmental 
authority, would be applied to ‘those states that have already failed’. In this 
scheme, local societies would delegate certain governmental functions to the 
UN and have a veto on decision-making. Helman and Ratner see PKO in 
Cambodia as an example of this scheme. In the last option, ‘local authorities 
would turn over power to the United Nations and follow its orders, rather 
than retaining a veto’. This scheme would be applied to ‘failed states.’ 
However, new trusteeship seems to be inconsistent with the principle of the 
sovereign equality. Helman and Ratner argue that ‘failed states’ cause 
serious human misery and that only new trusteeship could alleviate this 
１９５ 
 
 
 
kind of humanitarian crisis. In this study, the second and third options can 
be identified as new trusteeship, while the first as development trusteeship. 
Not only Helman and Ratner, various commentators, who analyze 
‘failed states’ and ‘new wars,’ justify new trusteeship as a prescription 
(Krauthammer 1992; Lyon 1993; Mazrui 1994; Pfaff 1995). They argue that 
‘failed states’ could not be ignored because of human suffering and that new 
trusteeship by the UN or developed countries would be the most effective 
option to reconstruct the existing anarchical condition of ‘failed states.’ It is 
presumed that some (post-) conflict societies do not have an ability to 
manage their own government and parliament. 
 Why should post-conflict societies be governed by international 
peacebuilders such as the UN? Why would assistance for elections without 
transitional administration be an inappropriate option? Some theorists 
argue that democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies. Analyzing 
‘collapsed states’ in Africa, Marina Ottaway concludes that:  
 
‘[democratization] encourages the conflicts that exist in a collapsing 
state to manifest themselves freely, but without the restraint of the 
checks and balances, and of agreement on the basic rules, that 
regulate conflict and make it manageable in a well-established 
democratic system.’ (Ottaway 1995: 235) 
 
Roland Paris also argues that ‘democratization and marketization are 
inherently tumultuous transformations that have the potential to undermine 
a fragile peace’ (Paris 2004: 7). According to him, before liberal 
democratization of post-conflict societies, international peacebuilders should 
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establish ‘effective administration over the territory’ (IBL approach) (ibid.: 
187). This includes a constitutional court, a reliable police force, electoral 
rules, the legal frame work for a market economy, and other liberal 
socio-political systems (ibid.: 205). In his scheme, until local conditions are 
ready for elections, international peacebuilders would administrate the 
territory. In other words, the construction of liberal democratic systems 
requires undemocratic political arrangements. Gareth Evans, who wrote the 
R2P report with Ignatieff, also supports Paris’ IBL approach (Evans 2008: 
160-163).  
This prescription is premised on the notions of ‘failed states’ and ‘new 
wars.’ As Charles Call (2008: 1504) observes, the idea of ‘failed states’ implies 
that ‘state and state institutions were rediscovered’ by theorists and 
practitioners. The destruction of state institutions provides the urgency for 
new trusteeship. In the introduction of At War’s End, referring to Kaplan’s 
the Ends of the Earth, Paris states that: ‘From Africa to Central Asia, 
internecine violence and collapsing states became an unfortunate but 
familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape’ (Paris 2004: 1). 
Moreover, following Snow (1996) and Ignatieff (1997), Paris recognizes ‘the 
revival of “premodern” forms of fighting’ as a serious problem in the 1990s 
(ibid.: 1). This implies that he might share essentialism with Kaplan and 
Ignatieff.  
Other theorists, who criticize the essentialism of the ‘new barbarism’ 
account, also tend to support new trusteeship. For example, although Kaldor 
sees that new trusteeship has a difficult problem regarding legitimacy, she 
justifies international protectorate as an effective political arrangement for 
(post-) conflict societies such as Bosnia because local civil societies could not 
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develop in the places where gangs and warlords control security sector 
(Kaldor 1999: Ch. 6). According to her, elections should be preceded by the 
reconstruction of rule of law. Otherwise, extreme nationalists would seize the 
government by elections and violence. She counters the essentialism of the 
‘new barbarism’ account by proposing political economic analysis of ‘new 
wars,’ but she does not deny the necessity of new trusteeship. Similarly, in 
his essay on ‘new wars,’ Edward Newman accepts the possibility that new 
trusteeship is unavoidable (Newman 2004: 187). 
As Ch. 2 of this study discussed, in the 19th century, British 
intellectuals and colonial administrators argued that democracy would cause 
anarchy in India and that benevolent despotism by civilized nations would 
be necessary. Similarly, in the late 20th century, some theorists on ‘failed 
states,’ ‘new wars,’ and peacebuilding argued that the introduction of 
democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies and that new 
trusteeship would be an effective political arrangement for post-conflict 
societies.  
 
Re-examining Sovereignty 
 However, after decolonization, new trusteeship could not be easily 
justified because this political arrangement was inconsistent with the 
principle of the sovereign equality. Therefore, in the early 1990s, theorists 
and practitioners began to reexamine the idea of sovereignty. The R2P report 
is one of the most important literatures. According to Gareth Evans, some 
new theories on sovereignty and security paved the way for the idea of R2P 
(Evans 2008: 32-37): ‘the right to intervene,’ ‘human security,’ ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility,’ and ‘individual sovereignty.’  
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(i) The Right to Intervene 
In 1987, the notion of ‘the right to intervene’ (droit d’ingerence) was 
proposed by Bernard Kouchner, who was co-founder of Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and would serve as the first UN Representative in Kosovo. 
When he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 
Biafra during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), he saw numerous Biafrans 
killed by deliberate starvation. The Red Cross kept neutral and was 
reluctant to interfere in local politics. Kouchner was shocked by this 
response to the situation and decided to break with the ICRC (Allen and 
Styan 2000: 829). As Cornelio Sommaruga, President of ICRC from 1987 to 
1999, argues, ‘Humanitarian action is not designed to resolve conflict but to 
protect human dignity and to save lives’ (Somaruga 1997: 184). This 
traditional approach of the ICRC seeks to prevent humanitarianism from 
underpinning trusteeship by avoiding pathologization of conflict societies. 
However, Kouchner criticized it for ignoring mass murder. Hence, his new 
approach focused not only on humanitarian assistance but also on political 
solutions. The notion of ‘the right to intervene’ aimed to redefine the 
implementation of political solutions to humanitarian crises as a legal right. 
As Kaldor (2007: 25) states, ‘he was able to promote his ideas in the United 
Nations, and after the Gulf War pushed for the droit d’ingerence to help the 
Kurds in northern Iraq’. However, as Evans observes, ‘the concept remained 
so inherently one-sided, not in any way acknowledging the anxieties of those 
in the global South who had all too often been the beneficiaries of missions 
civilisatrices in the past’ (Evans 2008: 33). 
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(ii) Human Security 
 The concept of ‘human security’ was suggested in the Human 
Development Report 1994 by the UNDP. The idea of ‘human security’ sought 
to make individual human suffering a fundamental issue of security. It was 
presumed that issues of state security had dominated international 
relations; therefore, individual human suffering was likely to be separated 
from security issues. Human security implies that political solutions should 
be applied to human suffering and that these political solutions include new 
trusteeship. The Final Report of the Commission on Human Security 2003 
suggested the idea of ‘responsibility to rebuild’ in post-conflict societies 
(which was originally proposed in the R2P report). It gave a top priority to 
‘establishing institutions that protect people and uphold the rule of law’ (the 
Commission on Human Security 2003: 68). Kaldor also argues that 
‘institution-building, including the rule of law’ is one of the human security 
policies (Kaldor 2007: 194).  
 
(iii) Sovereignty as Responsibility 
 The notion of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ was proposed by Francis 
Deng, former Sudanese diplomat and the Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004, with 
other colleagues at the Brookings Institution such as William Zartman. This 
notion claimed that (i) sovereignty is accompanied by responsibilities for the 
population; (ii) if governments fail to preserve life-sustaining standards for 
citizens, they should call for help and the international community must 
provide assistance; (iii) if governments do not discharge the responsibility 
and refuse the involvement of international community, the responsibility 
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would be transferred to the international community and, in this case, 
international organizations ought to intervene in the countries. The idea of 
‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ was premised on the notions of ‘failed states’ 
and ‘new wars.’ In Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in 
Africa, they state that:  
 
‘The premise is that internal conflicts are the principal source of 
human suffering, gross violations of human rights, and massive 
destruction of civilian lives and productive capacity. […] Those who 
suffer the humanitarian consequences of conflict fall into a moral 
vacuum left by the state’s failure, deliberate or imposed, to fulfill its 
normal responsibilities.’ (Deng et al. 1996: xii) 
 
This argument was important for new trusteeship because it sought to 
reconstruct sovereignty, in particular, of southern countries, although they 
did not argue about new trusteeship.  
 
(iv) Individual Sovereignty 
 Reconstruction of sovereignty had already been suggested by some 
theorists and practitioners before Sovereignty as Responsibility and R2P 
were proposed. In the Report of the Secretary General (1991), Javier Perez 
de Cuellar stated that:  
 
‘The principle of non-interference with the essential domestic 
jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier 
behind which human rights could be massively or systematically 
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violated with impunity. […] [This principle] would only be weakened 
if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day 
and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching 
systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian 
populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection.’ 
(1991: 12) 
 
His successor, Boutros-Ghali, also advocated re-examining sovereignty 
because ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, […] has passed; its 
theory was never matched by reality’ (UN 1992: para. 17). He stated that: ‘It 
is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance 
between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an 
ever more interdependent world’ (ibid.). Robert Cohen, who later joined the 
Brookings group, wrote in 1991, that ‘sovereignty carries with it a 
responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens’ (Cohen 
1991: 17). 
The idea of ‘Individual Sovereignty’ by Kofi Annan also aimed to 
reconstruct sovereignty. His article in Economist proposed two concepts of 
sovereignty. It stated that:  
 
‘State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not 
least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. 
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of 
their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual 
sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each 
individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent 
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international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and 
spreading consciousness of human rights. When we read the Charter 
today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect 
individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.’ 
(Annan 1999: 49-50) 
 
Thus, he opposed ‘Individual Sovereignty’ (human rights) to ‘State 
Sovereignty.’  
 
(v) Responsibility to Protect 
As these reports showed, in the late 1990s, the dilemma of 
humanitarian intervention was considered to be a big issue. Therefore, 
Annan made an appeal for international consensus about humanitarian 
intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Canadian government in 2000 to 
answer this appeal. The final report of the commission was written by three 
members of the commission: Gareth Evans (Co-chair), Michael Ignatieff, and 
Ramesh Thakur (Bellamy 2009: 38). The R2P is based on the redefinition of 
sovereignty as responsibility (ICISS 2001: 13). Like Sovereignty as 
Responsibility by Deng et al, it argues that sovereign states have 
responsibility to protect their citizens from a devastating catastrophe such as 
mass murder, ethnic cleansing, rape, massive displacement and genocide, 
and that if they fail or refuse to protect their population, the responsibility 
would be transferred to international society.  
 The R2P report is important for peacebuilding trusteeship because it 
aims to construct the legitimacy of peacebuilding trusteeship by defining 
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post-intervention obligations as ‘responsibility to rebuild.’ It justified 
transitional administration of ‘failed states’ under UN authority by 
separating it from colonial trusteeship. How different are they? The ICISS 
claims that: ‘”failed states” are quite likely to generate situations which the 
international community simply cannot ignore’ (ICISS 2001: 43). According 
to them, humanitarian crises and security problems, which ‘failed states’ 
would cause, can justify transitional administration. They presume that 
transitional administration was different from colonial trusteeship in terms 
of humanitarianism. Furthermore, they suggest that: ‘the suspension of the 
exercise of sovereignty is only de facto for the period of the intervention and 
follow-up, and not de jure’ (ICISS 2001: 44). According to them, while 
trusteeship is accompanied with the violation of de jure sovereignty of target 
societies, transitional administration was not. However, this claim means 
that the sovereignty of ‘failed states’ could be manipulated by interveners. In 
their theory, failed states do not have de facto sovereignty because they failed 
to fulfill their responsibility. At this moment, the failed states lose their de 
jure sovereignty. However, when external actors begin peacebuilding 
operations and assume de facto sovereignty, the failed states suddenly regain 
de jure sovereignty. In sum, while states lose de jure sovereignty if they are 
regarded as ‘failed states’ by international society, the failed states can 
regain de jure sovereignty as long as the interveners exercise de facto 
sovereignty. It means that the sovereignty of target societies can be 
manipulated by powerful interveners. As Mamdani argues, ‘“the 
responsibility to protect” is a right to punish [“failed” or “rogue” states] but 
without being held accountable – a clarion call for the recolonization of 
“failed” states in Africa’ (Mamdani 2009: 300). 
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 Annan adopted the idea of R2P into his report ‘In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (2005). It states 
that:  
 
‘I urge Heads of State and Government to [...] Embrace the 
“responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to 
act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first 
and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect 
its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or 
unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the 
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such 
methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of 
necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including 
enforcement action, if so required.’ (Annan 2005: 22) 
 
Thus, the idea of R2P influenced the policy discourse of the Secretary 
General. Furthermore, in 2005, World Summit Outcome Document of the 
UN General Assembly also adopted R2P. In addition, the Report of the 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the UN (2004) 
redefined sovereignty as responsibility to protect the welfare of its own 
peoples (UN 2004: para. 29).  
 
‘Lessons’ from the Rwandan War 
 Those who support new trusteeship have often referred to ‘lessons 
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from Rwanda.’ ‘Rwanda’ means that the UN failed to protect Tutsi and 
pro-peace Hutu during the Rwandan War in 1994. It is repeatedly invoked to 
argue for Darfur, Libya, and other cases. Some theorists, policy makers, and 
humanitarian aid agencies sought to draw several lessons from the Rwandan 
case.  
 The first lesson from this war, which pro-intervention theorists insist 
on, is that ‘genocide’ in progress can be stopped only by humanitarian 
intervention. Kouchner seeks to underpin the idea ‘right to intervention’ by 
highlighting mass murder such as in Rwanda. He states that: 
 
‘Can we dream of 21st century where the horrors of the 20th will not 
be repeated? Where Auschwitz or the mass exterminations that took 
place in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and later in Rwanda and 
Kosovo cannot happen again? The answer is a hopeful yes-if, as part 
of the emergent world order, a new morality can be codified in the 
“right to intervention” against abuses of national sovereignty.’ 
(Kouchner 1999: 4) 
 
Similarly, the R2P report argues that only intervention could prevent the 
recurrence of ethnic cleansing such as in Rwanda. It claims that:  
 
‘We want no more Rwandas, and we believe that the adoption of the 
proposals in our report is the best way of ensuring that. […] The most 
compelling task now is to work to ensure that when the call goes out 
to the community of states for action, that call will be answered. 
There must never again be mass killing or ethnic cleansing. There 
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must be no more Rwandas.’ (ICISS 2001: viii, 70) 
 
However, as Mamdani argues, France and the US had intervened in Rwanda. 
The former created a safe zone and the latter supported the Tusti-dominated 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (Mamdani 2009: 67). Moreover, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda had operated to aid the implementation of 
the Arusha Accords since 1993. Pro-new trusteeship theorists insist that 
larger scale intervention should have been conducted during this war.  
 The second lesson is drawn by humanitarian aid agencies. According 
to Barnett, ‘For the aid world, there is before Rwanda and after Rwanda’ 
(Barnett 2011: 213). Some aid agencies began to create the uniform 
standards of humanitarian action in order to improve the quality of the 
assistance. Sphere was an example of this movement. Originally, Sphere 
means Standards Project for Humanitarian Relief. According to Peter 
Walker and Susan Pardin (2004: 104), ‘many of the initiators of Sphere were 
involved in the Rwanda [multi-donor] evaluation.’ It is considered to be a 
catalyst for the birth of Sphere. This project aims to ‘elaborate technical 
standards, which agencies should seek to implement’ (ibid.).  
Other aid agencies reexamined the neutral principle of humanitarian 
assistance. For example, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) had to redirect their 
strategy after the Rwandan war because many members of CRS had 
operated in Rwanda. As Barnett observes, ‘CRS began to move toward a 
position that involved tackling the root causes of injustice and the violation 
of human rights that are essential for human dignity’ (Barnett 2011: 
203-204). Like CRS, some humanitarian NGOs such as CARE became 
engaged in peacebuilding trusteeship (ibid.: 198-212). 
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 The third lesson is related to the use of force in peacebuilding 
trusteeship. Some theorists and practitioners argue that, even after the 
conclusion of peace agreements, international peacebuilders ought to use 
their force to prevent ‘spoilers’ from breaking agreements. Since 1999, the 
UN had examined the lessons from Rwanda in various reports such as 
‘Report of the Secretary-general to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (S/1999/957), ‘Report of the Independent Inquiry 
into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ 
(S/1999/1257), and ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of 
Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects’ (so called, ‘the Brahimi 
Report’) (A/55/305–S/2000/809). The Brahimi Report argues that:  
 
‘In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious 
aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be 
operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. 
Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the 
international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation 
then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil.’ (Article 50) 
 
This report suggests that ‘mandates should specify an operation’s authority 
to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able 
to pose a credible deterrent threat’ (Article 51). According to this report, 
peacekeeping operation has become a ‘complex operation’ in which 
‘peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while 
peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining’. The 
employment of force would be required in a complex operation even after the 
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conclusion of peace agreements because ‘spoilers’ might break peace 
agreements. This recommendation seems to be inconsistent with the 
neutrality principle of traditional PKO. The ‘genocide’ of the Rwandan War is 
mentioned to justify it.  
 The Rwandan War offered several ‘lessons’ to theorists, policy makers, 
and aid agencies. Despite the differences between these ‘lessons,’ they 
indicate that humanitarianism tended to underpin peacebuilding 
trusteeship after the Rwandan War.  
 
1-3 After 9/11: New Trusteeship and Geopolitics 
 This section has explored the theology of new trusteeship, in 
particular, in the 1990s. The theology of new trusteeship was composed of 
the notions of ‘failed states,’ ‘new wars,’ ‘responsibility to protect,’ and other 
humanitarian discourses. Those elements of the theology focused on human 
suffering and violence in southern countries. Some theorists argued that 
some southern countries returned to ‘barbarism’ because of ‘state failure’ and 
‘new wars.’ Other theorists, criticizing the essentialism of this ‘new 
barbarism’ account, sought to analyze the political and economic mechanism 
of civil conflicts in the 1990s. Although their approaches were different, they 
jointly constituted new pathology of southern countries. ‘Failed states’ and 
‘new wars’ were considered to be central causes of humanitarian crises. This 
pathologization led to new trusteeship as a prescription. It was argued that 
the introduction of democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies 
because it would cause conflicts without functional state institutions. 
Therefore, international peacebuilders should administrate post-conflict 
societies until liberal state institutions are constructed. Although this 
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administration would be temporal, it is likely to be undemocratic and 
inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality. Therefore, many 
theorists and practitioners sought to redefine sovereignty, in particular, of 
southern countries according human rights. In their discourse, sovereign 
states have responsibility to protect their citizens from human suffering such 
as mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and rape. If they could not discharge this 
responsibility, they would be deprived of their sovereignty. In this case, 
international peacebuilders could administrate these countries and 
construct liberal state institutions. As stated in previous chapters, 
humanitarianism tended to constitute colonial trusteeship in the 19th and 
20th century. Similarly, after the Cold War, humanitarianism contributed to 
the constitution of new trusteeship.  
 The discourse which was explored above was rooted in 
humanitarianism. However, after 9/11, ‘failed states’ were represented as 
threats to the security of Western countries and therefore new trusteeship 
was supported by geopolitical concern. British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw 
stated in his speech in 2002, as follows:  
 
‘For as well as bringing mass murder to the heart of Manhattan, 
state failure has brought terror and misery to large swathes of the 
African continent, as it did in the Balkans in the early 1990s. And at 
home it has long brought drugs, violence and crime to Britain's 
streets. 
State failure can no longer be seen as a localized or regional 
issue to be managed simply on an ad hoc, case by case basis. We have 
to develop a more coherent and effective international response 
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which utilizes all of the tools at our disposal, ranging from aid and 
humanitarian assistance to support for institution building.’ 
 
The US National Security Strategy of 2002 stated that: ‘America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones’ (The US 2005: Ch. 
1). Not only policy discourse but also theoretical discourse tended to change. 
For example, Francis Fukuyama argued that failed states have become 
sources not only of poverty and human rights abuses, but also refugees and 
terrorism (Fukuyama 2005: 125). As Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings 
observe, ‘failed states […] are characterized by an inability to control 
territory, borders, and internal legal order and security, and lack the capacity 
or will to provide services to the citizenry’ (Boas and Jennings 2007: 477). 
Therefore, these countries such as Afghanistan were considered to be a 
hotbed of terrorists. As Duffield argues, state-building was employed as a 
part of the Western strategy which aimed to contain immigrants, refugees, 
and terrorists in southern countries (Duffield 2007: 198-200). Thus, after 
9/11, the geopolitical concern of Western countries supported new 
trusteeship which was constituted by humanitarianism in the 1990s.  
 
 
2. Practice of Peacebuilding Trusteeship after the Cold War 
 This section explores practice of peacebuilding trusteeship by 
analyzing the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Cambodia was the 
first case in which international peacebuilders were provided governing 
functions in the 1990s. In Bosnia and Kosovo, international peacebuilders 
exercised supreme authority to impose their policies on local societies. Thus, 
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these cases were identified as typical ‘new trusteeship’ cases. This section 
will show that practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was constituted not only 
by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarianism. As liberal 
peacebuilding theorists such as Paris (2004) argue, peacebuilding 
trusteeship in these cases was premised on liberal internationalism. 
However, when international peacebuilders sought to implement peace 
agreements, they have sometimes constructed undemocratic regimes in 
post-conflict societies such as Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In these cases, 
peacebuilding trusteeship is inconsistent with the idea of liberal democracy. 
Therefore, international peacebuilders, as this section will indicate, tend to 
use humanitarian discourse in order to underpin peacebuilding trusteeship. 
However, I do not mean that peacebuilding trusteeship has been constituted 
only by liberal democracy and humanitarianism. Rather, peacebuilding 
trusteeship and humanitarianism were strongly affected by geopolitical 
interests. When humanitarianism contributed to the constitution 
peacebuilding trusteeship, it was likely to be political.  
 
2-1 Cambodia 
 As stated above, in Cambodia, international peacebuilders were 
provided governing functions, although they were not elected by local 
societies. This political arrangement was underpinned by humanitarian 
discourse, as well as liberal democracy. Although the Khmer Rouge was not 
criticized in the Paris Peace Agreement, the policies by the Khmer Rouge 
and its results were represented as pathologies of Cambodia. The Peace 
Agreement stated that the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was expected to prevent this past from recurring. 
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However, as this section will argue, peacebuilding trusteeship in Cambodia 
was severely affected by the geopolitical interests of big powers.  
 
Background 
The civil conflict in Cambodia was led by the Vietnam War in the 
1960s. Cambodia received a large influx of Vietnamese communists who 
sought neutral sanctuary. In 1969 the US, under Richard Nixon, launched 
extensive airstrikes against the border areas of Cambodia. In 1970, civilian 
and military officials overthrew the government of Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, who had been the premier since 1957. The Lon Nol government 
came to power and enjoyed US support. As Vietnamese and Cambodian 
communists and US and South Vietnamese troops spread across the country, 
Cambodia became another battlefield for the Vietnam War. Therefore, the 
Lon Nol government lost control of the countryside. Subsequently, the 
Khmer Rouge rebels defeated the Lon Nol government and seized the capital 
in 1975. Kiernan (1996: 16) argues that: 
 
‘Although it was indigenous, Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won 
power without U.S. economic and military destabilisation of 
Cambodia which began in 1966 after the American escalation in 
next-door Vietnam and peaked in 1969-73 with the carpet bombing of 
Cambodia’s countryside by American B-52s. This was probably the 
most important single factor in Pol Pot’s rise to power.’ 
 
During the late 1970s, the Khmer Rouge was perpetrating mass 
murder. Approximately 2 million people were systematically killed by this 
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regime. The US, now under Jimmy Carter, began to notice what was 
happening in Cambodia. According to Kenton Clymer, ‘Even before Pol Pot 
took over Cambodia, the [US] government had substantial evidence of 
Khmer Rouge brutality’ (Clymer 2003: 247). However, the US did not protest 
against it, although Carter placed the defense of human rights at the center 
of his foreign policy. It was because the US attempted to maintain its 
relationship with China (Power 2002: 126-127; Clymer 2003: 255-256). In 
December 1978, Vietnam invaded the country, and installed a new 
government in Phnom Penh. Although its motivation was not 
humanitarianism, this intervention stopped the mass murder by Khmer 
Rouge. However, the US did not support this intervention. Rather, then 
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed that: ‘we must 
maintain diplomatic pressure to get Vietnam to remove its forces from 
Cambodia’ (Clymer 2003: 256). Therefore, when the Chinese armed forces 
invaded Vietnam in 1979, the US made no criticism. The US did not want 
Vietnam to be strong because it was supported by the USSR. As Clymer 
observes, ‘everything was examined from a geopolitical standpoint’ (Clymer 
2003: 258). Until the end of the Cold War, the US had resisted investigation 
of mass murder and never expressed even diplomatic criticism of the Khmer 
Rouge (Kiernan 2002). 
 As the structure of the Cold War collapsed, Western countries, the 
Soviet Union, China and other neighboring countries began to address the 
Cambodian problem. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev advocated the resolution of 
the Cambodian conflict in his speech. After Vietnam withdrew from the 
country in 1989, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was co-chaired by 
France and Indonesia. However, this negotiation failed because the conflict 
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parties and their international backers could not agree on main issues such 
as power sharing (Leifer 1992: 144). Even in 1989, the US and China still 
supported the Khmer Rouge and its allies. In 1990, after various 
negotiations and meetings, big powers such as the US, China, and Vietnam 
accepted the need for compromise. Finally, the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council and regional parties adopted a peace plan that ‘the UN 
would exercise “direct control” over the five areas of civilian administration – 
foreign affairs, defense, security, information, and finance – critical to a 
‘neutral political environment’ for a free and fair elections’ (Song 1997: 
70-71). 
 The plan of UN transitional administration was proposed by a US 
Democrat congressman Stephen Solarz and Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans in order to resolve the power-sharing problem. Evans, who 
would become a member of ICISS in the late 1990s, was a lawyer who had ‘a 
firm belief in the centrality of international law in effective global 
governance’ and ‘placed great faith in the United Nations as an agent of 
justice and a facilitator of world peace’ (Gurry 1995: 17). In the US, the Bush 
administration was criticized for its foreign policy toward Cambodia, in 
particular, its ‘indifference to genocide’ (Doyle 1995: 24). Furthermore, in 
February 1990, ‘the House voted 413 to 0 to urge the Bush administration to 
drop the “quadripartite government” option in favor of a “United Nations – 
supervised interim administration” option’ (Haas 1991: 255). However, this 
plan seemed to serve US and Chinese geopolitical interests because it would 
deter the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian regime and help the Khmer 
Rouge return to power (Song 1997: 74).  
In October 1991, the warring factions and eighteen countries signed 
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a peace treaty at Paris. In February 1992, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 745, by which United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was established. It stated that UNTAC was expected to 
‘contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Cambodia, to the 
promotion of national reconciliation, to the protection of human rights and to 
the assurance of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people 
through free and fair elections.’ 
 
Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Cambodia 
UNTAC was the first transitional administration by the UN in the 
1990s. The UN trusteeship system (a successor to the League of Nations 
mandate system) was not an option because it could not be applied to a 
member state of the UN because of Article 78 of the UN Charter 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1990: 12). UNTAC was a kind of peace keeping 
operation. However, in this operation, international peacebuilders had 
governing functions.  
 In order to separate UNTAC from colonial administration and the 
UN trusteeship system, the Supreme National Council (SNC), which would 
include representatives from all the factions, was established. According to 
‘Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia 
Conflict’ (hereafter, the Paris Peace Agreement), The SNC enshrined ‘the 
sovereignty, independence, national unity of Cambodia’ (Article 3). The SNC 
delegated to the United Nations ‘all powers necessary to ensure the 
implementation of this Agreement’ (Article 6). This political arrangement 
aimed to make clear that the authority of UNTAC was premised on the 
consent of Cambodian society.  
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However, Uch Kiman, Cambodian Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, stated that:  
 
‘The first and most obvious feature of UNTAC was that it was a 
serious impingement on Cambodian sovereignty. This was probably 
the most bitter pill which we all had to swallow.’ (Kiman 1995: 62) 
 
As he stated, although the SNC had de jure sovereignty, it did not have de 
facto sovereignty because it did not undertake governing functions and 
merely gave its authority to UNTAC. The Peace Agreement stated that the 
SNC could provide advice to UNTAC. However, UNTAC did not have to 
comply with it if there was no consensus among the members of the SNC 
(Paris Peace Agreement: Annex 1, Section A, 2-a). Prince Sihanouk was also 
entitled to offer advice to UNTAC, but it had to be consistent with the Peace 
Agreement. Furthermore, this agreement stated that: ‘In all cases, the 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative will determine whether advice or 
action of the SNC is consistent with the present Agreement’ (Annex 1, 
Section A, 2-e). 
The UNTAC mandate of the Peace Agreement was broad and 
ambiguous. Annex 1 of the Agreement stated that:  
 
‘UNTAC will exercise the powers necessary to ensure the 
implementation of this Agreement, including those relating to the 
organization and conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant 
aspects of the administration of Cambodia.’ (Section A, 1) 
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UNTAC was provided executive powers. The Peace Agreement stated that: 
‘all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign 
affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information will be 
placed under the direct control of UNTAC’ (Annex 1, Section B, 1). It ‘had the 
right to issue binding directives on an ad hoc basis’ to control administrative 
agencies (Suntharalingam 1997: 95). Furthermore, the Special 
Representative could ‘install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of 
all the Cambodian Parties United Nations personnel’ and ‘require the 
reassignment or removal of any personnel of such administrative agencies, 
bodies and offices’ (Annex 1, Section B, 4).  
 In addition, UNTAC could legislate in terms of election and human 
rights. It had the authority to adopt an electoral law and a code of conduct 
regulating participation in the election and to suspend or abrogate provisions 
of existing laws which were inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the 
Peace Agreement (Annex 1, Section D, 3-b). Also, it drafted the penal code to 
re-educate the Cambodian society to respect human rights (Doyle 1995: 38).  
 Furthermore, UNTAC exercised judicial powers. In order to protect 
human rights, UNTAC ‘can call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such other steps as are appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of such violations in accordance with the relevant international 
instruments’ (‘Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, 
Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia’: Article 5-4). According to J.M. Sanderson, Force Commander of 
UNTAC, in practice, UNTAC found there was not an effective justice system. 
Therefore, peacekeepers moved beyond self-defense to a form of enforcement 
(Sanderson 1995: 72). In January 1993, the UNTAC Military Component and 
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International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) were provided the power to arrest. 
And the Office of Special Prosecutor, ‘who had the authority to issue 
warrants and prosecute cases before the Cambodian courts,’ was established 
(Ibid.: 73). 
 Thus, UNTAC had executive, legislative, and judicial powers. On this 
regime, Kiman wrote that:  
 
‘We had to accept the “Akashi Protectorate” and referred to the 
position held by H.E. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of 
the United Nations Secretary General, […] as that of a “Viceroy”.’ 
(Kiman 1995: 62) 
 
These strong powers of UNTAC were underpinned not only by liberal 
democracy but also by humanitarian discourse. The Peace Agreement stated, 
at the beginning, that ‘Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special 
measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the 
policies and practices of the past’. In addition, ‘Agreement Concerning the 
Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality 
and National Unity of Cambodia’ also mentioned it (Article 3-2). Although 
signatories failed to refer to the Khmer Rouge and its mass murder, they had 
to mention ‘the policies and practices of the past’ to justify UNTAC. Electoral 
assistance was expected to facilitate the protection of human rights. In an 
Australian Peace Proposal, it was argued that: 
 
‘There is universal acceptance of the need to ensure in Cambodia a 
non-return to policies and practices of a recent past. The primary 
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means of guaranteeing such a non-returning will be the holding of 
free and fair elections whereby the people of Cambodia can freely 
determine their future and choose their own leaders.’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1990: 89-90) 
 
As stated above, the US and China were supporting the Khmer Rouge even 
in the early 1990s. Therefore, the Paris Peace Agreement could not criticize 
its mass murder. Nevertheless, it could not avoid mentioning ‘the past.’  
 Even Solarz, in his article, sought to justify UNTAC by employing 
humanitarian discourse, although the US foreign policy seemed not to be 
premised on humanitarianism. He argued that the most important objective 
of US foreign policy toward Cambodia was to ‘prevent the Khmer Rouge from 
returning to power and encourage Cambodian self-determination’ (Solarz 
1990: 112, 115).  
 Despite its humanitarian discourse, the exit strategy of UNTAC 
seemed to indicate the geopolitical considerations of international 
peacebuilders. The Security Council Resolution 745 decided that UNTAC 
should not exceed eighteen months. Although the liberal democratization of 
Cambodian society seemed to be incomplete, UNTAC identified elections as a 
deadline for the operation. As stated above, for the US and China, UNTAC 
was a means to deter the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian regime.  
 The ‘genocide’ by the Khmer Rouge led to pathologization of 
Cambodia. Humanitarians such as Evans advocated peacebuilding 
trusteeship to alleviate this human suffering. At the same time, 
peacebuilding trusteeship by the UN served the US and Chinese geopolitical 
interests. The US seemed to exploit humanitarian discourse to justify this 
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political arrangement. Peacebuilding trusteeship was constituted by both 
sides.  
 
2-2 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, international peacebuilders were provided 
governing functions as in Cambodia. They removed many local officials by 
using their supreme authority. This undemocratic regime was underpinned 
not only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarianism. The notions of 
‘exclusive nationalism,’ ‘ethnic cleansing,’ ‘mass murder,’ and ‘new wars’ 
pathologized the former Yugoslavia. This pathologization contributed to the 
constitution of peacebuilding trusteeship as a prescription for several regions 
of the former Yugoslavia. However, peacebuilding trusteeship in these 
regions was not free from the geopolitical interests of big powers. This 
section will analyze the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) which has governed this region. 
 
Background 
The Yugoslav Wars were caused by a multiplicity of factors and an 
exact cause is difficult to identify. Although nationalism has often been 
regarded as a primary cause of the wars, the challenging economic conditions 
in Yugoslavia and the manipulation of ethnic identity by opportunistic 
politicians were also contributing factors (Ignatieff 1994; Woodward 1995; 
Kaldor 1999). For example, Slobodan Milošević, the first President of Serbia, 
had little in the way of a serious political philosophy; ‘his only evident 
interest has been his own power ’ (Judah 1999: 5). He repeated incoherent 
and contradictory statements to achieve political power. Before the outbreak 
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of the wars, nationalists increased in power in the republics of Yugoslavia; as 
a result, Slovenia and Croatia began to claim greater autonomy within the 
Yugoslav confederation, while Serbia sought to strengthen the federal 
authority. When Slovenia and Croatia decided to claim independence from 
Yugoslavia in June 1991, a series of wars resulted. While the war in Slovenia 
soon ended, the conflict in Croatia, where a lot of Serbian people were living 
and opposing independence, intensified. After the secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia from Yugoslavia was achieved, Bosnia and Macedonia began to seek 
independence. While the Bosnian Serbs declared their own Serbian Republic 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1992, the referendum on Bosnian 
independence supported independence. Subsequently Bosnia was recognized 
as an independent country by the European Community and the US. Soon 
after independence, Yugoslav armed forces launched attacks against Bosnian 
settlements. 
In the Bosnian War, Western journalists and humanitarian NGOs 
sought to report from Yugoslavia and attempted to show the actual 
conditions of concentration camps. According to Bridget Robinson, ‘In August 
1992 an ITN news team, led by reporters Penny Marshall and Ian Williams, 
and Ed Vulliamy of the Guardian, “discovered” detention centres run by the 
Bosnian Serbs’ (Robinson 2004: 388; see Gutman 1993: 44-49). The pictures 
of camps in Omarska and Trnoplje reminded many Western people of Nazi 
death camps of World War II and strongly appealed to their sense of morality. 
A British aid worker observed that: ‘For six months, we have seen Sarajevo 
systematically being destroyed without the world getting very upset. Now a 
few pictures of people being held behind barbed wire, and the world goes 
crazy’ (cited in Holbrooke 1998: 36). There was little doubt that reports by 
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Western journalists determined the direction of humanitarian discourse. 
Newsday’s Roy Gutman was one of the leading journalists in the Bosnian 
Wars and the first reporter to enter the concentration camp in Manjaca 
(Hansen 2006: 179-184). His book called A Witness to Genocide received the 
Pulitzer Prize, and is often cited as an important source on ‘genocide.’ It 
described mass murder in Bosnia by using analogy with the Holocaust 
(Gutman 1993: 36-40, 174-180).  
As well as journalists, some human rights groups went to the 
Balkans to document atrocities. They also contributed to the pathologization 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, Human Rights Watch dispatched field 
missions there in 1991 and the following year published their report, War 
Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The introduction of this report stated that: 
‘The findings in this report and the reports from Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
independent news media, provide prima facie evidence that genocide is 
taking place’ (Helsinki Watch 1993: 1). Furthermore, they called on the UN 
Security Council to ‘exercise its authority under the 1951 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to intervene in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent and suppress genocide’ and ‘to enforce the 
prohibition of “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions by establishing an 
international tribunal at the highest level to investigate, prosecute, 
adjudicate and punish those on all sides who have been responsible for war 
crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ (ibid.). Although these 
appeals did not argue about peacebuilding trusteeship, they constituted the 
discursive foundation for it. Their assertion was that ‘genocide’ was taking 
place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, armed intervention by Western 
countries was indispensable to the protection of human rights. One of the 
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members of Human Rights Watch stated that:  
 
‘The organization had never called for military intervention, and we 
couldn’t bring ourselves to do so. Yet we could also see that the 
atrocities would not be stopped by any other means.’ (cited in Power 
2002: 258)  
 
 On the other hand, many political commentators and policy makers 
regarded this region as an important place in terms of geopolitics. They 
placed Bosnia ‘in the heart of Europe’ (Robinson 2004). The Bosnian 
population was represented as belonging to ‘Us’ (the West). Therefore, that 
Europe failed to deal with the humanitarian crisis was damaging confidence 
in Europe. In the Independent newspaper, Ignatieff (1995) claimed that:  
 
‘They were so like us, both the killers and the victims, good 
Europeans one and all. […] We could have stopped it. […] The 
obstacle, so our leaders told us, was ourselves…. it is hard to see why 
anyone should believe in this united Europe, if its already formidable 
institutions proved unable to stop ethnic cleansing two hours from 
Brussels.’ 
 
Bosnia was imagined as their geopolitical heartland by European countries. 
Similarly, in the New York Times newspaper, Richard Perle, an American 
neo-conservative theorist, with Richard Burt, claimed to use NATO air power 
against tactical targets in Bosnia and Serbia (Perle and Burt 1994). 
According to them, if the US and its allies ignore humanitarian crisis in 
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Bosnia, it would damage the credibility of the US and the NATO allies. They 
wrote that: ‘If NATO proves incapable of acting with resolve, it will soon 
become irrelevant in the post-cold-war world’ (ibid.). Furthermore, in Wall 
Street Journal, nuclear weapons strategist Albert Wohlstetter and former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also called on the US and NATO 
to conduct a military campaign in Bosnia (Thatcher and Wohlstetter 1993). 
They argued that the Bosnian War would destabilize Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Albania, and ultimately Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Thus, armed 
intervention in the Bosnian War was considered to serve the geopolitical 
interests of Western countries.  
 While the Bush administration was reluctant to be involved in this 
conflict, the Clinton administration decided to intervene. Since 1995, the US 
had begun mediating peace negotiations and exerting pressure on the 
Serbian representatives by NATO’s air strikes. With the help of NATO, 
Croatian forces succeeded in the annexation of Serbian residential areas by 
expelling Serbian people. Finally, in mid-1995, the fighting in Croatia ended. 
In Bosnia, the UN created ‘safe areas’ such as in Srebrenica to protect 
civilians, but completely failed to protect them. After this event, ‘Srebrenica’ 
has been referred to in numerous documents to justify humanitarian 
intervention and peacebuilding trusteeship, as well as ‘Rwanda.’ The 
massacre in the safe areas led NATO to increase air strikes against Serbia, 
and consequently drag the Serbian representatives to the negotiating table. 
In late 1995, the ceasefire went into effect and the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accord) was 
concluded. 
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Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(OHR) was the main organization of transitional territorial administration 
in Bosnia, working with the United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH). As in the Cambodian case, international peacebuilders publicly 
exercised authority that transcended local democratic decision making. The 
OHR was established in 1995 according to the Dayton Agreement, and even 
now continues to operate with the EU. The OHR is not an organization of the 
UN but consists of international representatives.  
The mandate of the OHR is not only to monitor the implementation 
of the peace settlement but also to reconstruct the overall socio-political 
systems. The institutions of the OHR cover all major elements of 
socio-political systems: the Political Department, Economic Department, 
Human Rights/Rule of Law Department, Legal Department, Anti-Fraud 
Department, Media Development Department, Military Cell, and the 
OHR-led inter-agency Reconstruction and Return Task Force. Furthermore, 
the OHR obtained final authority over decision making in Bosnia when the 
Peace Implementation Council endorsed the High Representative’s authority 
to remove public officials from office and to impose laws at the PIC meeting 
in Bonn in December 1997 (the so called ‘Bonn powers’). International 
peacebuilders assert this authority when they ‘deal with what the OHR 
deemed specific and concrete threats to the implementation of the peace’ 
(Knaus and Martin 2003). In practice, the OHR has often exercised this 
authority, and thereby the High Representative imposed various legislation 
such as the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dismissed 
more than 180 officials and politicians (Knaus and Martin 2003; Parish 
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2007; Zaum 2007: 91-92). 
 The civil service reform was a typical case that demonstrated the 
intrusive nature of the OHR. The OHR sought ‘to create a professional, 
meritocratic civil service’ and ‘strengthen the central government vis-a-vis 
other actors in the state’ (Zaum 2007: 107). The OHR asked the Support for 
Improvement in Governance and Management (a joint initiative of the 
OECD and the EU which provides the European neighborhood countries 
with support in the public administration reform) to produce a reform 
proposal of the civil service system in Bosnia. Subsequently, the working 
group, composed of international officials and representatives from the local 
government, prepared the draft law. Although this draft of the law was 
bitterly opposed by the local politicians who wanted to keep their control 
over the administration, the OHR achieved the civil service reform by 
accepting some compromise with them. The Law on Civil Service stated that 
civil servants were subject to a review process by the Civil Service Agency. 
The OHR kept the High Representative’s right to appoint the first head of 
the Civil Service Agency (ibid.: 111). Thus, the OHR sought to transform the 
whole structure of local civil service.  
 In order to legitimize the strong power of the OHR, reference to the 
human rights violations and the bloodshed in Bosnia was often made. PIC 
Bonn Conclusion, which provided a legal basis for Bonn Power, recognized 
human right violations as one of the most serious issues in Bosnia. It stated, 
at the beginning, that ‘the protection of human rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is still inadequate’ (Section I). Furthermore, the fourth high 
representative, Paddy Ashdown, who was widely regarded as having adopted 
a heavy-handed approach, stated that:  
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‘the one event that could change that calculation in favour of blood 
would be to return to the old Karadzic/Milosevic plan to divide 
Bosnia – what started it all back in 1992. […] It is always more 
difficult, especially in the Balkans, to defend the preservation of 
multi-ethnic spaces and resist the creation of mono-ethnic ones. But 
to do otherwise is always folly and nearly always ends in blood.’ 
(Ashdown 2008)  
 
Moreover, he represented the Bosnian people as corrupt and ignorant 
(Ashdown 2007: 108, 113) and justified the policies imposed from Europe 
(ibid.: 114).  
 Not only administrators of the OHR but also some theorists justify 
this undemocratic regime. As stated in the first section of this chapter, Mary 
Kaldor considers an international protectorate to be an effective political 
arrangement for Bosnia because local civil societies could not develop in the 
places where gangs and warlords control security sector (Kaldor 1999: Ch. 6). 
Bart Szewczyk also justifies the Bonn Powers by referring to human rights 
protection. He argues that:  
 
‘the Bonn Powers help maximise values of human dignity by 
overcoming internal deadlock within the Bosnian political structures, 
and thereby avoiding anarchy and chaos, being applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner against all violators of the Dayton 
Agreement, and protecting human rights as immutably enshrined in 
the Constitution.’ (Szewczyk 2010: 42) 
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In contrast to UNTAC, the OHR has governed Bosnia for more than 
15 years. For Western countries, in particular, EU countries, the 
Europeanization of Bosnia is important because it would contribute to the 
stabilization of European order. In fact, the High Representative of the 
international community has also been EU Special Representative in Bosnia 
Herzegovina since 2002. EU has allocated a large amount of resources to the 
peacebuilding in Bosnia. The geopolitical interests of Western countries have 
kept peacebuilding trusteeship in existence. 
 In the Bosnian War, numerous reports on mass murder, ethnic 
cleansing, rape, and other violence led to the pathologization of the former 
Yugoslavia. Many humanitarians insisted on humanitarian intervention and 
peacebuilding trusteeship to address the root causes of the Bosnian War. At 
the same time, by geopolitical strategists, humanitarian intervention and 
peacebuilding trusteeship were considered to serve the geopolitical interests 
of Western countries. As stated above, peacebuilding trusteeship in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was undemocratic. Therefore, it was underpinned not 
only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarian discourse.  
 
2-3 Kosovo 
 Since 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) had governed Kosovo. As in other new trusteeship, UNMIK 
exercised supreme authority and underpinned it not only by liberal 
democracy but also by humanitarian discourse.  
 
Background 
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The conflict in the former Yugoslavia did not end in 1995. Since 1998, 
the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia had heated up. The historical 
background of the Kosovo war was also complicated like other wars in this 
region. Kosovo, which had belonged to Albania in the 19th century, had been 
integrated into Serbia in 1913, and subsequently the resistance by Kosovar 
Albanians began. Even after the integration into Yugoslavia, Kosovar 
Albanians had not demonstrated their loyalty to Yugoslavia. By 1974, 
Kosovo could have ‘its own assembly, police force and local government, and 
all the prerogatives of the other Yugoslav republics such as Croatia or 
Slovenia’, but formal status as a republic (Judah 1999: 8). However, 
everything changed after Milosevic became Serb President in 1989. He 
sought to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy. During the Bosnian wars, adopting a 
passive resistance strategy, Kosovar Albanians did not start a violent 
separatist movement because they did not have enough power to fight 
against Yugoslavia. However, as the European Union (EU) recognized the 
new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo at the end of the Bosnian War, Kosovar Albanians shifted their 
strategy. Since 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had intensified its 
guerrilla war, attracting broad support from Kosovar Albanians.  
After the conflict worsened, the US and the European countries 
sought to intervene in Kosovo. As in the Bosnian case, the stories of ethnic 
cleansing and massacre pathologized Kosovo. Because numerous reports on 
human suffering were appealing to public opinion, Western governments 
obtained support for armed intervention in Kosovo (O’Loughlin and Kolossov 
2002: 581-582). Just before NATO began air strikes on Kosovo, Clinton 
sought to legitimize this campaign by referring to the Holocaust.  
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‘Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I 
began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both 
wars, Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United 
States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. […] Do our interests 
in Kosovo justify the dangers to our armed forces? […] I am convinced 
that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not 
acting – dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests’ 
(Clinton 1999b: 517-518).  
 
‘What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to 
Adolf Hitler earlier?’ (Clinton 1999a: 491).  
 
Geopolitically, Kosovo was important for European security. Then US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher thought that ‘deterioration in Kosovo 
would likely “bring into the fray other countries in the region – Albania, 
Greece, Turkey”’ (Power 2003: 446). NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was 
interpreted as a sign of the expansion of NATO to East Europe. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that NATO countries could not overcome Russian 
opposition to the intervention in the Security Council. Russia had strong 
interest in this region, even though Kosovo had little to do with Russia’s 
security concerns before NATO decided to intervene.  
Finally, in March 1999, NATO intervened in Kosovo without UN 
authorization. Subsequently, Russia and NATO countries achieved a 
compromise, and on 9 June 1999 the Security Council adopted the resolution 
1244 which established NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United 
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Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
 
Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Kosovo 
Like the OHR, UNMIK has strong authority in transitional 
administration. According to Alexandra Gheciu, ‘More broadly, UNMIK has 
exercised significant productive and coercive power over the Kosovars, in the 
name of promoting the norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’ 
(Gheciu 2005: 122).  
The mandate of UNMIK was: the establishment of law and order as 
well as security and freedom of movement throughout the whole territory of 
Kosovo; the establishment of a functioning administration; the protection of 
the Serbs and trust-building among the communities. Although the future 
status of Kosovo was unclear, international society achieved the consensus 
that Kosovo ought to reach an international standard such as international 
laws on human rights. In order to do that, UNMIK had not only to supervise 
the management of local political institutions but also to perform 
administrative functions including enforcement of law and to provide basic 
public service until they establish new socio-political institutions in Kosovo. 
Following the Report of the Secretary-General published on 12 July 1999 
(S/1999/779), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Bernard 
Kouchner, who insisted on the idea of ‘right to intervene,’ stated in the first 
regulation the following:  
 
‘All the legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo 
including the administration of the judiciary is vested in UNMIK and 
is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary General.’ 
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(UNMIK Regulation UNMIK/REG/1999/1) 
 
Moreover, as in the OHR, the Special Representative ‘had the power to make 
and revoke the appointments of all the officials within the UNMIK structure, 
and was even granted the unprecedented “final authority of interpretation” 
of Resolution 1244, and hence of UNMIK’s mandate’ (Gheciu 2005: 126-127). 
Moreover, UNMIK has stayed in Kosovo for more than 10 years. As 
stated above, for Western countries, Kosovo is a geopolitically important 
place. Therefore, even after Kosovo has been recognized as an independent 
state in the UN, UNMIK has continued to operate in Kosovo. Like 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo is actually an international protectorate.  
 In order to underpin the authority of UNMIK, international 
peacebuilders used humanitarian discourse. The Security Council Resolution 
1244, which established UNMIK, stated, in the introduction, that its aim 
was to ‘resolve the grave humanitarian situation’ and that UNMIK was 
established ‘to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo’ (Article 21). Furthermore, international peacebuilders 
claimed that both Serbians and Albanians were obsessed with not only the 
legacy of an authoritarian past but also had a strong ethnic bias and, 
therefore, they might cause another ethnic conflict. Michael Steiner, who was 
the head of the UNMIK from 2001 to 2003, stated that:  
 
‘Transforming Kosovo into a place where all its people can live in 
security and dignity is not only essential for the sake of minority 
communities […] It is essential for the long-term stability of the 
Balkans and of Europe itself. To achieve this transformation, we need 
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to help Kosovars to make European standards their own.’ (Steiner 
2003) 
 
Kouchner also sought to justify intervention and new trusteeship by 
humanitarian discourse. He claimed that:  
 
‘The charge of “human rights imperialism” against local cultural 
norms is also not a valid argument against the right to intervene. 
Everywhere, human rights are human rights. Freedom is freedom. 
Suffering is suffering. Oppression is oppression.’ (Kouchner 1999: 4) 
 
In practice, UNMIK sought to prevent ethnic fighting from taking place at 
strategically important places in Kosovo. Therefore, international 
peacebuilders sharply restricted the freedom of movement. This strong 
action against the local population was also underpinned by human rights 
norms (UNMIK/REG/1999/2; Carlowitz 2004: 310).  
 Thus, peacebuilding trusteeship in Kosovo was undemocratic as in 
other peacebuilding trusteeships. Therefore, international peacebuilders 
sought to underpin the transitional administration not only by liberal 
democracy but also human rights norms. However, as well as 
humanitarianism, the geopolitical interests of Western countries contributed 
to the establishment of peacebuilding trusteeship in Kosovo.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter analyzed peacebuilding trusteeship after the Cold War. 
It indicated that peacebuilding trusteeship was, theoretically and practically, 
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underpinned and constituted not only by liberal internationalism but also 
humanitarian discourse such as human rights norms. On the other hand, 
humanitarianism relied on the power relations in international society when 
it sought to alleviate severe human suffering.  
The notions of ‘failed states,’ ‘new wars,’ and violence itself formed 
new pathology of southern countries. They highlighted human suffering in 
southern countries. These notions seemed to be neither neutral nor objective 
but political. In this context, humanitarianism required practices which 
were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. The pathologization of 
conflict societies led to new prescriptions such as liberal peacebuilding. Many 
theorists and practitioners sought to underpin peacebuilding trusteeship by 
referring to ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars.’ Moreover, they sought to 
deconstruct the idea of sovereignty, in particular, of southern countries. Thus, 
the theology of peacebuilding trusteeship was premised on humanitarian 
discourse. However, after 9/11, new pathologies and prescriptions were 
integrated into the security strategy of Western countries.  
 In practice, this chapter analyzed the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. In these cases, international peacebuilders were provided governing 
functions. However, as they were not elected from local societies, these 
regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship were undemocratic. They were 
inconsistent with liberal internationalism. Therefore, they were 
underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarian 
discourse. However, the practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was influenced 
by the geopolitical interests of Western countries.  
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Conclusion 
 
By using a genealogical approach, this study has analyzed the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship from the early 19th century to 
the present. This concluding chapter will bring the findings of this study 
together and consider some of the theoretical, conceptual, and practical 
implications of my argument and analysis. The discussion is divided into 
four parts, dealing with: (i) the relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism; (ii) the power of trusteeship and humanitarianism; (iii) 
the theoretical implications for humanitarian intervention, development, 
and peacebuilding; and (iv) the possibility of justifying trusteeship. 
 
The Original Puzzle 
 Before summarizing the findings of this study, I would like to restate 
the original ‘puzzle’. It is that the language of trusteeship harks back to the 
colonial period even while the humanitarianism of today tends to reject 
political and colonial content. Ignatieff (2001: 173)’s argument about 
humanitarianism demonstrates this tendency.  
 
‘What should our goals as believers in human rights be? Here my 
slogan would be the title of the justly famous essay by my old teacher, 
Judith Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First.” We may not be able to create 
democracies or constitutions. Liberal freedom [in some societies] may 
be some way off. But we could do more than we do to stop unmerited 
suffering and gross physical cruelty. That I take to be the elemental 
priority of all human rights activism: to stop torture, beatings, 
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killings, rape, and assault and to improve, as best we can, the 
security of ordinary people. My minimalism is not strategic at all. It 
is the most we can hope for.’ 
 
Although he describes his approach as ‘minimalism,’ this minimalism can 
lead to the establishment of undemocratic regimes in post-conflict societies 
by international peacebuilders. As this study showed, humanitarianism has 
contributed to the constitution of trusteeship and trusteeship has required 
moral justification since the colonial period. As a result, the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship has repeatedly been reproduced. 
 In this study, the concept of ‘trusteeship’ refers to a relation of 
inequality, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. It is the 
wider concept which includes various practices such as indirect rule, the 
mandate system, development assistance, and transitional administration. 
Similarly, the category of ‘humanitarianism’ also includes practices such as 
protection from anarchy, relief from oppression, and freedom from poverty, 
which are above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. As Ch. 1 argued, 
this study established a framework for the analysis to examine the 
dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. It is based on ‘genealogy’, by 
which Foucault focused on the dispositive of power relations in a society. The 
concept of ‘dispositive’ means the system of relations that can be established 
among various elements such as laws, institutions, regulations, statements, 
and social practices. Foucault argued that a dispositive underpinned power 
relations in a society. Genealogy as methodology can be classified into two 
categories: archeological genealogy and sociological genealogy. While the 
former focuses on the discursive domain, the latter analyzes not only the 
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discursive domain but also the non-discursive domain. Employing the latter, 
this study investigated the discursive domain of trusteeship and 
humanitarianism (e.g. discourse of intellectuals and policy makers) and the 
non-discursive domain of trusteeship (e.g. social practices such as missionary 
work and humanitarian aid). As a framework, this study introduced the 
ideas of pathologization and prescriptions. This framework provided the 
hypothesis that humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of 
trusteeship by pathologization and prescription, and that the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship has been repeatedly examined and revised.  
 
Relationship between Trusteeship and Humanitarianism 
As Ch. 2 analyzed, British India in the 19th century was a case of 
existing rule that subsequently required justification. Utilitarianism, 
presuming that the Indian population had been suffering from despotism, 
constituted the moral justification of existing rule. The liberation of the 
Indian population from indigenous despotism and savagism was defined as 
the objective of trusteeship. It is possible to regard this objective as a kind of 
humanitarian discourse because it aimed to alleviate suffering of others. 
However, this humanitarianism was not just compassion with suffering, but 
it pathologized Indian societies. The pathologization of Indian societies led to 
social engineering and benevolent despotism by civilized nations. Thus, 
while existing rule in India required humanitarian discourse, humanitarian 
discourse underpinned the objectives and political arrangements of colonial 
trusteeship. Even after the Indian Mutiny, colonial trusteeship did not 
disappear because Indian societies were re-pathologized and the objectives of 
trusteeship were redefined. The protection of Indian societies from anarchy 
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replaced the liberation from despotism as the objective of trusteeship. This 
was an origin of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship.  
In the case of Africa, humanitarianism constituted colonial 
trusteeship before the British Empire began to rule Africa. Slavery and the 
slave trade were considered as grave human suffering by humanitarianism. 
While the early anti-slavery movement did not pathologize African societies, 
the successors of the movement ascribed the root causes of slavery and the 
slave trade to the nature of African societies. Cultivation of soil, 
Christianization of Africans, and civilization of African societies were 
advocated as prescriptions for the pathology, in addition to the suppression of 
slave traders by the Royal Navy. These social engineering policies were 
expected to transform the nature of African societies. Moreover, these 
policies required the colonization of Africa. Similarly, the native protection 
movement also called on the British Empire to put African societies under its 
control. The aim of this movement was to protect Africans from the invasion 
of European colonists, but it required Africans to become imperial citizens. 
While the early anti-slavery movement did not pathologize African societies, 
the successors of the movement ascribed the root causes of slavery and the 
slave trade to the nature of African societies. And the westernization of 
African societies and social engineering policies were advocated. The cases of 
India and Africa showed that trusteeship and humanitarianism were 
mutually constitutive and that they formed the dispositive of power relations 
in international society.  
 This co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism continued even after the 19th century, although the form 
of trusteeship and humanitarianism changed. While humanitarianism has 
２３９ 
 
 
 
critically reviewed the theology and practice of trusteeship, it has never 
denied the necessity of trusteeship. Rather, it has reproduced trusteeship in 
international society. And the relations of inequality in international society 
have to some extent been reflected in humanitarian discourse. When colonial 
trusteeship was internationalized around the time of the First World War, 
dependent territories were re-pathologized by humanitarianism, although 
the legitimacy of colonial empires was challenged. Non-European societies 
were represented as uncivilized and inferior to Western civilization. 
Wilsonianism described them as uncivilized, presuming a unilinear model of 
social development. Incipient cultural relativism sought to solidify the 
indigenous nature of non-European societies according to essentialism. 
While these pathologizations seemed contradictory, both discourses 
constituted colonial trusteeship. 
During and after the Second World War, developing countries were 
represented as suffering from poverty and requiring intervention of civilized 
countries. This re-pathologization led to the creation of development 
trusteeship. Even after the transition from British to American hegemony 
and the emergence of multilateral aid regimes, the discourse of poverty 
performed the function of expanding the power of aid agencies. In 
development trusteeship, undemocratic regimes of developing countries were 
strengthened and social engineering policies were legitimized.  
During and after the Cold War, as humanitarian crises of conflict 
societies were considered as human suffering and to be alleviated, 
peacebuilding trusteeship was created. Peacebuilding trusteeship was likely 
to be similar to colonial administration in that it attempted to introduce new 
socio-political institutions into post-conflict societies and legitimized 
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undemocratic administration by international peacebuilders, although the 
period of the mandate was predetermined.  
As stated in Ch. 1, trusteeship has been reproduced by 
humanitarianism through the critique of previous forms of trusteeship. It 
has formed a circular process. In the mid-19th century, British colonial 
administration in India was challenged by the local societies. As a result of 
the Mutiny, colonial trusteeship was radically revised. Utilitarianism, 
Christianization, and radical westernization were criticized for causing 
anarchy, and another humanitarian discourse was created to pathologize 
India. Around the time of the First World War, the legitimacy of colonial 
empires was undermined by accusations of the abuse of native peoples on the 
part of intellectuals and politicians. However, because of their humanitarian 
concern, they supported colonial trusteeship. They argued that, without 
supervision by civilized nations, uncivilized countries would be invaded by 
European traders. Therefore, internationalization of colonial trusteeship was 
advocated. During the Second World War, the previous form of colonial 
trusteeship, which denied radical modernization of dependent territories, 
was criticized for overlooking the poverty of these territories. A new colonial 
strategy, development trusteeship, was expected to alleviate malnutrition, 
inadequate education, poor standards of hygiene, and other social problems. 
During the decolonization movement, the violations of the right to 
self-determination began to be considered a kind of human suffering. This 
extension of humanitarianism challenged the legitimacy of colonial 
trusteeship. However, developing countries were still pathologized due to 
human suffering such as poverty and civil conflicts. Therefore, new types of 
trusteeship were required. After decolonization, development and 
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peacebuilding trusteeship were designed to coexist with the right to 
self-determination of target societies although the latter’s freedom was 
clearly delimited. Thus, humanitarianism stands in an ambivalent but 
intimate and constitutive relationship to trusteeship: while it has 
contributed to the legitimacy of trusteeship, it has also at times provided the 
grounds for its critique and reform. In conclusion, the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship reappears cyclically and changes its form 
across space and time, reproducing relations of inequality and facilitating 
intervention via pathologization and prescription. If this study is correct, 
then the development of humanitarianism will entail the development of 
new forms of trusteeship. However, I do not argue that any kind of 
humanitarianism leads to trusteeship. As stated in Ch. 1, this study focuses 
on humanitarian ‘responses linked to broader notions of human progress’ 
(Calhoun 2008: 74). I do not deny the possibility that humanitarian 
‘responses rooted in simply providing care’ (ibid.) does not constitute 
trusteeship. If humanitarianism could cautiously avoid the pathologization 
of target societies, it might not constitute trusteeship.  
Also, this study showed that geopolitical interests cannot be 
separated from humanitarian concerns in the discourse on trusteeship. In 
British India, the expansion of colonial rule seemed to be caused initially 
mainly by economic interests. In Africa, although humanitarians were 
lobbying for the colonization of Africa, the British Empire did not engage in 
extensive colonization until geopolitical interests were found in Africa. 
Development trusteeship was constituted as a part of the security strategy 
by the US. Peacebuilding trusteeship was not conducted until the 
geopolitical situation changed due to the end of the Cold War. While 
２４２ 
 
 
 
geopolitics has affected humanitarianism, humanitarianism has helped 
Western countries to pursue their geopolitical interests. Geopolitics cannot 
constitute trusteeship without humanitarianism, but humanitarianism 
cannot implement trusteeship without geopolitics. Thus, humanitarianism 
tends to be not neutral but political.  
 The co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism, which this study showed, challenges the presumption of 
existing works. As stated in Ch. 1, previous studies distinguish between good 
trusteeship and bad trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism. Good 
trusteeship embodies humanitarianism and bad trusteeship abuses 
humanitarianism. However, this dichotomy is highly questionable because 
humanitarianism and trusteeship are mutually constitutive. 
Humanitarianism constituted trusteeship in the colonial age. After 
decolonization, colonial trusteeship was denied. However, humanitarianism 
did not cast doubt on the legitimacy of trusteeship. Humanitarianism 
legitimizes trusteeship as ‘lesser evil’ even though it helps trustees to pursue 
their geopolitical interests. Therefore, humanitarianism cannot provide any 
standard to separate good trusteeship from bad trusteeship. The 
genealogical analysis of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship tells 
us that it is important to highlight the ideological role of humanitarianism.  
Not only the distinction of trusteeship but also the dichotomy of 
humanitarianism is also debatable. Existing works presume that there are 
two kinds of humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and 
‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ However, as Jahn (2012) observes, the 
separation of politics and morality in theory was created to legitimize 
violations of sovereign equality principle. This study shows that, in the 
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discourse on trusteeship, it is difficult to separate geopolitical interests and 
humanitarian concern. While humanitarianism redefined geopolitical 
interests, geopolitics distorted the recognition of humanitarian crisis. 
Moreover, power relations in international society have been reflected in 
humanitarian discourse even when geopolitics had no influence. Thus, 
humanitarianism is neither universal nor neutral. 
 
Power of Trusteeship and Humanitarianism 
 In addition to the co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship 
and humanitarianism, this study revealed the power of the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship. Dependent territories, developing countries, 
and post-conflict societies were excluded from the politics of trusteeship and 
humanitarianism. Those whose have documented this suffering that I have 
used for this study were mainly Western people. There was a boundary 
between observers and observed. Observers pathologized target societies 
through humanitarian discourse. Subsequently, target societies were put 
under trusteeship and thus excluded from decision making. Trustees sought 
to transform the identities of target societies through social engineering 
policies and integrate them into the power structure of trustees. When target 
societies raised rebellions against trustees, they were suppressed by armed 
force. While Bain (2003) argues that a central feature of trusteeship is 
paternalism, this study highlights other characteristics of trusteeship: 
authoritarian tendencies and the manipulation of identity. 
In the 19th century, Indian and African societies were colonized and 
deprived of their political agency. The British Empire unilaterally changed 
not only their socio-political systems but also their cultural identities. 
２４４ 
 
 
 
Colonial social engineering policies such as legislation and education aimed 
to make the Indian population docile bodies for the British Empire. Although 
Indian societies resisted colonial rule with the Mutiny of 1857, it was 
severely suppressed and interpreted as a pathology of Indian societies. Even 
through violent resistance, Indian societies could not regain their political 
agency. Similarly, in Africa, missionaries and colonial administrators sought 
to transform the nature of African societies by cultivation, Christianization, 
and civilization. African people were observed, investigated, and 
reconstituted as quasi-subjects of the British Empire. Even after the colonial 
strategy of indirect rule was adopted, colonial rule in India and Africa was 
despotic. Indian and African societies were re-organized into ‘traditional’ 
political entities.  
In the early 20th century, colonial trusteeship was internationalized. 
However, the power structure of colonial trusteeship did not change. 
Although the legitimacy of colonial and dynastic empires was challenged, 
colonial trusteeship was still supported. Even in the mandate territories that 
were supervised by the League of Nations, colonial despotic regimes were 
established and, at worst, armed force was employed to suppress local 
resistance. As in other British colonies, the mandate territories were 
administrated by colonial administrators who believed in the theology of 
indirect rule. Therefore, the socio-political systems of the mandate territories 
were reconstituted according to ‘traditional’ institutions.  
Wilsonianism and the right to self-determination undermined the 
legitimacy of colonial trusteeship after the First World War. These new 
norms finally changed the form of trusteeship in the 1960s. As stated above, 
in the post-colonial era, trusteeship has been re-constituted not to infringe 
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the right to self-determination. However, a hierarchy of international society 
has been reproduced by social engineering policies of trusteeship. The 
manipulation of identity has been allowed in international society even after 
decolonization. Development trusteeship did not recognize the political 
agency of target societies. Rather, target societies were defined as those 
whose pathological symptoms required social engineering. Their 
socio-political institutions were reformed according to the Western 
socio-political model. Their conduct was monitored and controlled. Since the 
1950s, international aid agencies have repeatedly revised their development 
theory. Developing countries have been re-pathologized each time. Donor 
agencies did not administrate target societies directly. However, as Ch. 5 
showed, development aid had the power to reform the socio-political 
institutions of target societies. Some of the target societies were not 
empowered but rather experienced a growing dependence on foreign aid. The 
hierarchy that separates trustees and target societies was reproduced.  
 Peacebuilding trusteeship demonstrated a more colonial power 
structure than development trusteeship. It aimed to reconstruct 
nation-states by recreating the socio-political institutions of target societies, 
especially the security sector. However, its long-term goal was to integrate 
post-conflict societies into the Western-centered international order. As the 
native protection movement sought to transform African people into good 
imperial citizens, peacebuilding trusteeship aimed to embed target societies 
in the Western-centered order by transforming them into liberal democratic 
states. In the late 1990s, peacebuilding trusteeship became large scale and 
peacebuilders obtained extensive authority to impose their policies on target 
societies. In such undemocratic regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship, the 
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local population could not get involved in the decision making process 
because pathologization deprived them of their political agencies. Those who 
committed ethnic cleansing were regarded as those who lacked the ability to 
manage liberal democratic systems.  
 As Brown (2004) argues, humanitarianism has been implicitly and 
explicitly linked to certain socio-political systems such as liberal democracy 
and free market economics. Humanitarianism has just sought to alleviate 
human suffering, but pathologization and prescriptions have been biased. 
When humanitarianism simply provided care for people suffering serious 
violence, it scarcely pathologizes target societies. However, when 
humanitarianism addressed the root causes of human suffering, it has been 
shaped in its particular forms of pathologization and prescription by the 
culture and socio-political system of the powerful, who are in a position to 
dispense his benefits to others. That is, humanitarianism tends to be 
political. 
In terms of sovereignty, trusteeship changed after decolonization. 
However, in terms of power structure, trusteeship did not change even after 
decolonization. The relationship between colonized and colonizers has been 
transformed into that between developing countries and donors and that 
between post-conflict societies and international peacebuilders. These 
relationships have been reproduced by the discourse of pathologization and 
prescriptions. However, I do not intend to say that trustees have always 
succeeded in the transformation of dependent territories and post-colonial 
countries. As various studies point out, development and peacebuilding 
trusteeship have hardly achieved their goals (e.g. Duffield 2007; Etzioni 
2007; Li 2007; Egnell 2011). 
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Theoretical Implications on Humanitarian Intervention, Development, and 
Peacebuilding Trusteeship 
 These results from the analysis of the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship provide several theoretical implications for 
humanitarian intervention, development, and peacebuilding. First, when we 
examine the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, we need to analyze not 
only the legitimacy of intervention but also the legitimacy of peacebuilding 
trusteeship. Many previous studies focus only on the phase of armed 
intervention in conflict societies when they examine the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention (e.g. Wheeler 2000). However, when 
humanitarianism constituted humanitarian intervention, it also tended to 
constitute peacebuilding trusteeship. The objective of humanitarian 
intervention is not only to stop serious human rights violations such as 
ethnic cleansing but also to prevent the recurrence of such human suffering. 
As this study revealed, when humanitarianism addresses the root causes of 
human suffering, social engineering is justified. The power of trusteeship is 
to transform the identity of target societies. Not only the invasion of 
sovereignty but also the manipulation of identity is an important issue for 
humanitarian intervention. Therefore, when we examine the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention, we need to analyze the subsequent 
peacebuilding trusteeship after armed intervention. 
Second, since decolonization, direct rule by trustees has been 
permitted only when it was believed that there was no other means to 
remove the root causes of human suffering. In other words, transitional 
administration is an exception of trusteeship after decolonization. After the 
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First World War, Wilsonianism undermined the legitimacy of colonial rule. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, the alleviation of poverty was employed to reestablish 
the legitimacy of trusteeship. However, in the 1960s, as dependent territories 
achieved independence from colonial empires, the direct rule of developing 
countries could no longer be justified through the discourse on poverty. 
Development trusteeship presumed that human suffering such as 
malnutrition, inadequate education, and poor standards of hygiene were not 
considered an imminent danger which required the transitional 
administration of target societies. However, even in the post-colonial period, 
direct rule of post-conflict societies by international peacebuilders has been 
conducted. Transitional administrations such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East 
Timor, were justified by serious human suffering such as mass murder and 
ethnic cleansing. This kind of human suffering has often been caused by the 
security apparatus of the state. Therefore, humanitarianism required 
international peacebuilders to deconstruct the state apparatus in 
post-conflict societies. Moreover, politicians and bureaucrats of post-conflict 
societies were also pathologized. International peacebuilders sought to 
reeducate politicians and bureaucrats and, during the reconstruction of state 
apparatus, they directly administrated post-conflict societies in their place. 
However, it is still highly controversial whether or not mass murder and 
ethnic cleansing can justify direct rule by international peacebuilders.  
 Third, while the ideas of ownership and partnership are suggested 
for the reform of development and peacebuilding trusteeship, they do not 
reduce the hierarchical divide between trustees and target societies. Since 
the 2000s, ownership and partnership have been key words to revise the 
policies of development and peacebuilding. As Ch. 5 argues, the idea of 
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partnership was suggested by colonial administrators as an alternative to 
the idea of trusteeship in the 1940s. However, this did not change the 
theology and practice of trusteeship. This study demonstrates that 
partnership in colonial trusteeship meant the creation of useful agencies for 
trustees. Ownership and partnership in new trusteeship may not empower 
target societies but foster useful collaborators for Western countries. Spivak 
(2005: 132) argues that: 
 
‘Colonialism was committed to the education of a certain class. It was 
interested in the seemingly permanent operation of an altered 
normality. Paradoxically, human rights and ‘‘development’’ work 
today cannot claim this self-empowerment that high colonialism 
could. Yet, it is some of the best products of high colonialism, 
descendants of the colonial middle class, who become human rights 
advocates in the countries of the South.’ 
 
In the early 19th century, utilitarianism argued that the British Empire 
would create the middle class in India. In the late 19th century, the British 
colonial administrators exploited indigenous ‘traditional’ authorities as their 
agents. How different are the ideas of ownership and partnership from 
colonial strategy in the 19th century?  
 
Reform or Revolution? 
This final section examines the possibility of justifying trusteeship. 
Even after the deconstruction of the relationship between trusteeship and 
humanitarianism, should we accept the legitimization of trusteeship by 
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humanitarianism? As this study revealed, humanitarianism is a source of 
the power of trusteeship. However, I do not deny humanitarianism itself 
though I accept the fact that it is neither universal nor neutral. Foucault also 
did not deny humanitarianism, but rather proposed ‘a repoliticisation of 
humanitarianism so that its relationship to sovereignty can be 
problematised’ (Campbell 1998: 519). The implications of this study are 
similar to this proposition. As long as we are human beings, compassion is a 
usual response to human suffering. If one refuses to accept any standards or 
norms, one would be a nihilist. Or, if one criticizes the dispositive of 
humanitarianism/trusteeship for oppressing someone, one implicitly adopts 
humanitarianism as his/her standard. The most important implication of 
this study is that we should recognize the potential danger of trusteeship 
and humanitarianism. Foucault stated that:  
 
‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is 
dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is 
dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position 
leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism’ (Foucault 
1984: 343). 
 
My position is similar to Foucault’s. Humanitarianism easily leads us to 
justify despotism and oppression. Therefore, we should be careful about the 
possibility that humanitarianism justifies everything as being the ‘lesser 
evil.’ Trusteeship is likely to be accompanied by the oppression of the local 
population. Moreover, it has not corrected but reproduced the unequal 
distribution of political and economic power in the world. Before accepting 
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the legitimization of trusteeship by humanitarianism, we have to reexamine 
what trusteeship has achieved. 
One of the most acute problems of trusteeship was to reproduce a 
hierarchy that divides between trustees (Western countries) and target 
societies (developing and post-conflict societies). In this structure, targets 
societies are deprived of their political agency. They are observed, 
investigated, and prescribed. If one compares this inequality with human 
suffering such as ethnic cleansing, one might choose the former as a lesser 
evil. However, I am not convinced by this narrative. The dichotomy between 
inequality (at worst, benevolent despotism) and anarchy (at worst, genocide) 
is a part of hegemonic discursive formation.  
 I do not intend to advocate revolution, but rather would like to 
suggest a reform of trusteeship. In order to deconstruct the hierarchy 
between trustees and target societies, this study makes two suggestions. 
First, before the pathologization of target societies, Western countries should 
find their own pathology. For example, in the 19th century, European 
countries bought and sold uncountable numbers of slaves in Africa. Their 
participation in the slave trade changed the nature of indigenous slave 
systems and devastated social conditions. Also, as capitalism expanded 
through the actions of missionaries, traders, and colonial administrators in 
Asia and Africa, it created new types of poverty such as unemployment by 
dissolving traditional socio-economic systems. In the late 20th century, arms 
smuggling, human trafficking, speculation in food-prices, and the 
exploitation of natural resources are conducted by Western countries. They 
have contributed to civil wars and poverty in developing countries. While 
Western countries have pathologized dependent territories and developing 
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countries, they have created a new pathology for these countries.  
Second, in development and peacebuilding trusteeship, complete 
liberal democratization of target societies would entail considerable costs. 
International aid agencies and peacebuilders have aimed to transform target 
societies into liberal democratic countries. As utilitarians argued, liberal 
democracy requires more than liberal democratic state institutions. 
Therefore, international aid agencies and peacebuilders tend to conduct 
large scale social engineering by constructing undemocratic regimes in 
target societies. However, new trusteeship does not guarantee the success of 
social engineering projects because local actors might resist these projects. In 
practice, international peacebuilders try to find a compromise with local 
actors (Ginty 2010; Veit 2011). Now, this kind of compromise is considered a 
failure of the project. Whether or not compromise with local actors is a better 
option, complete liberal democratization of post-conflict societies seems to be 
neither realistic nor justifiable in terms of morality.  
 In studies on development and peacebuilding, much jargon has been 
created, for example, the phrases ‘structural adjustment,’ ‘good governance,’ 
‘security sector reform,’ and ‘stability operations.’ While these concepts 
seemed to be new, in the history of trusteeship, they were not necessarily 
new. They presumed that the reform of socio-political institutions could 
transform the nature of target societies. This presumption was created by 
utilitarians in the 19th century. In future, even words like ‘development’ and 
‘peacebuilding’ might seem out of date, if not disappear altogether. However, 
trusteeship can hardly be abolished as long as humanitarianism exists. 
Humanitarianism will continue to constitute trusteeship, though I do not 
argue that all kinds of humanitarianism contribute to the constitution of 
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trusteeship. This study did not suggest that we be rid of the circular process 
of trusteeship development, but rather that we gradually reform the power 
structure of trusteeship. The answers of this study are neither nihilism nor 
revolution but prudence and reform.  
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